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Abstract of the Dissertation 
The Normative Significance of Volitional Empathy 
by 
 
Benjamin Leider 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy 
 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
 
Assistant Professor Jeffrey Helmreich, Chair 
 
The goal-directed efforts of other agents tend to strike us as to be helped, or at least, as 
not to be obstructed. We feel called upon in this way almost without any thought, and usually 
without consulting some general principle of morality, interest, or even courtesy, even where such 
principles may urge us along the same course. I call this general phenomenon volitional empathy, 
which I take to be the disposition to take what another agent wills as one’s own internal reason to 
will likewise—as a reason to promote, or at least not to obstruct, another agent’s goal-directed 
effort. This dissertation explores volitional empathy’s normative significance for regret, 
punishment, and trust. My first chapter seeks to show that agent regret, understood as moral self-
reproach, is rationally required, even though the agent of agent regret is not morally blameworthy 
for the regretted event. In my second chapter, I argue that punishment, when successful, induces 
belated volitional empathy in the punishment subject, and thereby prompts the punishment 
subject’s regret for the punished violation. This effect of punishment raises the prospect that 
volitional empathy might underwrite interpersonal norms by giving one agent an internal reason 
under the control of a second agent, namely, the agent whose effort underwrites the internal 
reason of the first. In my third chapter, I use this idea to explain the normativity of trust: I 
propose that the trustor’s reliance on the trustee involves the volitional empathy of the trustee for 
the trustor. The trustor can enforce this reliance by compelling either the trustee’s performance, 
or, following betrayal, by compelling him to repair the harm he caused. In both cases, the trustor 
pressures the trustee with his own internal reason, which, being his own, he cannot but take as 
motivating. The last chapter more closely considers rebukes of the betrayal of trust. Since rebukes 
 
 
viii 
 
occur after the damage of betrayal is done, it is not obvious why they are reasonable. I show that 
they are reasonable by explaining how, by inducing regret, they allow the trustor to compel the 
trustee to repair the harm he caused.   
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Introduction 
You reach for a book perched on a high shelf deep in the stacks. You brush the spine with 
your fingertips, but the book remains beyond your grasp. Just feet away, hunched over a book of 
my own, there I stand, unknown to you, unlikely to see you ever again—I’m visiting from out of 
town. For a moment, my eyes drift above my book, and I see you straining to reach one of the 
upper shelves—for you, a tragic inch too high, but not for me. Should I help you out? 
You’re in the mailroom of your apartment building, separating the bills and notices from 
the PennySaver, the catalogs, and the alumni magazines. You catch sight of a person standing 
outside the building’s glass front door just beyond the mailroom entrance. She’s a resident—a 
casual acquaintance—and she carries in each arm a large bag of groceries. Preparing to unlock the 
door, she fumbles with her keyring, heroically refusing to set the bags down. One of them starts 
to slip. She swiftly shifts to save it, but her hold on the other bag becomes more precarious. 
Please, just put down the bags, you think at her to yourself. Should you help her out? 
These are not the questions I investigate, but rather, those whose common answer I take 
for granted. And that answer is: yes, of course! Of course I should help you fetch the book from 
the high shelf. Of course you should open the door for the hapless laden resident. And of course, 
this answer assumes that other things are equal. If you’re in crutches, perhaps the reasonable 
extent of the help you render is to silently wish the best to the woman outside. If I see the edges 
of a suspicious geometric tattoo peeking out from the receding sleeve of your extended right arm, 
which turns out to be reaching for Mein Kampf in a way, now that I think about it, strangely 
reminiscent of how the Germans reached for Hitler, then such considerations might reasonably 
give me pause. 
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What I am pointing towards here is that when a goal-directed effort is salient to us, it 
tends to strike us as something to be helped along, or at least not to be interfered with. I say it 
“strikes us” this way because this normative appearance is not mediated by an inference from a 
higher principle or an ulterior motive; rather, it’s just the way that a goal-directed effort looks—
the way a volition looks, to use the term I prefer in the chapters that follow. We are just disposed 
to find the volitions of others as guiding our practical reasoning towards helping or not 
interfering. That is to say, we are disposed to treat the volitions of others as pro tanto practical 
reasons, whether or not they really are—whether or not they ought to guide our practical 
reasoning in the way they actually do. In this way, the volitions of others behave like our own 
ends. Perhaps they might even be counted among our own ends, insofar as we might acquire ends 
from different sources, and insofar as we cannot simply acquire or discard ends at a whim. I have 
therefore decided to call these reason-like things internal reasons, since they seem to fit what 
Bernard Williams describes under that name, though without committing to reasons 
internalism—or to reasons externalism, for that matter.1 
Volitional empathy is my name for this disposition to take the volitions of others as 
internal reasons of one’s own. Volitional empathy is volitional twice over: first, because it is a 
responsiveness to the volitions of others; and second, because it guides us towards having 
volitions of our own. It is empathy a broad sense—or analogous to empathy, if we wish to reserve 
that term for emotions—because in treating the volitions of others as reasons, we are prompted to 
have volitions with the same content: I take your volition to retrieve the book as an internal 
reason of my own to retrieve the book for you. Unlike pure emotional contagion, however, 
 
1 Williams 1982a. I distinguish under the name volitional reasons those internal reasons that we acquire 
from the volitions of other agents. 
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volitional empathy does not bypass our reasoning, but rather submits an input to it. After all, the 
input may be outweighed by the balance of other considerations, as I have mentioned. 
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to explore volitional empathy’s normative 
consequences. Here, by ‘normative’, I mean normative in a weak, agent-relative sense that 
internal reasons can, I hope, be uncontroversially normative: guiding of an agent’s practical 
reasoning in the non-compulsive, inferentially sensitive way that reasons ought to guide it. This 
guidance is not purely causal as it involves the following idealization: the agent deliberates in an 
instrumentally rational way with adequate relevant information—that is, in a way not liable to 
undermine her own ends. I do assume that this sense of normativity is largely predictive of agents’ 
practical reasoning, since I assume that it is possible to impute ends to most agents such that they 
are largely instrumentally rational, and since I assume that the best interpretation of their ends is 
the one most charitable in this way. 
 In my first chapter, which directly considers agent regret but speaks to regret more 
generally, volitional empathy does not explicitly arise. I do, however, make ample use of internal 
normativity to show that an agent’s own ends can make it appropriate for him to experience 
regret when he is morally blameless, and in just the same way they do when he is morally 
blameworthy. In addition, I conceive of regret as a kind of volition, and consequently, something 
that volitional empathy can prompt. Regret figures prominently in my second chapter, where I 
take advantage of its volitional character to argue that punishment, when successful, induces the 
punishment subject to feel regret by prompting his belated volitional empathy. The idea that 
punishment can, and perhaps should, induce volitional empathy, raises the possibility that 
volitional empathy can underwrite interpersonal norms. After all, if one can prompt an agent to 
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experience volitional empathy, then one can make doing what one expects of him to be “right” by 
his own lights, even against his own wishes. I develop this idea in my third chapter, where I 
propose that trust involves reliance required by the volitional empathy of the trustee for the 
trustor, and enforceable by the trustor in the much the same way that rights are: the trustor can 
demand that the trustee keep her trust, and rebuke him for breaking it, and in this way restore 
either his motivation not to betray her, or his motivation to repair the harm she suffers after his 
betrayal. This chapter focuses on how volitional empathy can underwrite the normativity of trust, 
and touches on demands and rebukes only briefly. My last chapter considers demands and 
rebukes more closely. It attends to rebukes in particular, since it is unclear why one should bother 
to rebuke someone who has already betrayed one’s trust. My answer recalls the discussion of 
regret from the second chapter, as I propose that rebukes prompt regret, while regret prompts 
repair, both of the harm the trustor suffered because her reliance was disappointed, and of the 
harm to her relationship with the trustee on account of his betrayal disconfirming her belief that 
he is trustworthy. 
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Chapter 1: Agent Regret and Practical Reason 
Suppose on a trip out of town you spot an old friend you haven’t seen in decades. You are 
positively thrilled, and in your eagerness you approach him and call out, “Jack, is that you?” 
Unfortunately, Jack over the years has developed a serious heart condition. Startled, he clutches 
his chest and collapses. Or suppose you’re an electrician working with your partner on the wiring 
in a house. She calls down to you, “I think I’ve fixed it! Turn the circuit breakers back on—I want 
to see if everything works now.” Moments later, she realizes she’s dropped a tool onto an exposed 
wire. She reaches for it just as you hit the circuit breaker switches, and is electrocuted. Or 
consider Bernard Williams’s canonical example: while driving down a street, a child darts into the 
path of your truck. Although you are driving carefully and at an appropriate speed, you run the 
child over before you can react, killing him.  
In all of these cases the agent does nothing wrong. It even seems appropriate to comfort 
the agent as if he were morally in the same position with respect to the misfortune he caused as 
would be an innocent spectator. And yet, Williams maintains, “There is something special about 
[the agent’s] relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated by the 
consideration that it was not his fault”2. Williams calls the agent’s self-reproachful attitude 
towards her special relation to what happened agent regret, and he intimates throughout his 
article that this attitude has a moral character. I wish to consider the following question: is agent 
regret, understood as self-reproach of a moral kind, in fact an appropriate response to causing 
harm through no fault of one’s own? 
 
2 1982b, 28 
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Harry Frankfurt and David Sussman do not hold that such a response is appropriate. They 
agree that a negative attitude of some kind is appropriate, but it is non-moral in character. Julie 
Tannenbaum, Jeffrey Helmreich, and Connie Rosati come down on the other side of the question, 
holding that moral self-reproach is in fact appropriate on the agent’s part. R. Jay Wallace and 
Joseph Raz disagree over whether the agent’s response is of a different kind that the spectator’s 
response; the truth of the matter will determine whether a rationalization of the agent’s response 
must also rationalize the spectator’s response. 
In this paper, I consider and critique these positions. I then develop and argue for my own 
answer: agent regret understood as moral self-reproach is appropriate because it is rationally 
required, and it is rationally required because innocent moral agents ought to reproach 
themselves in broadly the same way that guilty moral agents ought to reproach themselves. That 
is to say, innocent moral agents, like guilty moral agents, are rationally required to have past-
0riented volitions that can no longer be carried out because it is now too late to do so. 
This paper has two parts. The first discusses the positions of Harry Frankfurt, David 
Sussman, Julie Tannenbaum, Jeffrey Helmreich, Joseph Raz, R. Jay Wallace, and Connie Rosati on 
whether moral self-reproach is appropriate for an innocent agent who brings about harm. I invite 
readers mainly interested in my positive account to skip to the second part of this paper, 
beginning on page 30. This part consists of the last three sections, beginning with section seven, 
where I lay out certain preliminary assumptions of mine about the nature of instrumental 
rationality. In section eight I distinguish temporal features of volitions that allow regret to be a 
volitional phenomenon despite being a past-oriented attitude. I bring everything together in 
section nine, where given the volitional coherence principle discussed in section seven and the 
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temporal features of volitions discussed in section eight, I conclude that it is in fact appropriate—
even rationally required—for an innocent agent to experience moral self-reproach. 
Part 1: The Agent Regret Literature 
I. Frankfurt 
For Harry Frankfurt, when an agent is innocent, it cannot be appropriate for him to 
experience agent regret understood as moral self-reproach. Like Williams and the other authors I 
consider, Frankfurt accepts that an agent’s negative reaction will normally follow blamelessly 
causing harm. He concludes that it is in fact appropriate for the blameless agent to reproach 
himself, though only in a non-moral way. Frankfurt characterizes this non-moral species of self-
reproach as embarrassment for “having failed,” for being “deficient.”3  Embarrassment 
appropriately intensifies by degrees into shame and eventually horror in proportion to the severity 
of the action’s consequences. It may even be appropriate for the agent to think of himself as a 
“poisonous creature, who cannot avoid doing dreadful harm,” and even to conclude “that the 
world would be better off without him,” while at the same time “acknowledging no moral 
responsibility at all for being so toxic,” as that acknowledgement would not be appropriate.4 
There is much to be said for Frankfurt’s account. It takes seriously the fact that people 
reproach themselves for causing harm even if they consider themselves morally innocent. In 
addition, it plausibly distinguishes self-reproach—the negative attitude of the agent—from the 
negative attitude of spectators: although spectators may find the outcome of the agent’s action 
 
3 Frankfurt 2008, 10–11 
4 Frankfurt 2008, 13 
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unfortunate, they will not attribute that outcome to their own “deficiency or an inadequacy,” and 
will have no reason to reproach the agent for his, either 5. 6  
Although I won’t dispute the claim that agent regret concerns deficiency or failure, I’m not 
convinced that embarrassment or shame for this deficiency is the most complete or accurate way 
to characterize the feeling occasioned by blamelessly harming another person. For one, 
embarrassment can be understood rather light-heartedly, as when someone stumbles or drops 
something. Frankfurt has foreseen this worry. He answers:  
Perhaps it may seem that embarrassment is not a sufficiently penetrating or 
portentous emotion to be suitable as a response to having killed someone or 
having caused someone to die. It may strike us as too shallow to reflect at all 
adequately a person’s recognition that he has brought about an immeasurable and 
irreparable harm. In fact, however, a feeling of embarrassment may be both deep 
and shattering. It need not be shallow or inconsequential. After all, embarrassment 
is closely related to shame; and feelings of shame may be quite devastating.7 
I reply, in turn, that the problem with characterizing agent regret as ‘embarrassment’ is 
not the intensity, magnitude, or severity of embarrassment as a mental state, but rather: (1) that 
embarrassment and agent regret are about different things, and (2) that embarrassment and agent 
regret are phenomenally distinct—they simply feel different. We can discover both differences 
using Frankfurt’s own examples: we may see how (1) bears out by considering his example of 
“trivial” embarrassment, and we may see how (2) bears out by considering his example of severe 
embarrassment. 
 
5 Frankfurt 2008, 12 
6 Unless he could have intervened, in which case he might also experience self-reproach to some degree.   
7 Frankfurt 2008, 10 
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First let us consider Frankfurt’s “trivial” example: 
To take a trivial example… [the feelings of embarrassment] may be the very 
feelings that would be expected of someone who, in the midst of a formal dinner 
party, emits a loud and grossly offensive belch. Perhaps he really could not help 
himself. Let us assume, at any rate, that the belch was not voluntary, and that it 
was truly uncontrollable…. Nevertheless, he will quite naturally—and indeed, quite 
appropriately—chastise himself; and he will chastise himself precisely for having 
failed to notice that it was coming, and for having failed to suppress it.8 
But now suppose that the moment before the belch escapes him, a waiter drops a large tray of 
glasses filled with champagne. There is a spectacular crash as the glasses explode against marble 
floor, diverting the attention of the other guests and completely concealing the belch. It will still 
be the case that our now-fortunate guest failed to notice his belch coming, and it will still be the 
case that he failed to suppress it. And yet he will not be embarrassed but relieved. This is because 
he would not be embarrassed that he belched at a formal dinner party, but that the other guests—
the president of the country club, the senator, the boss, and the woman he was chatting up—all saw 
him belch at a formal dinner party. Paradigmatic of embarrassment is that it concerns other people 
finding out. True agent regret, however, cannot be defeated in this way: the truck driver will be 
riven with guilt-like feelings of self-reproach even if the street was entirely deserted but for the 
child, whose lifeless body rolls into an open manhole and washes out into the middle of the 
ocean, never to be discovered. This indefeasibility is not a result of the severity of the harm in the 
truck driver example, either. Suppose I slip on ice outside of an opening door and use it to catch 
myself, at the same time forcing it closed and—unbeknownst to me—painfully tweaking the hand 
 
8 Frankfurt 2008, 10–11 
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of the person trying to exit. There are no witnesses. I discover later that this person was injured by 
my action and that she blamed the wind, which was really gusting that day. It is quite plausible 
that I reproach myself, and yet if I do, it will not be on account of people finding out, as in this 
case they don’t. 
Now let’s consider Frankfurt’s example of severe embarrassment: 
Let us suppose… that a person is the carrier of a highly contagious and dreadful 
disease. Mere proximity to this person, even without any more intimate contact, is 
sufficient to lead to infection with a severely debilitating and often fatal illness. Let 
us say, moreover, that this person came to be a carrier of the disease through no 
fault of his or her own. It was entirely inadvertent that the person became a 
terrible threat to everyone around. It was just a matter of bad luck that the world 
became worse because of this particular person’s misfortune in acquiring the 
uncontrollable tendency to spread illness and death.9 
I grant that the agent will in this case feel terrible even if we stipulate that no one discovers his 
role in the spreading of his illness. But this is not obviously an example of embarrassment at all, 
severe or otherwise. If anything, this is an example of blamelessly inflicted harm, much like the 
harm blamelessly inflicted by Williams’s truck driver. For that reason, it merely raises the 
question of whether agent regret is really embarrassment, rather than showing it to be so. 
Contrast this with a more obvious and central case of severe embarrassment. Suppose one is using 
PowerPoint slides to deliver a talk on a dry subject to a packed lecture hall. One advances to the 
next slide, only to discover that it has been replaced with a salacious photograph of one engaged 
in sexual relations with one’s spouse. I submit that one would find oneself severely embarrassed. I 
 
9 Frankfurt 2008, 13 
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submit further that one would be embarrassed before it even occurred to one how the photograph 
got into the slideshow, or how it was taken (we’ll stipulate that one doesn’t arrange for such 
photographs), or whether one was negligent in not inspecting the marital bedroom for hidden 
cameras, or anything else at all that might be the content of self-reproach. I submit, finally, that in 
this surely conceptually central case of severe embarrassment, the horror one experiences at the 
moment of exposure would feel very different from the horror one might experience upon 
learning that one is a highly infectious carrier of some dreadful disease. 
Frankfurt is driven to his view because he reasons that only being guilty can make moral 
self-reproach appropriate. Therefore, without guilt, something other than moral self-reproach—
such as embarrassment—must be appropriate. The trouble Frankfurt has with cashing out this 
alternative suggests that Williams may be right about the moral character of innocently causing 
harm, a character that feeling terrible and feeling embarrassed do not acknowledge, much less 
explain.  
II. Sussman 
Sussman agrees with Frankfurt that agent regret is appropriate but non-moral. It is 
appropriate for Sussman because it is rational, and it is rational because it consists in part of 
desiring to make “amends” to a person one has blamelessly harmed while sharing with her a 
temporary “moral state of nature” where each person is morally entitled to kill the other.10 
Sussman asks us to consider the following case, somewhat altered from Williams’s example: 
In place of the child, consider instead an adult pedestrian blown into the path of a 
truck by a freak gust of wind and badly injured (rather than killed) by that truck. I 
 
10 Sussman 2018, 792, 804–5 
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assume that, like the truck driver, the pedestrian is without fault; she’s sober, 
watching where she’s walking, wearing sensible shoes, and so on. What’s 
important to see here is that as he careens toward this unlucky person, the truck 
driver comes to stand toward her as a kind of innocent threat.11 
In an example reminiscent of Judith Thomson, and with the same conclusion, Sussman asserts 
that the pedestrian would be morally entitled to use her disintegrator gun to obliterate the 
oncoming truck along with its driver whom she correctly believes to be innocent. But as a 
consequence, “as the pedestrian raises her disintegrator to vaporize the approaching truck, so too 
may the truck driver draw his own disintegrator in an effort to preempt her attempts at what he 
knows to be completely justified self-defense.”12 As it happens, neither the pedestrian nor the 
driver are packing heat that day, and fortunately, the pedestrian is not killed but only injured. 
While better than the outcomes in which either party is killed, there is now an awkwardness, to 
say the least, between the truck driver and the injured pedestrian.  
Sussman feels a need in this case for the truck driver to issue a “quasi-apology,” where 
quasi-apologies, or at least the disposition to make them, is a component of agent regret. A quasi-
apology is a kind of fictional apology—an apology in form, but under the mutually understood 
false pretense that the truck driver is blameworthy and that the pedestrian is morally free to reject 
it and consequently to decline to associate with him. Sussman compares this exchange with 
“fighting” with his wealthier father over the privilege of paying a restaurant bill—a privilege that 
his father always “wins.” Both Sussman and his father understand that the latter should pay, as he 
is richer, but also that if he does not, then Sussman should not protest, having himself demanded 
 
11 2018, 802 
12 2018, 803 
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to pay. As in Sussman’s ritual with his father, both the truck driver and the pedestrian understand 
that the truck driver is not at fault and that the pedestrian should “forgive” him—that is, “quasi-
forgive” him—but if she declines, then the truck driver should not protest. 
Sussman variously describes the purpose of these quasi-actions as effecting a “joint 
affirmation” of the cessation of the moral state of nature “by which their return to a way of living 
together is acknowledge and ratified”; as facilitating a “return to something like the space of social 
possibilities that existed before the conflict”; and as meeting a “need to recognize that we have 
done (blameless) wrongs” and “to disown those wrongs while nevertheless recognizing them as 
blameless,” for “after such a crisis, these people cannot just go on as they had before.”13 The idea 
seems to be that there is a social relationship, or at least the potential for one, that is damaged 
when agents enter and emerge from a moral state of nature, even though everyone emerges with 
morally clean hands. 
Sussman here uncovers a fascinating phenomenon by drawing attention to the strange 
normative position of the driver vis-à-vis the pedestrian. On the one hand, by quasi-apologizing, 
the truck driver affirms the pedestrian’s privilege14 to resume or not the social status quo ante. On 
the other hand, by expecting to be quasi-forgiven (precisely as someone who actually apologizes 
cannot expect), the driver presupposes a claim15 against the pedestrian failing to resume the status 
quo ante, which is precisely to reject the pedestrian’s privilege to resume the status quo ante or 
not. This normative contradiction can be resolved by distinguishing two logically independent 
 
13 2018, 804–5 
14 Strictly speaking, this is probably a higher-order privilege—an Hohfeldian power—to resume or not the 
claims and duties constituting the social relationship in the status quo ante.  
15 Strictly, an Hohfeldian immunity. 
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kinds of normative relations: moral relations and nonmoral social relations, such as social 
relations conceived in terms of Margaret Gilbert’s theory of joint commitment.  
On such an understanding, in virtue of being morally blameless, the truck driver has a 
moral claim against the pedestrian declining to resume the social status quo ante. But as the truck 
bore down upon the pedestrian, both people—had they a moment to reflect on this—would 
recognize the pedestrian’s privilege to kill the truck driver in order to save herself. This 
recognition arguably constitutes a mutual abrogation—a “joint rescission,” in Gilbert’s terms—of 
the nonmoral claims and duties following from the joint actions, joint beliefs, joint decisions, and 
other collective intentionality phenomena that constitute the social relationship between the 
truck driver and the pedestrian.16 These claims and duties, according to Gilbert, are those that are 
necessary for people doing things together to mutually conform to their shared ends 17. Needless 
to say, refraining from killing each other is necessary for virtually all18 shared ends, and thus 
constitutes a nonmoral duty (independent of any similar moral duties) owed by each participant 
to the others. This very duty is what the pedestrian and the driver jointly rescind. The social 
relationships constituted by the shared ends depending on that duty are therefore suspended 
until they are restored by a process of “joint commitment” of their participants to resume them.19 
And indeed, by a convergence of language reflecting perhaps a similar convergence in thought, 
 
16 2018, 165, 192–93 
17 2018, 169 
18 But not quite all, e.g., Josephus’s suicide pact with the other zealots to be carried out by mutual execution. 
19 That is to say, the participants create claims and correlative duties upon each other constraining them to 
φ as a body (that is, to “emulate, by virtue of their several actions… a single non-collective body” in φ-ing) 
2015a, 119. 
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Sussman speaks of a need after the crisis for a “joint affirmation by which their return to a way of 
living together is acknowledged and ratified.”20 
Sussman’s account is most illuminating where it discusses the peculiar normative 
situation of the agent vis-à-vis the victim. It rationalizes agent regret as the attitude that prompts 
the agent to recognize this situation, but as we shall also see when discussing Tannenbaum, it 
fares less well in rationalizing agent regret’s affective character. Unlike Tannenbaum, who 
explicitly brackets agent regret’s affective character, Sussman seems to assume this explanatory 
burden when he criticizes Williams for observing without explaining the remorse-like character of 
agent regret (791-2). But it is not clear why the truck driver’s restoration of normal social life with 
the pedestrian must have the affective valence of an apology, or, for that matter, why it must have 
the form of an apology at all, rather than the form of a frank conversation about the normative 
facts on the ground (whether there is fault, whether there is harm, and whether the pedestrian 
wishes to go on as before). At the very least, the necessity of the pretense of apology, rather than a 
frank conversation, is no clearer than the necessity of the pretense of fighting over the dinner 
check with one’s father rather than gratefully and humbly accepting the meal. 
Finally, Sussman's account doesn't explain why agent regret is appropriate when quasi-
forgiveness is impossible. Recall that Sussman changes Williams's example so that the person hit 
by the truck is an adult blown into the street by the wind, and who is badly injured but not killed. 
Sussman wishes to bracket “concerns that depend on the special moral status of children” and 
also, presumably, to silence any suspicion that the adult pedestrian might herself be at fault.21 But 
 
20 2018, 805 
21 Sussman 2018, 802 
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altering the example to preserve the pedestrian's life betrays a lack of generality in Sussman's 
rationalization of agent regret. Suppose that the pedestrian had been a vagrant with no friends, 
co-workers, or living relations—in short, someone who would not be missed, at least not by 
anyone other than her killer. The driver cannot seek quasi-forgiveness from someone who no 
longer exists, nor from any people who might quasi-forgive him on the vagrant’s behalf, or on 
their own behalf as people—such as a friends or relatives—who are themselves indirectly harmed. 
In this case, it is impossible to restore normal social life with the victim or with anyone else by 
quasi-apology, and yet this is far from a peripheral case of agent regret. Indeed, in Williams’s 
original example the victim is killed. If the rationality of agent regret depends on the rationality of 
restoring normal social life, then Sussman does not explain the rationality of agent regret in the 
paradigmatic case of the phenomenon. 
III. Tannenbaum 
Perhaps Frankfurt feels that only moral blameworthiness can make moral self-reproach 
appropriate because he assumes a representational view of the appropriateness of a state like 
moral self-reproach, a view of the sort advanced by Julie Tannenbaum. On this view, moral self-
reproach for an action is appropriate insofar as the self-reproachful attitude somehow correctly 
represents to oneself the action’s wrongness. Given this representational story, one must hold 
either that moral self-reproach is inappropriate because the agent clearly isn’t morally 
blameworthy; or that moral self-reproach is appropriate because the agent really is morally 
blameworthy, where the appearance to the contrary is explained away. If Frankfurt in fact relies 
on such a representational view, he has opted for the first alternative. Tannenbaum, as we shall 
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see, opts for the second. Part of my proposal is that, at least as far as agent regret is concerned, the 
representational view is mistaken. 
In “Emotional expressions of moral value,” Tannenbaum examines agent regret in 
Williams’s paradigmatic case of the truck driver. She takes this instance of agent regret to be a 
“moral feeling”—in this case, a feeling associated with a special negative moral self-evaluation for 
an action. Since the feeling is associated with the negative moral evaluation, Tannenbaum thinks 
that it is rational insofar as the evaluation “correctly represents the world.”22 A negative moral 
evaluation correctly represents the world, in turn, when the action evaluated satisfies at least one 
of the three following conditions: 
(1) The action is not chosen for a morally valuable end. 
(2) The action does not realize the agent's end or sub-ends. 
(3) The agent is acting for the wrong end. 
Failing to satisfy (1) or (3) justifies the evaluation that the agent violated his obligations. 
Failing to satisfy (2) justifies the evaluation that the agent failed to realize his moral ends or 
associated sub-ends, such as not killing children. It is this latter evaluation that Tannenbaum 
associates with agent regret.23 
Tannenbaum’s argument offers a valuable interpretation of the action in examples like 
Williams’s, an interpretation that contributes to rationalizing both the negative moral self-
evaluation on the agent’s part, and the judgment of the agent’s blamelessness on the part of 
everyone else. And in fairness to Tannenbaum, this is the precisely the declared goal of her 
 
22 Tannenbaum 2007, 44 
23 2007, 45 
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paper—to show that agent regret meets a “necessary condition for being rational” because “the 
negative moral evaluation associated with agent-regret correctly represents the action as morally 
inadequate.”24 In a footnote to the quoted text, however, Tannenbaum seems to formulate her 
goal in stronger terms, ironically by way of a disclaimer: “In this paper,” she writes, “I do not argue 
for or against the claim that the driver’s feelings are rationally (or morally) required, but rather 
that they are justified. If a feeling is required, then lacking the feeling would be unjustified.”25  
If we are to understand that her goal is merely to show that there is a way in which agent 
regret is not unjustified, or that there is a feature of agent regret (say, the representational 
accuracy of its thought content) that contributes to its justification, then we may without further 
ado look beyond her account as we investigate how agent regret is positively justified. On the 
other hand, if we understand Tannenbaum as also seeking to establish positive justification of 
agent regret, then her argument, I suggest, fails to account for the guilt-like feeling that Williams 
first observed in his case of the truck driver. Recall that the goal in the present paper is to justify 
the specific experience of agent regret when it is inappropriate for anyone to blame the agent but 
himself. What is missing from Tannenbaum’s story is an account of why it is agent regret that is 
justified instead of some other feeling associated with the relevant negative moral self-evaluation. 
Her argument, in other words, would justify too much: it would show not only that agent 
regret is justified, but that any feeling is justified if it happens to be associated with an accurate 
negative moral self-evaluation, whether that feeling is the guilt-like self-reproach of agent regret or 
not. Perhaps one associates with negative moral self-evaluation the feeling of equanimity, or 
 
24 2007, 44–45 
25 2007, 45n9 
 
 
19 
 
 
cynical resignation, or even glee, where some possibilities are surely less justified than others. So 
long as this feeling is associated with the negative moral evaluation she describes, and so long as 
the evaluation itself “correctly represents the world,” or in this case the action, the feeling counts 
as justified. These two conditions, however, seem quite insufficient for rationality because agent 
regret is not just its thought content but also an experience with phenomenally distinct affect: it 
feels a certain way. A state involving Tannenbaum’s evaluative thought content but accompanied 
by glee would not only not be agent regret, it wouldn't be rational. And lest we be tempted to 
deny the very possibility that thought content can be associated with incongruous affect, John 
Deigh has offered the counterexample of irrational fear, which can exist without the appropriate 
evaluative judgment—the judgment that the fear object is a “potential source or agent of some 
bad effect,” as in phobic episodes (e.g., involving a garter snake one knows to be harmless) and 
instinctive reactions (e.g., to loud noises).26  
IV. Helmreich 
Unlike Tannenbaum, Helmreich holds that it may indeed be appropriate for an agent to 
have a self-critical reaction to causing harm even if she is unequivocally blameless. “[H]arming 
someone in any way,” he writes, “including legally and morally innocent ways, merits a self-
critical stance.”  His argument is thus:  
(i) “Moral agents are deeply invested in not harming others.”27 
(ii) “Investment against harm grounds self-criticism” should they harm 
others.28 
 
26 Deigh 1994, 836–37 
27 Helmreich 2011, 585 
28 2011, 586 
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(iii) Therefore, moral agents are grounded in their self-criticism should they 
harm others. 
Helmreich justifies (ii), that “investment against harm grounds self-criticism,”29 by 
observing that when agents are invested in a goal, they take a self-critical stance towards 
accidentally subverting it. In addition, the intensity of self-criticism scales with the degree of 
investment. To use Helmreich’s example, one would surely take a highly self-critical stance 
towards accidentally destroying a house one was building. This stance is a self-critical one (as 
opposed to a stance of some other kind, presumably) because self-criticism is simply how people 
experience the “tension between what one actually did and what one was deeply invested in 
doing.”30 
Helmreich may be saying one of two things here: (a) that a self-critical orientation 
towards failure is a universal response of agents, or (b) that a self-critical orientation towards 
failure is a common response of agents. In fairness to Helmreich, (b) is enough to settle the titular 
question of his article, “Does sorry incriminate.” For regardless of whether it is rational to do so, if 
people are prone to apologize even when conscious of their own innocence, then apologies do not 
reliably correlate with wrongdoing, and therefore do not incriminate any more than polygraphs 
do. That said, Helmreich is clearly reaching for something more ambitious than (b)—after all, he 
writes that the innocent harm “merits” a self-critical stance—but his argument does not support 
(a). People no doubt tend to be self-critically oriented towards failure, and if I were to observe 
someone apparently indifferent to it, then I would likely suspect the person’s commitment to 
succeeding. But it also seems possible that my suspicion is mistaken. Helmreich allows as much 
 
29 2011, 586 
30 2011, 586–87 
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by granting the conceptual coherence of a “legalistic moral agent” who somehow fulfills her 
obligations without the sort of investment that produces a self-critical stance towards failure, but 
he doubts that legalistic agents would tend to fulfill their moral obligations successfully.31  
This doubt assumes that investment, and thus the self-critical stance it entails, contributes 
to success. However, a case suggested by Helmreich’s own example involving competitive sports 
may argue otherwise. While it is common to assume a self-critical stance towards, say, missing the 
basket when shooting a basketball, this stance can interfere both with one’s subsequent ability to 
play and with one’s ability to have made the failed shot to begin with. For the stance of self-
criticism is experienced not only subsequent but also prior to the attempt, when it takes the form 
of performance anxiety. Moderating this stance for the sake of performing well is especially 
critical when the stakes are high—when one’s investment is great—and no stakes are higher than 
moral stakes. Like athletes who take their minds of winning, moral agents may even divest 
themselves of the very goals they seek to promote to the extent that investment interferes with 
success, even if the optimal level of investment underrepresents the moral urgency of the goals in 
question. 
V. Raz and Wallace 
An undisputed feature of agent regret is what Joseph Raz calls its “self-reflexive” character. 
That is to say, agent regret is a de se attitude: x regrets that x φ’d, where the identity of the 
referents of the first and second occurrences of ‘x’ is known to x and is necessary for regret of this 
kind. For example, Oedipus’s initial regret that someone killed the previous king of Thebes is not 
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agent regret, even though it will turn out that he is the person in question. But after discovering 
the identity of the perpetrator, his regret that he killed the previous king of Thebes—he rather 
than someone else—is agent regret. The identity of the regret subject with the subject of the 
regret’s content is significant for Raz because it makes the attitude “particularly poignant due to 
its being, in part, about the person one is or was, as manifested on that occasion.” Raz elaborates 
that “it is poignant in being, not regret that there is such a person, but that I am such a person.”32 
I mention Raz’s discussion of self-reflexivity because my rationalization of regret concerns 
agent regret only, as opposed to non-self-reflexive “spectator regret” of the sort an uninvolved 
witness might experience upon seeing the truck driver kill the child. As we shall see, my argument 
derives the rationality of agent regret from agent-relative reasons following from instrumental 
rationality. This avenue of justification is not open to spectator regret. Consequently, it matters to 
my account that agent regret is not merely a case of spectator regret, pace R. Jay Wallace, who 
undermines the strategy Raz uses to distinguish agent and spectator regret from each other. 
Wallace writes: 
The uninvolved observer or third party, after all, can perfectly well appreciate that 
the unfortunate event occurred, and also that it is unfortunate…. So what 
proprietary form of conscious awareness might be taken to be available only to the 
agent? Is it just the indexical thought that it was my agency that gave rise to the 
unfortunate event? It is true that an emotional reaction that constitutively 
involved an indexical thought of this kind would not even be available to those 
who were not themselves caught up as agents in the regrettable events…. But it 
isn’t obvious that emotions of retrospective assessment that involve such indexical 
thoughts really constitute an interesting natural kind of psychological 
 
32 Raz 2012, 141 
 
 
23 
 
 
phenomenon. Nor is it clear why it should be important to insist that agents such 
as the lorry driver rightly feel emotions of this kind…. What exactly would be 
deficient in the attitudes of a lorry driver who felt profound and persistent regret 
about the fact that the child died, but only of an impersonal kind that was not tied 
constitutively to the thought that the death resulted from his agency in 
particular?33 
Raz can cash out the “indexical thought” that it was I who did such and such as the 
thought that I am the sort of person who does such and such. But this analysis does not 
distinguish agent regret from third-party attitudes: a mother disappointed in her son might well 
regret that he is the sort of person who does such and such. 
I must therefore agree with Wallace that there is little promise in strategies like Raz’s for 
distinguishing agent from spectator regret. But there is another way of establishing the 
distinctness of agent regret, a way following from a feature of agent regret—or rather of what 
Wallace considers regret in general—as recognized by Wallace himself. He observes that all regret 
involves an “orectic attitude” not supplied by a mere evaluative judgment, such as the judgment 
that things should have been otherwise. Wallace initially describes this attitude as being supplied 
by a “wish” or “preference” that things were otherwise, over and above a mere evaluative 
judgment that they should have been otherwise.34 But Wallace seems to be reaching for 
something stronger than wishing or preferring, as he describes regret as closely analogous to 
intention, and specifically distinguishes “desires, construed as attraction or repulsion, and 
intentions,” where one can desire something without actually intending it. Furthermore, 
“[i]ntentions represent commitments of the kind that bring practical deliberation to a provisional 
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conclusion, whereas desires are states that precede deliberation and provide a potential for 
choice.”35 
I gather, then, that by ‘orectic attitude’, Wallace means a sort of striving stronger than 
mere desire—strong enough to issue in action if only there were an opportunity, as there often is 
in the case of garden-variety intentions. I entirely agree that regret has this conative character, as 
I will call it, and I am very sympathetic to the analogy with intention. My own account will 
assimilate regret to a species of volition, where I say ‘volition’ in part36 to avoid the theoretical 
commitments of the term ‘intention’.  
The close analogy of regret with intention is important to Wallace because it allows regret 
to have intention’s orectic character. Indeed, Wallace seems inclined to consider regret a species 
of intention but for the fact that regrets are about the unchangeable past, while “intentions 
typically take as their objects prospective actions that represent real options for the agent at the 
time when they are formed.”37 But if regret and intention are really so similar—if they are really 
different only in respect of the “reality” of their objects as options for the agent—then as I shall 
presently show, it is difficult to resist the consequence that this account of regret in general is in 
fact an account of agent regret. As for spectator regret, it must be something fundamentally 
different, perhaps in being desire-like rather than intention-like, since Wallace’s analysis seems to 
exclude it. 
 
35 2017, 55 
36 This is not my only motive for choosing the term ‘volition’, however. ‘Volition’ is more native to 
psychological discourse while ‘intention’ is more native to practical reasoning discourse. I will argue that 
regret is a volition about the past, which, while strange-sounding, is less paradoxical than an intention 
about the past. That is to say, while there is certainly nothing to be done about the past, perhaps there is yet 
something to be willed about it. 
37 2017, 56 
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The reason Wallace’s account of regret in general is in fact an account of agent regret is 
that there is reason to think that intentions are always self-reflexive. Consider how the locutions 
for intention statements nearly always follow the word ‘intend’ or ‘intention’ with an infinite 
clause. For instance, I intend to convince you that Wallace is mistaken. I hope it is your intention 
to hear me out on this matter. This self-reflexivity is more explicit when we restate these 
intentions in terms of that clauses: I intend that I will convince you that Wallace is mistaken. You 
intend that you will hear me out on this matter. While clumsy, these constructions reveal the 
subject of the content of the intention to be the very person to whom the intention itself 
belongs—they reveal that these intentions are self-reflexive.  
Gilbert Harman has argued that all intentions are self-referential in a way that makes 
them self-reflexive: intending to φ is always intending to φ by that very intention to φ. This feature 
of intention is necessary, for among other reasons, for the right actions to count as intentional as 
opposed to unintentional actions—intentional actions being those that result non-deviantly from 
their agents’ intentions. To adapt Harman’s example, if Mabel could merely intend that Ted be 
killed (rather than intending that because of that very intention, she kill Ted), then it would be 
difficult to make sense of how she kills him unintentionally when she accidentally runs him over 
while driving to his house.38 Against this point, Luca Ferrero claims that a further argument is 
needed to show that an intended state of affairs (the object of an intention that, to use a 
construction grammatically permitting non-reflexive intentions) must be the intention subject’s 
own action.39 But it is hard to see how an intended state of affairs could possibly result non-
deviantly from one’s intention without it being true that one saw to it that the state of affairs 
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obtains: there is something paradoxical about the following conjunction: I intended that φ, φ 
results non-deviantly from my intention, but I did not see to it that φ. 
VI. Rosati 
In spite of the disagreement voiced above, I am very sympathetic to Wallace’s analogizing 
of regret with intention, an analogy I will echo in my own account by considering regret to be a 
species of volition. I am also sympathetic to Connie Rosati’s account of the how the cognitive (as 
opposed to the affective) component of nonmoral agent regret can be “well-grounded”—that is, 
how the “normative assessments it involves are true or warranted.”40 Rosati’s account is shaped by 
the intuition that “a good life is a life without cause for regret”—which she takes to mean that 
regrets are somehow grounded by reference to a conception of the good.41 Her account is also 
shaped by her position that one’s good can change over time. She derives this position from the 
fact that regrets are subject to reevaluation, rather than forever striking us as irretrievable errors 
that permanently reduce the value of our lives.42 
Rosati introduces the notion of an effective conception of the good, which we individually 
develop for ourselves in order to organize our desires into a “coherent, stable, and attractive set of 
aims” that suit our changing “abilities, temperaments, and interests.” Effective conceptions of the 
good must also “suit us as autonomous agents—creatures who engage in self-reflection, who care 
what we are like and how we are motivated, who seek to define ourselves by what we choose.”43 
 
40 Rosati 2007, 232–33 
41 2007, 234 
42 2007, 234–35 
43 2007, 251–52 
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Rosati distinguishes three kinds of regret, two of which are well-grounded by reference, in 
different ways, to one’s effective conception of the good.  
The first and most straightforward kind of well-grounded regret is a response to what we 
might call mistakes—choices that fail to satisfy one’s effective conception of the good construed 
as “correctness conditions” for choosing. Sometimes, however, conceptions of the good are not 
effective because, for instance, they involve “aims that are, as a practical matter incompatible, or 
aims that will continually lead to disappointment.”44 A second kind of regret, which we might call 
anomic regret, can be well-grounded as a response to this situation. Finally, Rosati writes of well-
grounded “choice regret,” which concerns “having to choose and to lose an option we regard as 
desirable, and such regret involves no sense that we have chosen mistakenly all things 
considered.”45 The thought here seems to be that choice regret is well-grounded because it is the 
way the regret subject appreciates the opportunity cost of her choices, including the opportunity 
cost of choices that are correct according to her effective conception of the good. 
I am not certain that choice regret is really regret rather than some other attitude, as it is 
not obvious to me that the necessity of choosing between desirable ends, or of lacking a basis for 
correct choice, are possible contents of a regret attitude. Granted, a lifeguard who saves as many 
people as she could from a large drowning group might naturally say, “I regret not saving 
everyone.” But ‘regret’ in this case seems to refer to a distinct attitude—a wish, perhaps, that 
saving everyone had been possible. For it is intuitive to conclude that people do not really regret 
actions that they would repeat, and endorse repeating, in relevantly similar contexts. Assuming 
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that the lifeguard would again seek to save only as many people as she safely could, even short of 
everyone, then in a sense—the sense I am interested in discussing—she does not regret not saving 
everyone. Now Rosati may simply be discussing a broader concept of regret than I am, in which 
case I only observe that I wish to confine my attention to the narrower idea. 
Perhaps anomic regret is in fact regret, but if it is distinct from mistake regret, I am not 
sure how. Presumably, it is not merely mistake regret given a conception of the good that is 
ineffective on account of producing jointly unsatisfiable correctness conditions for choice. While 
such a rationally incoherent conception of the good would have the tragic consequence of 
inevitable mistake regret, conceptions of the good can be ineffective in other ways, too: they can 
fail to suit an agent’s current “abilities, temperaments, and interests,” or fail to be chosen or 
endorsed by the agent, and thus fail to suit the agent’s autonomy. Conceivably, we might impute 
to all agents a higher-order desire that their desires be organized in a way that suits them (or suits 
them in a rationally coherent way)—a higher-order desire, in other words, to have an effective 
lower-order conception of the good. Consequently, all possible effective conceptions of the good 
(where we now speak generally of conceptions comprehending desires of every order) include this 
desire. Well-grounded anomic regret then turns out to be mistake regret well-grounded on any 
conception of the good effective for a given agent. The obvious alternative, of construing anomic 
regret as basically distinct from mistake regret, returns us to the question of how it can be well-
grounded—of what distinguishes anomic regret that is well-grounded from anomic regret that 
isn’t. It would not be enough to simply reply that anomic regret is well-grounded when it is 
occasioned by the absence of an effective conception of the good, since it seems perfectly 
reasonable to ask whether one should regret not knowing what one wants. 
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Most compelling is Rosati’s account of the well-groundedness of mistake regret. Mistake 
regret seems to be regret in the way choice regret does not, as it makes sense to think of mistakes, 
rather than inevitable opportunity costs, as things that could have been otherwise. In addition, we 
can clearly determine when it is well-grounded, namely, when it concerns a choice that 
undermined one’s effective conception of the good. This is unlike anomic regret, whose well-
groundedness conditions are mysterious unless anomic regret is really a species or extension of 
mistake regret.  
My own attempt to rationalize agent regret is similar in several ways to Rosati’s account of 
mistake regret’s well-groundedness. I will presently rationalize agent regret using a principle of 
instrumental rationality. Like an effective conception of the good, instrumental rationality 
rationalizes choices—and is therefore grounds for criticizing them—in agent-relative terms. 
While the norm of instrumental rationality I appeal to is minimal, it can be enriched by other 
structural constraints on practical reasoning, also in the spirit of rational coherence, in order to 
achieve the organization of ends constitutive of effective conceptions of the good.46 As noted 
earlier, Rosati seeks only to explain how the judgments that regret involves can be well-grounded. 
She distinguishes from this task the question of regret’s “appropriateness,” that is, the question of 
whether it is rational to experience regret’s affective component.47 I would like to go beyond 
Rosati to offer a unified account that rationalizes both components. 
 
46 I have in mind instrumental principles for weighting or time-ordering of ends, as mentioned by Williams 
in “Internal and External Reasons” (104). Speaking of internal reasons, instrumental principles combined 
with reasons internalism, applied retrospectively to evaluate choices, yields a justificatory account of regret 
similar to Rosati’s account involving the retrospective evaluation of choices against an effective conception 
of the good suited to the agent. 
47 Rosati 2007, 232 
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 Part 2: The Practical Reason Account of Agent Regret 
VII. Instrumental Rationality Preliminaries 
The Volitional Coherence Principle 
An agent can be instrumentally coherent or incoherent with respect to her volitions. For 
instance, she is incoherent in this way if she wills two mutually exclusive ends. Among the many 
considerations doubtless bearing on an agent’s volitional coherence, I call attention to one that 
concerns the relationship between means and ends. I will call this, simply, the volitional coherence 
principle, since it is the only one that matters here: 
Volitional coherence principle: it ought to be the case for an agent A that: if A wills 
that φ and A knows that ψ is the means to φ, then A wills that ψ. 
Typically, there is more than one known means to a given end, and different means often 
come with different advantages and different implications for an agent’s other ends. These 
complications are certainly relevant to instrumental reasoning, but for the purposes of this 
discussion, let us suppose that A has ruled out all other known means ψ′ using some sufficiently 
rationally procedure: perhaps ψ is optimal, or optimal during the period of A’s deliberation, or the 
first satisfactory means occurring to A, or something else of that nature. What is relevant here is 
that A has already settled on a means ψ to φ—in that sense the means—and that, intuitively, 
there is something irrational about not willing the means when one wills the end. For instance, if 
it is really my will to apply for a job, and the means to this end is to drop the completed 
application, now in my hand, into the mailbox several feet away, then I would be rationally 
incoherent if I did not also have the will to act accordingly. The volitional coherence principle has 
wide scope, which is to say that the ought has in its scope the entire conditional (hence the 
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awkward phrasing), rather than the consequent alone. This means that one can conform to the 
principle in two different ways: by willing the means to one’s willed end, and also by giving up the 
end. To resume the example, I would cease to run afoul of this principle either by mailing the 
application or by giving up on applying for the job. This reflects the fact that incoherence between 
two things is something that can be resolved by adjusting either. I will be assuming this principle 
as necessary condition of an agent’s instrumental rationality. 48 
Instrumental and Final Volitions 
It will be convenient to have a term designating a willing of some means ψ to a given 
willed end φ, as well as a term designating the willing of the end φ. Let us call the willing of ψ an 
instrumental volition and the willing of φ a final volition. In these terms, for example, the 
volitional coherence principle states that if an agent has a final volition, then he ought to have the 
 
48 Broome 1999; Schroeder 2004. It is controversial whether and how principles of instrumental rationality 
are normative. Typically, intentional coherence principles are discussed, such as that an agent who intends 
an end ought to intend what he knows or believes to be the means. A “narrow-scope” version of this 
principle, of the form P → O(Q), where the ought, O, has only the consequent of the conditional in its 
scope, is immediately problematic. For instance, P may be that an agent intends to commit murder, while Q 
is the known necessary means, namely, stabbing the victim in the heart. Yet it is absurd that the agent 
ought to stab his victim in the heart just because that he decides to commit murder (see, e.g., Raz 2005, 2-3; 
Schroeder 2009, 224). Surely an ought cannot be bootstrapped in this way, much less this ought. 
 
A wide scope intentional coherence principle of the form O(P → Q) avoids this problem, as it blocks 
detachment of the consequent by modus ponens (Broome 1999, 401-403). Instead, it only follows that the 
agent ought either to intend to stab or to cease to intend to murder: O(~P ∨ Q), which is consistent with 
giving up the intention to murder being, in fact, the only thing the agent ought to do. Against this, Raz and 
Schroeder have each argued, on different grounds, that wide scoping does not actually avoid the 
bootstrapping problem. Raz’s argument seems to depend on two questionable entailments. Where R is a 
pro tanto reason operator:  R(P → Q) ⊢ R(~P) ∧ R(Q), and also O(P → Q) ⊢ R(~P) ∧ R(Q) (Raz 2005, 12). 
Yet although Raz’s criticism is aimed at Broome, nothing Broome says requires these entailments. 
Schroeder’s criticism, in turn, seems to depend on treating epistemic and practical oughts as logically 
equivalent in the otherwise unimpeachable inference O(P → Q), O(P) ⊢ O(Q) (Schroeder 2009, 227). This 
seems implausible. It is not obvious that epistemic and practical oughts even range over all of the same 
objects. And even if they do, or even if we restrict our attention to the intersection of their ranges, it is not 
obvious that oughts from different normative domains would even be consistent with each other. 
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associated instrumental volition. To return to our example above, the final volition is that I eat 
dinner at the popular restaurant sometime next week, and the instrumental volition is that I make 
a reservation. 
VIII. Temporal Features of Volitions 
In this section I explore two temporal features of volitions, namely, duration and 
propositional tense. A mismatch between duration and propositional tense can produce the 
phenomenon of disappointment, which is central to my account of agent regret. 
Duration vs. Propositional Tense 
Volitions have duration. By this I mean that volitions qua mental states begin—they are 
formed—and they conclude—they unconsciously dissipate or are consciously revoked. For 
instance, if I will that I go to the bank and then later either change my mind or entirely and 
permanently forget this volition, then the volition’s duration is the span of time from forming it to 
revoking or losing it. 
Second, volitions have propositional tense. Like all intentional attitudes, volitions have 
propositional content. This content, in turn, often has a temporal truth condition. For example, if 
an agent wills that he have coffee during his break from 2-2:15, then the volition’s propositional 
content is only true if he has coffee during that fifteen-minute span. While the volition itself is 
not true or false, the temporal truth condition of its propositional content—the volition’s 
propositional tense—is nonetheless important, as it is the time when the willed event is willed to 
take place. If he gets coffee after leaving work at 5 pm, he does not do what he originally willed. 
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There are many possible propositional tenses. One such tense might span the time 
between two moments, such as making coffee any time within the next fifteen minutes. Another 
propositional tense might include but a single moment, such as igniting the rocket engines in 
exactly ten seconds. A propositional tense might have an indefinite beginning or end—roughly 
corresponding to grammatical aspect—such as willing that one writes that letter to Aunt Susan 
sometime in the near future, or willing that one pleases one’s parents for as long as one can 
remember.49 
Propositional Tense and Disappointment 
I call the degree to which a volition’s content fails to obtain during its propositional tense 
the degree to which the volition is disappointed. For instance, if an agent wills that he make coffee 
within fifteen minutes and fails to make it in time, then his volition is totally disappointed. But if 
instead he wills, say, that he drink no more than two cups of coffee a day for the next month, and 
on six occasions in the next month he drinks three cups of coffee, then we may say that his 
volition is partially disappointed (perhaps pending some finer-grained report of the propositional 
tense of the volition). I shall use ‘disappointed’ to describe both total and partial disappointment. 
Pre-Disappointment 
Some volitions have propositional tenses beginning or even ending prior to their duration: 
I might will that I had not slept through my alarm, or that I had not struck a child while driving a 
truck. When reporting such past-oriented wills, we tend to use locutions involving would: “If only 
I’d known the market was going to crash I would have sold all my stock,” or, “If I could do it all 
 
49 In other contexts we might equivalently say “from time immemorial.” 
 
 
34 
 
 
over I wouldn’t become a lawyer,” or, “If I could go back in time, I would take voice lessons 
instead of slaving away at the violin.” A 19th century heroine might say, “Would that I’d never 
married that heartless rake.”  
In such volitions, the beginnings of their propositional tenses precede the beginnings of 
their durations. Consequently, they are typically (though not invariably) already partially or 
totally disappointed.50 I wish to consider two such cases of pre-disappointment. The first is where 
one could have formed the instrumental volition prior to disappointment, and the second is where 
one couldn’t have formed it prior to disappointment. 51 As an example of the first case, let us 
suppose that an agent is firmly committed to not hurting people. Not racing other drivers in 
residential neighborhoods is a means to this end, but a means the agent fails to will in a moment 
of weakness. He then strikes and seriously injures someone in a crosswalk. I postpone discussion 
of the second case until the end of this section as it is similar in most respects to this first case. 
Let us suppose that the agent is a moral agent. I take the following to be uncontroversial: 
(1) if he drives in the future, he doesn’t race in residential neighborhoods on account of not 
wanting to hurt people, and (2) he would assent to the statement, “If I could go back in time I 
would never have raced in residential neighborhoods.” Both (1) and (2) can be explained by a 
single volition: the volition not to race in residential neighborhoods—a volition whose 
propositional tense begins prior to injuring the pedestrian and extends through the present and 
 
50 Conceivably, I might now form the volition to ψ at some point in the span of three days beginning with 
yesterday and ending tomorrow, as perhaps when I today discover that yesterday, today, and tomorrow are 
the days during which I am permitted submit a form. 
51 I am using ‘could’ as follows: an agent A could have formed a volition to φ at time t if and only if A had 
reason to φ at t given A’s ends at t and A’s knowledge at t. I realize that this is not a straightforward 
epistemic modality. I mean to capture the sense of ‘couldn’t’ (and thus of ‘could’) in “I couldn’t have 
known!” uttered in self-exculpation. 
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indefinitely into the future, but whose duration begins only after injuring the pedestrian. It seems 
that after the accident he forms the very instrumental volition he ought to have had ever since he 
started driving. From his perspective as a new driver, he ought to will that he not race in 
residential neighborhoods over the course of his driving career. From his perspective after the 
accident, he ought to will the very same thing. From both perspectives the volitions are the same, 
even though from the second perspective part of his driving career is now in the past. The 
difference in perspective does not change the volition’s content—specifically its propositional 
tense—in the slightest. 
We can now consider the second case of pre-disappointment. In this new case the agent 
couldn’t have formed the instrumental volition prior to disappointment, whereas we recall that in 
the first case the agent could have. For instance, suppose that the agent hits someone not because 
he drives at reckless speeds through a residential neighborhood—in fact he is driving very 
carefully—but because a child suddenly darts out in front of his truck. In this case, the agent 
couldn’t have known that the child would be there. Nonetheless, he wills after the fact that he had 
made some choice that would not have led him into the child’s path: he wills, for instance, that he 
had driven especially slowly down that road. The difference between this second case and the first 
is as follows. In the first case, the agent always knew that not racing through residential 
neighborhoods is a means to the end of not hurting people. In the second case, the agent did not 
and could not have known that driving especially slowly on the child’s road is a means to the end 
of not hurting people.  
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Disappointment Does Not Distinguish Guilt from Innocence 
There is a timeless causal relation between not racing through residential neighborhoods 
and not hurting people, and likewise between driving especially slowly on the child’s road and not 
hurting people. That is to say, one might know that these relations obtain before they bear on 
one’s decisions—before one races in a residential neighborhood (or drives normally on the child’s 
road)—and one might know them after they bear on one’s decisions—after one strikes the 
pedestrian (or the child). The fact of these relations obtaining does not change over time. 
Consequently, by the volitional coherence principle, an agent who wills that he not hurt people 
ought to have the relevant instrumental volition as soon as he knows that the causal relation 
between means and ends obtains, even if it is too late to carry that volition out—even if the 
volition is pre-disappointed.  
It might seem that the volitional coherence principle cannot require pre-disappointed 
instrumental volitions, since such volitions cannot be carried out in service of the agent’s final 
volitions. The volitional coherence principle does in fact require them, however. As we recall, the 
principle states that if an agent A wills that φ, if ψ-ing is the means to φ, and if A knows that ψ-
ing is the means to φ, then A ought to will to ψ. It is true that the volition to ψ—the mental 
state—is no longer a means to φ. But that is irrelevant: by the volitional coherence principle, one 
ought to will to ψ in order to φ not because the volition to ψ is a means to φ, but because ψ-ing is 
a means to φ. The causal relation between ψ-ing in a given span of time and φ obtaining in a 
 
 
37 
 
 
given span of time is itself a timeless metaphysical fact, one independent of the time at which an 
agent forms volitions concerning φ or ψ. 52 
In conclusion, even if one is innocent, one can be rationally obliged to have a past-
oriented volition just as if one were guilty: both the innocent and guilty drivers might will that 
they had not driven as they drove—the innocent driver wills that he had driven especially slowly, 
and the guilty driver wills that he had not driven so fast. The innocent driver now has a past-tense 
volition just like the guilty driver, and the innocent driver’s innocence is not entailed or even 
necessarily registered in any way by his volition’s propositional tense or content. The fact of 
disappointment is the same for both agents. The only difference between them is that only the 
guilty agent has actually violated the volitional coherence principle: only the guilty agent knew in 
advance of the instrumental relation between not doing what he did and not hurting people, and 
so only the guilty agent was required to have had the corresponding instrumental volition in 
advance of his accident. 
 
52 I implicitly granted here that past-oriented pre-disappointed volitions qua mental states may well be 
instrumentally futile, but this need not be the case: they can play an important role in an agent’s future-
oriented projects. For when changes occur in the agent’s knowledge of what means serve what ends, the set 
of instrumentally required volitions changes as well. Even if the newly acquired volitions are pre-
disappointed, they can usefully bear on the agent’s future plans. For instance, suppose a surgeon operating 
on a patient’s heart experiences a hand tremor, which she recognizes as a symptom of incipient Parkinson’s 
disease. Her scalpel slips from her fingers and into the patient, killing him. She now knows that not 
operating on people is instrumental to her end of doing no harm, and because she is rational, she wills that 
she not have operated. This volition has a propositional tense beginning in the past but extending into the 
future. The volition is partially disappointed because she already operated, but since its propositional tense 
extends beyond the operation and into the future, it moves her to give up surgery. In this manner, self-
reproach for something past causes her to alter her future plans in a way instrumental to her ends. 
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IX. The Appropriateness of Agent Regret 
The goal of this paper, we recall, is to answer the following question: is agent regret, 
understood as moral self-reproach, an appropriate response to causing harm through no fault of 
one’s own? In this section I lay out my answer, which I illustrate by returning to Williams’s truck 
driver. 
Let us assume that the driver is a moral agent, and therefore has the end of not killing 
children. That is to say, not killing children is an end he adopts for moral reasons. By the 
volitional coherence principle, he is rationally required to will that he drive especially slowly on 
the child’s street, since he knows now that by doing so he will disappoint his end of not killing 
children. Since this volition is rationally required, it is appropriate. Since the fateful day is past, 
the volition is pre-disappointed. Since the volition is pre-disappointed and since he is a rational 
agent, I propose that he experiences his volition as self-reproach, as I will now explain.  
Consider that the driver comes to know of the instrumental relationship between driving 
especially slowly on that street and not killing children only by driving normally down that street 
and killing a child.  He thus finds himself vividly confronted by irrefutable evidence of the 
instrumental necessity of willing that he drive especially slowly there, and because he is rational 
he so wills. But this will is already frustrated: he finds himself futilely striving to change his 
involvement in events now forever beyond his control. This tension, which is brought on by the 
conative character of volition and the unachievable character of the volition’s object, together 
account for the self-reproachful character of his experience. Finally, the self-reproachful character 
of this volition is moral because the volition is instrumental to a moral end.  
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By accounting for the self-reproachful character of agent regret, I avoid the objection I 
raised against Tannenbaum. We recall that she does not explain how blamelessly causing harm 
justifies agent regret rather than some other, phenomenally distinct feeling. She cannot rule out 
even feelings that are entirely inappropriate, such as glee, because she understands agent regret as 
a feeling associated with a judgment, and it seems possible to associate a variety of feelings with a 
judgment. It is much less plausible, however, that glee would be the experience of the tension 
between the conative character of volition and the unachievable character of the volition’s object, 
as I would have it. 
In addition, by identifying agent regret as the experience of this tension, I avoid the 
objection I raised against Helmreich. We recall that he doesn’t establish that it is appropriate for 
all moral agents to experience agent regret for blamelessly causing harm. He does show that agent 
regret is appropriate insofar as the agent’s odds of success are increased by adopting a self-critical 
orientation towards failure. He does not, however, then establish that such an orientation 
contributes to success for all moral agents, and so he does not establish that agent regret is for all 
moral agents appropriate. In contrast, my account succeeds in showing this because all moral 
agents who blamelessly cause harm are rationally required to have volitions they now cannot carry 
out, and having those volitions is experienced as agent regret. And if all moral agents who 
blamelessly cause harm are rationally required to have the response of agent regret, then a 
fortiori, it is appropriate for all such agents to experience agent regret. 
Furthermore, the timeless character of the instrumental relation between means and ends 
allows my account to be more general than Sussman’s. As we recall, Sussman rationalizes agent 
regret by appealing to the social function of making amends—to how the truck driver’s quasi-
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apology, together with the pedestrian’s quasi-forgiveness, allow them to return to the social status 
quo ante. But where no amends can be made, as when the pedestrian is killed rather than injured 
and where there are no friends or relations to accept the quasi-apology instead, it seems that 
making amends is impossible. Sussman’s account does not appear to rationalize agent regret in 
such cases, which my account is able to cover by rationalizing agent regret solely in terms of 
instrumental rationality and the agent’s own ends. 
Like Raz, I maintain that agent regret is fundamentally self-reflexive: the subject 
experiencing agent regret is the same person as the agent responsible for the action occasioning 
agent regret. As discussed earlier, Wallace rebuts Raz’s claim that agent regret is distinct from 
spectator regret because agent regret’s self-reflexivity gives it unique content. While Wallace may 
be right that spectator regret can also have this content, the possibility that agent regret is just a 
case of spectator regret is undermined by his own analogizing of agent regret with intention. By 
unreservedly incorporating the insight of this analogy, my account is able to support the 
distinctness of agent regret while also explaining the orectic attitude of the regret subject—that 
is, the conative character of the regret attitude—that Wallace usefully identifies. 
Finally, my account incorporates Rosati’s thoughts about regret’s justificatory structure. 
My rationalization of agent regret depends on instrumental rationality in a way conscious of how 
her account of the well-groundedness of mistake regret depends on effective conceptions of the 
good. My account learns from her discussion in order to go beyond its stated scope and to 
rationalize the affective component of regret in addition to the cognitive component that Rosati 
insightfully discusses. 
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X. Conclusion 
I hope to have shown that it is appropriate for moral agents who blamelessly caused harm 
to experience agent regret understood as moral self-reproach. I began by discussing Frankfurt and 
Sussman, who deny that agent regret thus understood is appropriate at all. I next considered 
Tannenbaum, Helmreich, Raz, Wallace, and Rosati, who agree that agent regret thus understood 
is appropriate, but on grounds I found problematic. I then laid the foundation for my own 
positive account claim by assuming a minimal conception of practical reason as given by what I 
called the volitional coherence principle. Next I observed that volitions have the temporal 
features of propositional tense and duration. It was significant when the beginning of a volition’s 
propositional tense precedes the beginning of its duration, since such volitions might be 
impossible to execute. It turned out that the volitional coherence principle requires such volitions 
of a moral agent who blamelessly causes harm. I then argued that agents experience as self-
reproach the tension between having a volition and knowing that it cannot be carried out. When 
the volition in question is a means to an end adopted for moral reasons, such as not causing 
harm, the agent’s self-reproach is moral self-reproach. It followed that moral agents who 
blamelessly caused harm are rationally required to have volitions they cannot but experience in a 
morally self-reproaching way. Moral self-reproach is thus not only appropriate but rationally 
required when moral agent cause harm even when they are morally blameless for causing it.  
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Chapter 2: Making Them Regret It 
Volitional Empathy as a Success Condition of 
Punishment 
A man is at a bar on a Friday night after a long week. He encounters another patron and 
their conversation quickly sours. Words are exchanged. Blows seem sure to follow, but our man 
storms out of the establishment. Later that night, outside the bar and around the corner, he 
ambushes his antagonist with a pipe wrench and bludgeons him to death. It doesn’t take long for 
the police to apprehend him: his victim, after all, was found not far from the bar where many 
other patrons witnessed the altercation that night. He is charged with murder. He is given a 
procedurally fair trial, he is convicted, and he is sentenced appropriately—perhaps to many years 
in prison, or perhaps to be “hanged from the neck until dead.” 
When he is led from the courtroom, he curses the judge, the jury, and the lawyers. He 
stews in his vindictive anger until the day appointed for his execution. On the gallows he curses 
the executioner. He smiles maliciously at the victim’s family at the front of the onlooking crowd. 
He says that he will see them all in Hell. Or perhaps, having been sentenced to prison instead of 
death, he whiles away his long sentence dreaming of revenge. He views his incarceration as a kind 
of amoral outrage against his person—a violation that superior power has compelled him to 
suffer, and one to be avenged by violations that he dearly hopes will one day be his turn to inflict. 
Perhaps he never sees this through when he is finally released, but only out of an abundance of 
prudence. Let us call someone who responds to punishment in this way a vengeful villain. 
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Or instead, perhaps the assailant is dragged from the courtroom shouting with sincere 
righteous indignation that he goes now to be butchered on the altar of tyranny. For you see, his 
victim was a soldier, and soldiers, being agents of state violence, are in his view the criminal 
instruments of a despotic regime. The action was not murder—or at least not in any morally 
problematic sense of the word—but rather a blow struck for justice and revolution. He sees 
himself as a political prisoner, and he is convinced that he will be vindicated in the judgment of 
history. Or similarly, perhaps he sees the government as an irreligious abomination. He goes to 
his punishment with not only a clear conscience but conspicuous pride, innocent as he is in the 
eyes of God. Let us call someone who responds to punishment in these ways a martyr. 
Or instead, perhaps as he goes from the courtroom, there is a distinctive spring in his 
step—almost a lurch—betraying the secret delight with which he beholds many years in what he 
sees as a taxpayer-funded paradise of masochistic delights. And in fact, his sentence, which would 
in most others cause an acute sense of deprivation, in his case interacts with his predilections to 
cause the utmost fulfillment. Or perhaps he goes to his execution eagerly expecting ecstasies 
beyond description in the moments before he expires. Let us call someone who responds to 
punishment in this way a masochist. 
I suspect many would agree that there is something wrong with a punishment when the 
person to whom it is administered responds in one of these ways. This is not to say that such a 
punishment is not, in fact, punishment, but that it is somehow incomplete or deficient.53 I propose 
in this paper to explain this deficiency as the failure of punishment to induce the wrongdoer to 
 
53 I set aside the question of whether deficient punishment is still punishment. My discussion is consistent 
with deficient punishment being punishment, but failing to accomplish one of its purposes; and also with 
deficient punishment being punishment-like, but not strictly punishment. 
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experience a species of moral regret involving what I call volitional empathy. That is to say, 
punishment fails in our problem cases because it fails to provoke the wrongdoer’s empathetic 
participation in the volitional states of his victim.54 In the first section of this paper, I will show 
that traditional desiderata for successful punishment struggle to explain how punishment in our 
problem cases is deficient. In the second section, I develop the concept of moral regret arising 
from volitional empathy—a species of regret that I call empathetic moral regret—and whose 
absence, I propose, explains the deficiency of punishment in our problem cases.55 Finally, I will 
discuss how empathetic moral regret may be not merely a necessary condition for punishment’s 
success but the very purpose of the experience of punishment. 
I. The insufficiency of other desiderata 
In this section I consider whether the deficiency in the punishment of our three problem 
cases can be explained by the failure to achieve one of three desiderata put forward by existing 
theories of punishment. These desiderata include giving wrongdoers their moral deserts as 
proposed by retributivist theories, the moral education of the wrongdoer and the public as 
proposed by Jean Hampton and Herbert Morris, and the expression of condemnation as proposed 
by Joel Feinberg.56 
 
54 My discussion does not apply to punishment of wrongs where no one is harmed in any sense, directly or 
indirectly. Perhaps someone with no family or friends who harms himself in a way prohibited by law would 
be such a “wrongdoer,” or at least a criminal. 
55 This proposal only attempts to identify something missing from the theories of punishment to be 
discussed in the paper’s first section, namely, how punishment should affect the wrongdoer. I am not 
offering an alternative theory of punishment, which would also need to explain various other features of 
punishment—for instance, the relation between punishment and law.  
56 I set aside the desideratum of deterrence because I wish to examine the subjective response of 
wrongdoers to punishment  (as distinct from behavioral reform of the wrongdoer or of spectators), and 
because I take the problem cases to show, if anything, that a wrongdoer’s subjective response can affect 
punishment’s success. 
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A. The retributive desideratum 
I will first consider whether achieving the aim of retributive theories of punishment can 
rectify the unsuccessful cases of punishment initially described. Before I begin, however, I set 
aside the important question of whether retributive theories are morally supportable. I also set 
aside this question when we discuss other punishment desiderata, but I wish to make special note 
of this matter here because the question of moral justification is especially urgent when a theory 
demands that we punish by retaliating57 harms against wrongdoers. I table this question because 
the issue under consideration is whether punishment is successful, and not whether it is morally 
justifiable. 
According to H.L.A Hart, retributive theories of punishment make three claims: 
[F]irst, that a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily done 
something morally wrong; secondly, that his punishment must in some way 
match, or be the equivalent of, the wickedness of his offence; and thirdly, that 
the justification for punishing men under such conditions is that the return of 
suffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just or morally good.58 
Hugo Bedau has observed that this model of retributive theories omits what we might 
imagine to be the central desideratum of retributive punishment: giving wrongdoers what they 
deserve. So essential is the concept of desert, according to Bedau, that “retributivism without 
desert—the concept of punishment as something deserved by whoever is rightly liable to it—is 
like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark”.59 Bedau offers several conservative suggestions for 
 
57 ‘Retaliation’ in the sense of lex talionis—as returning harms somehow in kind—and not in the sense of 
simple revenge. 
58 Hart 2008, 231 
59 Bedau 1978, 608 
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how the concept of desert might be supplied, such as by making Hart’s first and second claims the 
truth conditions for propositions involving desert, or by requiring that punishment be “imposed 
by reference to” a criminal’s wrongdoing, in which case it is deserved if it is properly 
proportional.60 In any event, Bedau does not seem especially worried by this omission of Hart’s, 
and the fact of the omission testifies to Hart’s own lack of concern. I will take Bedau’s suggestion 
that desert’s truth conditions are given by Hart’s first and second claims. This is convenient for 
our purposes since we are tabling the issue of moral justification, and that issue is what Hart’s 
third claim concerns. Desert, then, is whatever is supplied by a punishment that appropriately 
matches the “wickedness” of a wrong voluntarily committed by the person punished. Let this be 
the retributive desideratum for us to examine. 
Next to time-honored if unfashionably rigorous sentences involving eyes and teeth, the 
most famous examples of retributive punishment are probably those described by Kant in the 
Metaphysics of Morals. Kant’s first two examples seem aimed to show how injuries can be 
retaliated in kind, with appropriate adjustments, even when the circumstances of the perpetrator 
and victim crucially differ. But no such complications arise in the case of murder, for which the 
only appropriate punishment is apparently death. Kant takes the requital of death for murder so 
seriously that he famously insists that it is the duty of the state to carry out all death sentences 
even if it were about to dissolve itself, so that “each has done to him what his deeds deserve and 
blood guilt to does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment.”61 
 
60 Bedau 1978, 609 
61 Kant 2017, 6:332-3 
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Since the vengeful villain, that masochist, and the martyr are all guilty of murder, death, 
then, is the punishment whose success we should evaluate, according to Kant. Let us suppose that 
Kant is right, and that death is indeed what our wrongdoers deserve. It is certain that many have 
gone to their executions with the vindictive attitude of the vengeful villain and the self-righteous 
attitude martyr, and there is little reason to think that the strange attitude of the masochist is 
outside the realm of psychological possibility. Is, then, the punishment of death successful when 
the perpetrators to be punished bear towards their punishment these problematic attitudes? 
Let us consider the attitudes of our three perpetrators more closely. The vengeful villain 
believes that his punishment is an evil that he does not deserve to suffer, and even if he comes to 
accept his crime as a wrong, he objects to his punishment as nothing more than revenge. The 
masochist, in contrast, believes that deserved or not, his punishment will not only not involve 
suffering, but will be a delight, and he looks forward to it with pleasure rather than dread. Finally, 
the martyr, like the vengeful villain, believes that his punishment is an evil that he does not 
deserve to suffer, and like the masochist, he looks forward to his punishment. He does not, 
however, look forward to his punishment as a pleasure, but as a moral victory over the punishing 
authority. In short, the vengeful villain has inappropriate beliefs about desert, the masochist has 
inappropriate beliefs about suffering, and the martyr has inappropriate beliefs about the kind of 
moral good achieved by punishing him. 
I grant that one may consistently hold that the central claims of retributivism are satisfied 
by such punishment and that the punishment is successful. However, at this point I hope to have 
clarified the intuition that in the punishment of these perpetrators, something important is 
missing. This intuition reflects an argumentative burden that anyone must meet who holds that 
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satisfying the central claims of retributivism is sufficient for the success of punishment. That 
burden is to explain how punishment can succeed irrespective of how it is received by the 
punished. 
B. The expressive desideratum 
The next desideratum I would like to consider is what Feinberg has called “the expressive 
function of punishment” in his article of the same name. Feinberg describes this function as 
follows: 
Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of 
resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, 
either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those “in whose 
name” the punishment is inflicted.62 
Feinberg later clarifies that reprobation just is the “stern judgment of disapproval,” and he 
seems to subsume indignation, along with other and “various vengeful attitudes,” under the name 
of ‘resentment’. We may therefore distinguish two features of the expressive function: 
(1) Resentment: various vengeful attitudes 
(2) Reprobation: a stern judgment of disapproval. 
The expression of both attitudes, which Feinberg calls condemnation, constitutes the 
primary expressive function of punishment.63 I say ‘primary’ because Feinberg proceeds to list four 
“derivative symbolic” functions of punishment that presuppose condemnation. They are as 
follows: 
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(3) Authoritative disavowal: the execution of punishment supports the 
punishing authority’s additional claim that the punished party was not 
acting on the authority’s behalf.  
(4) Symbolic non-acquiescence: the execution of punishment discharges the 
responsibility of the people authorizing the punishing authority (such as 
citizens where the authority is their government) to recognize a wrong as 
such. 
(5) Vindication of the law: the execution of punishment defends the mandatory 
character essential to the law—a character that erodes when laws are not 
enforced by punishments. As Feinberg puts it, “a statute honored mainly in 
the breach begins to lose its character as law, unless, as we say, it is 
vindicated (emphatically reaffirmed); and clearly the way to do this (indeed 
the only way) is to punish those who violate it.”  
(6) Absolution of others: where relevant, the execution of punishment 
exonerates other suspects of the same wrongdoing.64 
We need not add anything out of the ordinary to the punishments of the vengeful villain, 
the masochist, and the martyr to easily satisfy the expressive conditions as given. Indeed, it would 
be hard to see how a punishment prescribed by law could fail to satisfy these conditions so long as 
it is sufficiently severe and public, and so long as it is pronounced and executed with official 
pomp. That said, we might make the satisfaction of these conditions vivid by imagining the robed 
and bewigged president of a tribunal, enthroned on a high platform before the seal of the state 
and the ensigns of the law, gravely pronouncing the sentence of death upon the offender. The 
condemned man is conducted to a public square where there awaits a firing squad comprised of 
ten citizens randomly selected for the duty as they might have been for a jury. As the man is 
 
64 Feinberg 1965, 404–8 
 
 
50 
 
 
hooded, his crimes are declaimed to a large and expectant crowd, and his death is solemnly 
devoted to Justice and to Peace. The order is given, the shots ring out, the man collapses dead 
into his chains. After a moment of silence, the crowd erupts in cathartic applause. 
Before we can consider whether the expressive desideratum can explain the deficiency of 
the punishment in our problematic cases, we need to distinguish the expressive and retributive 
desiderata. We may thereby consider the expressive desideratum’s unique explanatory 
contribution, which might in turn conceivably explain the deficiency in punishment in our 
problem cases. This clarification is needed because retributive and expressive desiderata 
substantially overlap. We can illuminate the boundary between these desiderata by considering 
the vengeful villain, for whom both retributive and expressive punishment seems especially apt—
even more so than for the masochist or the martyr.  
Ex hypothesi, the vengeful villain, the masochist, and the martyr have committed identical 
wrongs—they differ only in their attitudes towards their sentences. With respect to punishment’s 
reprobative function and the other derivative functions, it is far from clear how punishment of the 
vengeful villain is especially fitting. Since there is no difference in the wrong or its circumstances 
committed by the three wrongdoers, there are no grounds for the “stern judgment of disapproval” 
being different in content or sternness for the vengeful villain. The same can be said for the 
derivative functions symbolic non-acquiescence and absolution of others. And if anything, the 
vengeful villain’s insolent attitude makes authoritative disavowal less necessary, since it is less 
necessary for the state to support with punishment its claim that the vengeful villain was not 
acting on its behalf when it can also cite his contempt for its agents. Perhaps there is greater need 
to “vindicate” the law in the face of contempt. But insofar as it is the failure of the relevant 
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authority to enforce of the law and not the contempt of the lawbreaker that erodes a law’s 
character as such—as Feinberg suggests when he gives the example of racist jury nullification of 
murder laws during the prosecution of white perpetrators with black victims—if indeed it is 
failure of enforcement that erodes a law’s lawlike character, then the vengeful villain’s insolent 
attitude is irrelevant.65 
The expression of resentment is the only remaining function to which we might appeal to 
explain the superior aptness of punishing the vengeful villain. Feinberg does not develop this 
feature of punishment in much detail. In fact, he is clearly reluctant to include resentment among 
punishment’s expressive functions, and does so only with a frown and a sigh: 
At its best, in civilized and democratic countries, punishment surely 
expresses the community’s strong disapproval of what the criminal did. Indeed, 
it can be said that punishment expresses the judgment (as distinct from any 
emotion) of the community that what the criminal did was wrong. I think it is 
fair to say of our community, however, that punishment generally expresses 
more than judgments of disapproval; it is also a symbolic way of getting back at 
the criminal, of expressing a kind of vindictive resentment.66 
Feinberg proceeds, as if with mounting bewilderment, to describe as a vehicle for this 
resentment the “self-righteous” and “naked hostility” of a prisoner’s “guards and the outside 
world”— treatment which “bears the aspect of legitimized vengefulness.” 
We seem to have an explanation for why the vengeful villain seems especially punishable: 
his contempt is insulting, there is nothing more natural than revenging an insult, and one of the 
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functions of punishment is to express the vengeful attitudes that constitute resentment. But 
before we can consider whether the expression of resentment, given the other expressive criteria, 
can make punishment successful, we must take note of two factors that complicate the role 
expressing resentment plays in punishment. The first is that Feinberg does not seem to think of 
expressing resentment as conceptually necessary for punishment, since “at its best, in civilized 
and democratic countries,” even if not “in our community,” punishment expresses only a 
“judgment (as distinct from any emotion).” The second is that resentment is not merely 
“symbolized” by the suffering punishment invariably involves. As A. J. Skillen observes:  
Whereas black is arguably neutral in itself and only contextually and 
conventionally constituted as mourning wear… it is pretty clear that losing 
money, years of liberty, or parts of one’s body is hardly neutral in that way…. 
Feinberg vastly underrates the natural appropriateness, the non-arbitrariness, 
of certain forms of hard treatment to be the expression or communication of 
moralistic and punitive attitudes. Such practices embody punitive hostility, they 
do not merely “symbolize” it.67 
There is, in short, a close relationship—one much closer than mere conventional 
symbolism—between resentment and inflicting suffering. I offer that the relationship in question 
is that resentment, especially qua “various vengeful attitudes,” is satisfied by inflicting suffering on 
its object. Feinberg himself suggests as much when, in culminating his short discussion of 
resentment, he quotes J. F. Stephen’s observation that “the criminal law stands to the passion of 
revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”68 Stephen probably did not 
mean that marriage’s relation to the sexual appetite is that it prescribes that appetite’s 
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conventional, symbolic expression—say, in the composition of love poetry—but rather, that 
marriage prescribes the satisfaction of the sexual appetite by sexual intercourse. In keeping with 
the analogy, then, the criminal law’s relation to the passion of revenge is not that it prescribes the 
symbolic expression of the passion of revenge, but rather its satisfaction by the suffering inflicted 
on the criminal. 
Feinberg seems to think that suffering, too, is conceptually unnecessary for punishment. 
After observing the evolution over time of the “symbols of shame and ignominy” used in 
punishment, and noting the possibility of “stigmatiz[ing] without inflicting any further (pointless) 
pain to the body, to family, to creative capacity,” Feinberg considers an “elaborate public ritual, 
exploiting the trustiest devices of religion and mystery, music and drama, to express in the most 
solemn way the community’s condemnation of a criminal for his dastardly deed,” in order to 
“preserve the condemnatory function of punishment while dispensing with its usual physical 
forms—incarceration and corporal mistreatment.”69 
Feinberg is uncertain whether this hypothetical ritual is an “idle fantasy.”70 It probably is 
given two things: first, that I am right about the relationship between punishment and 
resentment’s vengeful attitudes—that the former satisfies and does not merely express the 
latter—since it is hard to see how vengeful attitudes can be satisfied without vengeance; and 
second: that we interpret Feinberg as offering a hybrid account of the function of punishment, 
namely, to express reprobation and to satisfy (and perhaps also to express) resentment. On the 
other hand, Feinberg’s ritual is probably not an idle fantasy if we take Feinberg’s language of 
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expression as meaning just that and nothing more. I would venture to diagnose Feinberg’s 
ambivalence about the possibility of punishment without suffering as a symptom of conflating the 
expression of resentment with its satisfaction. 
If we interpret Feinberg as insisting on resentment’s satisfaction, which I take to be a 
retributive aim, then I have nothing to add here to my discussion in the previous section of the 
retributive desideratum. If, however, we interpret Feinberg as insisting only on resentment’s 
expression (if only in a society sufficiently “civilized and democratic”), then we should consider 
the sort of punishment ritual he has in mind. I am not sure what to make of Feinberg’s suggestion 
that the ritual involve “trustiest devices of religion and mystery, music and drama,” which seem 
more likely to produce aesthetic detachment than to express public resentment. (Perhaps 
Feinberg felt that in a civilized and democratic society, even resentment’s mere expression could 
be dispensed with.) If anything, the ritual should have the appearance of satisfying public 
resentment—it would express the desire for revenge by representing its satisfaction. It would, in 
short, look like the execution described earlier (or like any other punishment sufficiently severe 
and public to satisfy Feinberg’s expressive criteria). We might imagine the condemned criminal—
awed or perhaps drugged into compliance—falling on cue as his executioners discharged their 
blank rounds in his direction. This would not be a mock execution—everyone, including the 
criminal himself, would know that this ritual is meant to express, without stooping to satisfy, the 
vengeful attitudes of the punishing authority and the society that authorized it. 
Let us suppose that this ritual punishment was carried out upon the vengeful villain, the 
masochist, and the martyr. Each for entirely nonmoral reasons sincerely resolves never to murder 
again. Perhaps they found the experience overwhelmingly humiliating, or perhaps they couldn’t 
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bear the disgust they felt at the weakness and hypocrisy of a society that delights in pantomiming 
brutality it condemns. My point here is not to indulge in speculation about the possible 
unsatisfactory responses to the punishment ritual described, but rather to point out that the 
success of punishment intuitively depends to some extent on the response of the punished, and 
that it is still possible, even when the criteria for expressive punishment are met, for this response 
to be inadequate. 
C. The moral education desideratum 
The last desideratum I would like to consider is the moral education of the wrongdoer and 
of the public. As Hampton puts it, “Punishment is intended as a way of teaching the wrongdoer 
that the action she did (or wants to do) is forbidden because it is morally wrong and should not 
be done for that reason. The [moral education] theory also regards that lesson as public, and thus 
as directed to the rest of society.”71 I take Hampton to mean here that the wrongdoer is taught to 
forbear from an action because it is wrong, rather than to forbear from an action because it is 
forbidden.72 Of the essence of this desideratum is that punishment teaches moral reasons to 
choose not to do wrong. The goal of punishment is not, or is not primarily, to merely deter 
antisocial behavior by striking fear or imposing costs.73 Hampton does allow that a secondary 
purpose of punishment is to merely deter the “criminal [who] refuses to understand the state’s 
communication about why there is a barrier to his action,” though mere deterrence can be 
distinguished from the primary desideratum of moral education.74 With respect to the 
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72 For Hampton, the relationship between the prohibition and the wrong seems to be that the prohibition is 
a legal representation, made vivid by punishment, of a moral requirement. The audience for this 
representation consists of those who might not otherwise see the requirement in question (212).  
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desideratum of moral education, then, we may say that a wrongdoer is successfully punished 
when two conditions are met:  
(i) The punishment agent communicates to the wrongdoer and to the 
public, by means of the punishment, that the punished action should 
not be done because it is wrong.  
(ii) On account of (i), the wrongdoer accepts that the punished action 
should not be done because it is wrong. 
Would the satisfaction of (i) and (ii) transform the deficient punishments of the vengeful 
villain, the masochist, and the martyr? For several reasons I am doubtful. First, the moral 
education view diagnoses the moral defect in wrongdoers as a deficiency in knowledge, but only 
the martyr is clearly mistaken about what is morally required, since the martyr is morally 
motivated, but in the thrall of the wrong moral theory. The vengeful villain and the masochist 
might be deficient in moral knowledge, but since the motives for their wrongs were nonmoral, it 
is also possible that their moral knowledge was adequate, but that it does not receive the usual 
weight during deliberation. That is to say, their problem is that they are selfish because they give 
excessive weight to nonmoral egocentric considerations, rather than that they are morally 
solipsistic because they are unaware of the moral considerations to begin with. 
The vengeful villain and the masochist, for example, might be disposed to sincerely judge 
actions of the sort they were punished for as wrong, and to believe that such actions should not 
be done on account of their wrongness. However, were they to find themselves provoked in the 
way that they were the night they murdered their victims, they might restrain themselves on 
account of nonmoral considerations alone, without which they would become repeat offenders. 
The vengeful villain recalls with impotent rage the jeering of the public during his perp walk. The 
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masochist recalls the bitter disappointment of compulsory community service, which he 
completed only to convince his parole board to save him from the endless tedium. Both, in short, 
were convinced by their punishment that they should not murder because murder is wrong, but 
neither is ultimately disposed by that judgment to forbear from murdering, at least not in every 
circumstance where such forbearance is morally required. 
The moral education theorist might reply that this objection misconstrues (ii): it is 
incorrect, perhaps, to consider someone to have moral knowledge who is aware of moral 
considerations but finds himself unmoved by them. In other words, even if the vengeful villain 
and the masochist were aware of the relevant moral considerations, the very possibility that such 
considerations could be outweighed by others betrays moral ignorance—if not of the existence of 
moral considerations, then of their deliberative role. 
I, for my part, am not fully convinced that the weight to be assigned to a consideration is 
best understood as a kind of knowledge. But let us grant that it is. Let us suppose that the 
vengeful villain and the masochist both judge that murder is wrong, and that this judgment is 
sufficient to motivate them to forbear from murdering again. What would they make of their past 
murders? They would certainly judge those actions as wrong and not to be repeated. But the 
judgment that one’s past action was wrong does not by itself entail that one regret one’s action. It 
entails that one should not have acted so. It entails that past deliberation would have properly 
concluded in the forbearance of murder. It entails, even, that deliberation must have properly 
concluded in the forbearance of murder—that no possible nonmoral consideration could have 
outweighed the moral requirement that murder be avoided. But it seems perfectly consistent for 
the educated masochist and the vengeful villain to accept all of these judgments and yet recall 
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their past wrongs with equanimity. After all, they were deficient in moral knowledge, and this 
predictably led them to commit moral wrongs, which they are now in an epistemic position to 
avoid. 
This brings me to the second reason I am skeptical that satisfying (i) and (ii) would 
transform the defective punishments of the wrongdoers under consideration. It is intuitively 
problematic that successful punishment—especially punishment aiming to reform—need not 
lead the punished to be bothered by their past wrongdoing. In circumstances where people suffer 
some misfortune, especially (though not exclusively) as a result of their own actions, we take their 
distress as evidence that something they valued was lost, and inversely, we take the absence of 
distress as evidence that whatever was lost was not of value to them. If someone is distressed over 
losing a worthless trinket, this is surely because the trinket had some great value to them—that it 
was not to them nearly so worthless as it seemed to us. Likewise, if someone shrugs at the loss of 
his life’s savings, then it is reasonably to conclude that this person did not subjectively value his 
life’s savings nearly to the extent that we would expect. The intuition that people should be 
bothered by their wrongdoing is explained, then, by our expectation that people come to value 
whatever their wrongdoing harmed or destroyed. Equanimity (or surprise or anything other than 
the right sort of distress) is evidence that this expectation remains unmet. 
The moral education theorist might reply, in turn, that whatever it is that wrongdoers 
should come to value can simply be incorporated into the moral education curriculum. I grant 
that under a sufficiently expansive concept of education, perhaps this is true. My point is not that 
the moral education view is deficient under all possible interpretations of ‘education’, but rather 
that the concept of education seems to lend itself to teaching people to value things 
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prospectively—in order to guide their actions—and not retrospectively, as grounds for distress 
when by their actions they harm or destroy valuable things. 
Herbert Morris gives a richer description, under the name of ‘paternalism’, of what 
Hampton calls ‘moral education’. For Morris, the goal of paternalism is “an autonomous 
individual freely attached to that which is good, those relationships with others that sustain and 
give meaning to a life.” Morris requires that a wrongdoer satisfy a number of overlapping 
conditions in order to approach this good. Most relevant to our discussion is his first condition: 
First, it is a part of this good that one comes to appreciate the nature of 
the evil involved for others and for oneself in one’s doing wrong. This requires 
empathy, a putting oneself in another’s position; it also requires that 
imaginative capacity to take in the implications for one’s future self of the evil 
one has done; it further requires an attachment to being a person of a certain 
kind. The claim is that it is good for the person, and essential to one’s status as 
a moral person, that the evil underlying wrongdoing and the evil radiating from 
it be comprehended… not merely, if at all, in the sense of one’s being able to 
articulate what one has done, but rather comprehended in the way remorse 
implies comprehension of the evil caused.75 
I confess that I would be very hard pressed to describe a punished wrongdoer satisfying 
this condition—much less Morris’s others—whose punishment is intuitively unsuccessful. That 
said, this condition obscures the relationship between empathy and remorse and lays Morris open 
to Russ Shafer-Landau’s charge that Morris (as well as Hampton) fails to explain how punishment 
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is consistent with the claim of Morris and Hampton that their accounts of punishment respect a 
wrongdoer’s autonomy.76 
Morris thinks that the wrongdoer’s understanding of his wrong results from comparing 
the sort of person who causes in his victim what he empathetically experienced with the sort of 
person he is committed to being, and finding that the former falls short of the latter. I 
wholeheartedly agree that successful punishment critically depends on the wrongdoer coming to 
empathize with his victim. But the kind of empathy is of the first importance if it is to do the work 
that Morris assigns to it—if it is to produce in the wrongdoer the comprehension “not merely, if at 
all, in the sense of one’s being able to articulate what one has done, but rather… in the way 
remorse implies comprehension of the evil caused.” For example, I might value being a good 
person in the way that a true amateur—a true lover of the sport for its own sake—might value 
being a good golfer. Since I cannot simply consult a scorecard to determine whether I’ve wronged 
someone, I imagine myself in his place, and by this empathetic procedure I determine that my 
actions have caused another to feel violated.  I reflect with disappointment on my moral 
underperformance, since such behavior is not consistent with the proficient moral athlete I am 
committed to becoming. But I feel no more remorse for what I’ve done than the golfer would who 
is not lately on his game.  
In addition, so long as there is no constraint on the sort of person one may autonomously 
seek to be, then in many (if not most) cases, it will not be possible to punish wrongdoers without 
violating their autonomy. We need not even consider the person who has no commitment 
whatsoever to being morally upright. For insofar as people are inclined to provide answers in 
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addition to “morally upright” to the question, “What sort of person would you like to be”—insofar 
as they are inclined to say “wealthy,” “respected,” “attractive,” “powerful,” or “preeminent in 
bicycle racing”—then compelling people to develop their moral uprightness at the expense of, say, 
their bicycle racing careers, is a prima facie violation of their autonomy. 
II. Regret 
The punishments of the vengeful villain, the martyr, and the masochist do not fully 
succeed, as shown by their lack of regret. I will argue that the incompleteness of their punishment 
is explained by the fact that the wrongdoers are no more responsive, on account of their 
punishments, to the moral reasons arguing against doing those wrongs than before those wrongs 
were done. But before I argue this, I wish in this section to clarify the concept of regret that I will 
be using. 
A. Regret is a volitional state 
Whatever else it is, regret is an intentional state whose object, in central cases, is the 
regret subject’s own past action or inaction: perhaps I regret not purchasing Facebook stock 
during its initial public offering; perhaps you regret snapping at a friend while you were in a bad 
mood. It would be very strange for me to say that I regret your snapping at a friend, or for you to 
say that you regret my failure to invest in Facebook. I might be angry or sad or disappointed about 
your action and you might be likewise about my inaction, but regret seems quite inappropriate.77 
It would be at least as strange if I now claimed to regret my future failure to invest in the next 
 
77 Perhaps I might regret your action if you are my agent—I might conceivably regret that, as my attorney, 
you settled for less than my case was worth—but perhaps this is because your actions qua my agent are in a 
relevant sense my actions too. 
 
 
62 
 
 
successful startup, or for you now to claim to regret your future failure to control your temper 
that finally and irreparably alienates your long-suffering friend. We might well be resigned to a 
future action or inaction we perceive as inevitable, or worried by a future action or inaction we 
perceive as possible but avoidable, but it is hard to conceive of how we might regret what we have 
not yet done or forborne from. 
We do sometimes say that we regret a dispositional cause of our own past action or 
inaction: perhaps I regret being so conservative with my investing since I might have otherwise 
invested in Facebook; perhaps you regret having such a short fuse since it caused you to snap at 
your friend the other day. I am inclined to understand these cases as regret of action coupled with 
a causal hypothesis: I regret not investing in Facebook during its initial public offering, and I 
believe that this failure is due to my conservatism; you regret snapping at your friend the other 
day, you believe that you did so because you have a short fuse. This understanding is suggested by 
the oddness of “regretting” a disposition that never manifests itself in regretted action or inaction: 
I would not say that I regret an overconservative financial temperament that I have always 
somehow overcome to make good investments; you probably would not say that you regret a 
short fuse that your background in stand-up comedy has always allowed you to successfully 
disguise as humor. Such dispositions may well worry us as possible causes of undesirable future 
action or inaction, but it seems malapropos to say that we regret them when no such action or 
inaction has yet transpired. 
So far, we have characterized regret as an intentional state whose object is a past action or 
inaction. We can be more specific: I propose that regret is a volitional state. The object of this 
state is the opposite of whatever action or inaction one regrets—an action where one regrets 
 
 
63 
 
 
inaction, and inaction where one regrets an action. That is to say, its object is a counterfactual 
past action or inaction such that my having done or forborne is the complement of whatever I 
forbore from or did that I regret. That is to say, I regret that I φ-ed if and only if I will that I had 
not φ-ed. For example, where I regret that I did not invest in Facebook during its initial public 
offering, my volition is that I had done so; where your regret is that you snapped your friend, your 
volition is that you had not done so. 
It may seem peculiar to think of regret as a volitional state because its object is in the past. 
Indeed, when we normally will something (for by ‘volitional state’ I mean a state of willing), what 
we will is a future action, a future forbearance from action, or in some cases a future state of 
affairs.78 Perhaps it weighs against regret’s volitional character that the central cases of volitional 
states are those with future objects. Weighing in favor of regret’s volitional character is that 
volitional states are not just occurrent states accompanying action or inaction but also 
dispositional states to act or forbear when the appropriate circumstances arise: it can be my will 
to drink a Coke for the better part of a day even though I am not holding that prospect before my 
attention, provided that, other things being equal, I take advantage of my first opportunity to 
drink a Coke. I propose that regret is also a disposition to act or forbear: if you really regret 
snapping at your friend, you would now stop yourself from having done so if that were possible.  
 
78 When we will future states of affairs, we generally will whatever actions collectively conduce to that 
end—(rational) volition is structured by the norms of instrumental reason. This structure, in addition to 
obvious parallels in usage and meaning, raise the question of the relationship between volition and 
intention. While that relationship is not something I wish to consider here, it seems intuitive to say that if 
you intend φ then φ is your will. However, it seems stranger to speak of intending a counterfactual past 
action or inaction than to speak of willing a counterfactual past action or inaction. If, in fact, volitional 
states can have counterfactual past objects—as my discussion of regret would have it—then perhaps in this 
respect volition and intention are not coextensive. 
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Suppose, for instance, you snap at your friend over email. You instantly regret it. Moments 
later, you recall that Google, your email provider, offers an “undo send” feature that delays, for 
potential recall, the delivery of sent email for a predetermined amount of time. You have, in short, 
the opportunity to retroactively forbear from snapping at your friend. Other things being equal, 
you will naturally take advantage of this opportunity. In this way, regret and dispositional 
volitional states are functionally the same: both states are dispositions to act or forbear in the 
appropriate circumstances. Indeed, failing to be disposed to undo a regret seems to defeat regret’s 
very attribution: all things being equal, if you were aware of “undo send” but declined to use it, 
then I think most people would be very hard pressed to consider you regretful of sending the 
email, at least for as long as “undo send” was available, you were aware of its availability, and you 
nonetheless did not use it. 
Another way regret and volition might seem distinct is in their phenomenality. At the very 
least, regret is always unpleasant. Volition, on the other hand, is generally pleasant to the degree 
that success approaches, and unpleasant to the degree that it recedes. Thus, regret is at best an 
unpleasant species of volition. And with that conclusion I am in agreement: regret is a volitional 
state, but there are certainly volitional states other than regret. But against this conclusion one 
might adduce a further distinction between the unpleasantness of regret and the unpleasantness 
of unpleasant volition. For I take the unpleasantness of volition as success recedes to be that of 
fear, as when one is on the brink of losing a game. The unpleasantness of regret, on the other 
hand, need not involve fear, since the undesired outcome has already come to pass.  
This phenomenal difference, however, is not by itself sufficient to show that regret and 
volition are distinct. Consider that the objects of fear are invariably in the future. Assuming that 
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the object of the fear characteristic of unpleasant volition is that volition’s failure, then the 
unpleasant volition in question is a volition with a future object. But nothing about unpleasant 
volitions in general is revealed by this feature of unpleasant volitions with future objects, at least 
not without begging the question against the possibility of volitions with counterfactual past 
objects. 
Because of the functional similarity between regret and dispositional volitional states, and 
because the phenomenal difference between regret and volitional states is not sufficient to show 
that the former is not a species of the latter, I conclude that regret is in fact a species of volitional 
state, namely, that it is a volition with a counterfactual past object. I realize that these 
considerations are not likely to convince people especially put off by the very notion of volitional 
states with counterfactual past objects. If the strangeness of volitional states with past objects is 
felt to be insurmountable, then I invite the reader to think of regret as a “volitionalistic” state—a 
state functionally similar to a volitional state, but accompanied (or perhaps partly constituted) by 
the belief that achieving its object was once possible but is no longer due to the passage of time. 
B. Moral and nonmoral regret 
I would like to distinguish moral regret from regret in general. After all, the presence of 
nonmoral regret would not rectify the problematic punishment of the martyr, the masochist, or 
the vengeful villain. Indeed, it could make their punishments’ outcome more problematic still. 
The martyr, for example, might regret the murder because the ensuing conviction deprived him of 
the opportunity to take a grander, bloodier stand against the state and its postal cronies, perhaps 
by bombing a post office or assassinating the postmaster general. The masochist might regret the 
murder because it was foolishly committed in a jurisdiction known for its relatively humane penal 
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institutions. The vengeful villain, finally, might regret the murder because after reflecting on what 
he has done, he determines that he would have found more satisfaction in torturing and 
murdering his victim’s family while forcing his otherwise unharmed victim to watch. 
I call the regrets described in the previous paragraph nonmoral because they are not 
motivated by the balance of moral reasons79. The masochist and the vengeful villain regret the 
murders they committed because their own satisfaction was not thereby maximized, where the 
question of the moral value of their satisfaction does not arise, even if only to be taken for 
granted. Their regrets are nonmoral, then, because the most important moral reasons (those 
arguing against murdering his victim) are either missing or (in the case of the value of the 
perpetrators’ satisfaction) present but not qua moral reasons.  The martyr’s case is somewhat 
different, as he regrets what he did because he could have struck a greater blow against tyranny—
a moral evil. Now let us suppose that in this example, the postal employee murdered by the 
martyr is personally innocent of the tyranny that the government may or may not be perpetrating, 
at least aside from any moral complicity that may ultimately arise from drawing a government 
salary or delivering mail sent to and from government offices. Let us suppose further that prior to 
committing the murder, the martyr was cognizant of his victim’s personal innocence—the 
victim’s death was in the martyr’s mind a means to a morally valuable end. So while the martyr’s 
regret is perhaps not nonmoral in as total a sense as that of the vengeful villain or the masochist, 
it is nonmoral to the extent that the most important moral reasons are missing (again, those 
arguing against murdering the victim). 
 
79 I am using ‘moral reason’ in the sense of a pro tanto moral consideration in practical reasoning. By the 
‘balance of moral reasons’, I mean whatever conclusion, or set of possible conclusions, following from 
practical reasoning that takes into account the relevant moral reasons. 
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III. Empathetic moral regret and successful punishment 
I submit to the reader that a man not wanting to die is a compelling and generally decisive 
moral reason not to kill him. I submit further that this reason is salient to a person who has the 
life of another in his hands, and who is undeserving of and not about to deserve punishment for 
killing. Finally, I submit that an agent adequately responsive to moral reasons finds the 
conclusion that he ought not to kill someone compelling because (perhaps among other things) 
the person in question does not want to die—that is, without requiring the inferential mediation 
of a principle like the general impermissibility of killing people lacking death wishes. Bernard 
Williams has famously claimed that there is something wrong with a husband who is ultimately 
motivated by inferential mediation of a general principle to save his imperiled wife over an 
equally imperiled stranger.80 If there is any truth to this observation, then there is, a fortiori, 
something wrong—certainly something insufficiently right—with someone who refrains from 
delivering the coup de grace to his bloodied, pleading victim, but not because his victim so 
obviously doesn’t want to die, but rather because our assailant recalls that it is generally 
impermissible in these circumstances to finish people off. I call volitional empathy this 
phenomenon of taking and responding to someone else’s will, by itself and without inferential 
mediation of a general principle, as a pro tanto reason to help or at least not to interfere with it, 
where the weight of this reason is proportional to the importance of the volition to its original 
subject.  Volitional empathy is volitional in the sense that one person’s volitional states in this 
manner affects the deliberative process behind another person’s volitional states (rather than 
 
80 Williams 1982c, 18 
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involving emotional or doxastic states, for instance), and it is empathy in the sense that one 
person’s will is prompting another person to will in harmony, so to speak. 
Our perpetrators were clearly deficient in volitional empathy when they killed their 
victims—the fact that their victims did not want to die was either not salient to them as a reason 
not to murder, or it was salient but motivationally inert. The significance of this deficiency is that 
if it were to be belatedly remedied—if our perpetrators were to be moved belatedly by the wills of 
the people they murdered—then they would find themselves fervently but futilely willing that 
they not have done what they did. In other words, they would be filled with regret. I call 
empathetic moral regret the regret prompted in this way—by the belated and consequently futile 
response to a moral reason recognized in the unmediated way characteristic of volitional 
empathy. 
Let us consider more closely what would happen were we to supply this deficiency. We 
might imagine our wrongdoers emerging from prison, or perhaps awaiting execution. Let us 
stipulate that they now experience volitional empathy with their victims: they take and respond 
to their victims’ volitions as reasons to promote the volitions’ objects, where the volitions in 
question include those our wrongdoers were aware of at the moment of their crimes, as well as 
those of which they were retrospectively informed in the course of their trial and punishment. 
Countless such volitions are associated with their victims’ now annihilated projects: the 
promotion never to be earned, the charming house never to be bought, the Broadway show never 
to be seen with the spouse never again to be embraced, the children never to see grown, the 
estranged father with whom never to be reconciled. Ex hypothesi, the wrongdoers take each 
volition as a pro tanto reason to help or at least not to interfere. They are now belatedly moved by 
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the operation of volitional empathy to promote the volitions in question. But by their own 
actions, they made have it impossible to promote these volitions in any direct way. The wills they 
nullified have now at last become their own.  
The existence of this state of empathetic moral regret is incompatible with the persistence 
of the hateful contempt of the vengeful villain, the delight of the masochist, and the self-
righteousness of the martyr, as these attitudes each deny the reason-giving force of the victims’ 
volitions. The contempt of the vengeful villain takes the volitions of his victims not as reasons for 
promotion or noninterference, but rather as urging their own obstruction—the very fact that the 
victim begs for his life argues that he should be deprived of it, or so the vengeful villain formerly 
reasoned. The masochist’s deliberation was differently deficient: the victim’s volitions were to be 
promoted or obstructed as a means to achieve the end of a pleasurable incarceration. The martyr, 
finally, neglected to take his victim’s volitions as reasons at all, or took them as reasons, but with 
deliberative weight far short of what was appropriate given their importance to their original 
subject. 
Empathetic moral regret clearly cannot coexist with such sentiments on pain of rational 
and motivational incoherence. The victory of empathetic moral regret quiets the intuition that 
our wrongdoers were not successfully punished. I think it does this because that intuition reflects 
the sense that the wrongdoers were not responsive in the right way to moral reasons: their 
unresponsiveness disposed them to do wrong, while the manner of their unresponsiveness 
disposed them not to regret wrongs already done. Empathetic moral regret is the consequence of, 
and thus evidence for, the existence of volitional empathy. Further discussion of volitional 
empathy is beyond the scope of this paper, but I offer that the need to rectify volitional empathy’s 
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absence—which explains the absence of empathetic moral regret—is what ultimately explains the 
intuition that wrongdoers are not successfully punished unless they are made to regret their 
wrongs done. 
IV. Sufficiency of regret for punishment 
I conclude this paper with the observation that empathetic moral regret’s role in 
punishment is more than merely a necessary condition for success. While it is not my ambition 
here to prove that empathetic moral regret is the sole purpose of punishment, I would like to 
gesture towards the conclusion that empathetic moral regret explains the effect that punishment 
should have on the wrongdoer. In favor of this point is that sometimes leniency or even 
forgiveness is warranted, and the presence of empathetic moral regret can explain why this is so. 
We are inclined to forgive people who have “suffered enough,” as well as people who make a 
sincere effort to repair the harm they have caused. People sufficiently regretful satisfy both 
conditions—we might even say that they “self-punish.” Regret under any conception is a form of 
suffering. We would expect the suffering of empathetic moral regret to be especially persistent, 
since it is a volition concerning the counterfactual past, and as such, it cannot be terminated by 
being accomplished. Nor can it be terminated by simply changing one’s mind, since it is 
motivated not by one’s self-chosen goals but by the appreciation of reasons which cannot be 
made to disappear at will. In addition, regretful people will be strongly disposed to repair 
whatever harm they caused to the degree that it is in their power to do so. This, again, is because 
regret is understood volitionally, and while they cannot achieve the object of their volitions—to 
undo their wrong—it would be only natural for them to seek what is next best, namely, to fix 
what they broke to the extent that doing so is in their power. Indeed, if they were not disposed to 
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try to repair their harms, we would take that as evidence that they did not really regret what they 
did. 
Another reason we might think that inducing empathetic moral regret is the effect 
punishment should have on the wrongdoer is that it goes a long way towards explaining the other 
desiderata, which seem to describe different features of the regret to be induced by punishment, 
or how punishment is to induce it. The retributive desideratum of giving wrongdoers their moral 
deserts, where moral desert is suffering in a kind and proportion suited to the wrong, can be 
explained as seeking to induce in the wrongdoer the infringed volitions of the victim in kind and 
degree. When we are wronged, our retributive instincts do not simply demand that the 
wrongdoer be harmed, they demand that the wrongdoer know how it feels. Retaliating an 
inaccurate feeling, even if it is equally unpleasant, seems unsatisfactory. This way of analyzing 
retributivism has the additional benefit of explaining the mysterious “moral alchemy” Hart 
accuses retributivism of supposing “in which the combination of the two evils of moral 
wickedness and suffering are transformed into good.”81 For responsiveness to moral reasons is 
undeniably a moral good. Sometimes, it is unpleasant—excruciating, even—to confront and 
respond to reasons. But it is hard to see how anyone who values agency could maintain that the 
good of being an agent—insofar as agency requires responsiveness to reasons—is outweighed by 
whatever unpleasantness confronting those reasons involves. 
The expressive desideratum, or at least the reprobative criteria (I take the expression of 
resentment to manifest fundamentally retributive concerns), seems to describe the consequences 
of regret if we understand the agent of the expression to be not the state but wrongdoers 
 
81 Hart 2008, 234 
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themselves. Regretful wrongdoers are disposed to willingly accuse themselves of their wrong, 
satisfying the primary reprobative function of expressing a stern judgment of disapproval. 
Regretful wrongdoers can in addition satisfy something analogous to authoritative disavowal by 
disavowing their own wrong as something they would never now do and could never in retrospect 
justify. They also discharge their special obligation to recognize their wrong as such, thereby 
expressing symbolic non-acquiescence. Regretful wrongdoers can vindicate the law by willingly 
resigning themselves to the mercy of the punishing authority, thereby recognizing the law’s 
mandatory character. Finally, by assuming full responsibility for whatever it is they are fully 
responsible for, they absolve others of the same wrong. 
Where the retributivist desideratum describes the nature and magnitude of punishment 
as a regret-inducing experience, and where the expressive desideratum describes the 
consequences of regret successfully induced, the educationist desideratum gets closest to 
identifying regret itself as an important goal of punishment in Morris’s case, or its only goal in 
Hampton’s. Hampton and Morris seem to diagnose in the wrongdoer a deficiency in moral 
knowledge, hence their conceiving of punishment as a kind of communication.82 I grant that in a 
certain light, failure to appreciate reasons of a certain kind might be construed as or explained by 
a deficiency in knowledge. I maintain, however, that my way of looking at punishment’s goal—
inducing empathetic moral regret rather than communicating moral knowledge—is more 
illuminating: it is much easier to see how agency is respected when people are compelled to 
become responsive to moral reasons than when they are compelled to be taught moral 
knowledge.  
 
82 Morris 1981, 264; Hampton 1984, 216 
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Chapter 3: Normative Trust and the Confidence 
Trickster 
Trust, as I understand it,83 is not merely reliance: only trust can be betrayed, while mere 
reliance can only be disappointed. This important insight of betrayal as the hallmark of trust, 
introduced by Annette Baier in her formative discussion, has motivated the category of will-based 
trust theories, as Karen Jones has called them.84 In order to distinguish reliance relationships 
where betrayal is possible from those where it is not, and in this way, to distinguish trust from 
mere reliance, will-based theories require trustors to rely specifically on trustees’ good will, 
competence, and nothing else. Unfortunately, all will-based theories on offer are subject to 
Richard Holton’s counterexample of the confidence trickster. Holton’s trickster initially relies on 
a potential victim so that the victim will come to rely on him—a reliance the trickster intends to 
exploit at the victim’s expense.85 Intuitively, the trickster’s reliance is not trust, and accordingly, it 
is susceptible only to disappointment and not to betrayal by the potential victim. And yet, the 
theories of Baier, Jones, Pamela Hieronymi, and Zac Cogley all count the trickster’s reliance as 
 
83 ‘Trust’ is ambiguous in common use. For instance, had Admiral Nelson signaled to his fleet before 
Trafalgar, “England trusts that every man will do his duty” (close to the originally proposed “England 
confides…”) he might have meant that England hopes that every man will do his duty, that England believes 
that every man will do his duty, that England relies on every man doing his duty, that England demands that 
every man do his duty, etc. I intend to discuss a sense of ‘trust’ where the trustor is vulnerable to betrayal by 
the trustee, and without prejudice to other senses of ‘trust’. 
84 Baier 1986, 234–35. In addition to will-based theories there are risk-assessment views, which make no 
attempt to account for the intuition that trust can be betrayed, and which conceive of trust as depending 
indifferently on any consideration bearing on the trustee’s likelihood of behaving as the trustor predicts, 
potentially including the effects of coercion, deception, and narrow self-interest. See, for instance, Dasgupta 
2000; Hardin 2002. Hardin’s concept of trust is slightly narrower than Dasgupta’s. Hardin’s encapsulated 
interest theory requires that the trustor believe that the trustee will come through because the relationship 
with the trustor is beneficial to him (Hardin 3). Dasgupta merely requires that the trustor believe that the 
trustee will do something, even if the trustee’s reliability is unintentional (Dasgupta 55-56). I am inclined to 
see the will-based and risk-assessment camps more as interested in different concepts of trust than as 
disagreeing substantively. 
85 Holton 1994, 2 
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trust, vulnerable to betrayal. This is likely not by design for Baier and Jones, and certainly not for 
Hieronymi and Cogley, who both attempt to exclude the trickster case.  
Cogley’s solution is especially promising, benefiting from the important insight that trust 
has a normative component. As we shall see, however, it remains possible for a trickster to satisfy 
the conditions of Cogley’s trust account. I am nonetheless convinced that Cogley was right to fix 
on the normativity of trust as key to solving the trickster problem. If only we had an account of 
trust specifically adapted to explaining trust’s normative features, we might finally understand 
why it is that the trickster does not trust. And if ruling out the trickster case is a consequence of 
correctly accounting for these normative features, then solving the trickster problem can be used 
to guide the construction of a normatively focused account. In order to explore this possibility, 
the goal of this chapter is twofold: to solve the trickster problem, and to account for the 
normative features of trust. I proceed by constructing an account of trust designed to achieve 
both aims. If I succeed, my account of trust will not only have the advantage of explaining trust’s 
normativity, it will also be extensionally superior to the will-based theories on offer, which fail to 
exclude the case of the trickster. 
This paper divides into five sections. The first reviews the trickster problem and the 
solutions offered by Holton, Hieronymi, and Cogley. The second section considers the normative 
features of trust relationships, features to be explained by a normative account of trust. 
Importantly, it will turn out that trust is normative, but in a non-moral way. The third section 
considers a suitable form of non-moral normativity. The paper culminates in the fourth section, 
which proposes an account of trust that employs the form of normativity developed in the third 
section, that explains the normative features of trust relationships discussed in the second 
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section, and that solves the trickster problem discussed in the first section. The concluding 
section explores the significance of betrayal, which connects trust to regret and punishment. 
I. Prior Solutions to the Trickster Problem 
Holton proposes the trickster as a counterexample to the characteristic requirement of 
will-based trust theories, namely, that the trustor rely on the trustee’s good will and competence. 
The trickster, after all, may rely on the victim’s good will (and presumably, on her competence), 
yet intuitively, he does not trust her during his fraud.86 The trickster’s modus operandi is to rely 
on his victim to rely on him. He then exploits her reliance to his benefit and her detriment. For 
instance, suppose that a financial advisor approaches someone with an offer to invest her life 
savings. Predictably cautious, she decides to try him out by investing an insignificant sum with 
him, intending to withdraw her principal after several months—or whatever is left of it, if 
anything, should he turn out to be incompetent or a fraud. She tells him at the outset that she will 
invest her savings with him if he skillfully manages this smaller sum. Several months later, she 
withdraws her entire original investment as planned, and in the meantime, she has received 
several checks of market-beating returns. Concluding that the advisor is trustworthy, she invests a 
much larger sum with him. He turns out to be a confidence trickster after all, vanishing with her 
savings. In reality, the trickster did not bother to invest the initial small sum. His willingness to 
return it and to pay out “returns” were ruses to induce her to give him control over her savings. If 
 
86 Holton 1994, 2. In this same place, Holton also argues that good will is not sufficient for trust since a 
“member of an estranged couple between whom there is precious little goodwill can still trust the other to 
look after the children.” The insufficiency of good will is undisputed by will-based theorists themselves, 
however, since belief in the trustee’s competence is universally understood to be a necessary condition of 
the trustor’s trust. 
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she had decided not to invest with him again, he would have lost his own money—perhaps a 
substantial amount for him.  
Does the trickster trust his victim when, in order to profit and to recoup the phony 
returns, he relies on her to invest with him again? He does something outwardly resembling trust, 
certainly, but does he, in fact, trust? It does not seem right to say that he does: there is something 
intuitively disqualifying about his reliance’s role as a means to defrauding his victim.  
Can we explain this intuition by appealing to trust’s hallmark, namely, the vulnerability to 
betrayal? Suppose that the trickster does trust his victim. In that case, she would betray him if she 
did not invest with him again after his excellent performance. Perhaps the situation struck her 
more and more as fishy, somehow, though she could not support her suspicion with reasons, nor 
was her suspicion itself an objectively reliable sign of untrustworthiness. But is it correct to 
characterize this decision as a betrayal? She does something outwardly resembling betrayal, 
especially if she led him to believe that she would hand over her savings should he do well with 
her trial investment. Despite this change of heart, however, there is something intuitively 
exculpating about her ignorance of his relevant intentions, since she would never have relied on 
him had she known them. 
Holton’s solution to the problem he raises is to propose that trust is reliance from the 
participant stance, a concept he borrows from P. F. Strawson, whose own term is the participant 
attitude. This is “the attitude (or range of attitudes) of involvement or participation in a human 
relationship,” where one is disposed to feel particular participant attitudes87 (the more specific 
 
87 Or reactive attitudes (7), or participant reactive attitudes (10), terms that Strawson appears to use 
interchangeably, and not to distinguish species or genus. 
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attitudes in the “range” of the attitude) towards another person, at least some of which are 
reactions to whether he or she manifests the “degree of goodwill or regard” that we “demand… on 
the part of those who stand in these [personal] relationships to us.” The presence or absence of 
the expected “degree of goodwill or regard” activates a disposition towards gratitude or 
resentment independent of the good or harm incurred. For instance, “If someone treads on my 
hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute than if he treads on it in 
contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall 
generally feel in the second case a kind and degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the 
first.”88 
Holton asserts that the trickster does not trust on account of relying on our good will 
without adopting the participant stance towards us—while “treat[ing] us simply as objects to be 
manipulated to his advantage.”89 Holton does little to elaborate on this claim, though he is clearly 
trying to articulate the intuition that the trickster is not altogether relating to us as one agent to 
another, but rather as an agent to a mere means.  
Hieronymi offers an “admittedly very sketchy suggestion” to explain how, exactly, the 
trickster fails to take the participant stance towards his victim. For Hieronymi, if I were take the 
participant stance towards you, I would think of your intentions as products of reasons, and not 
merely as psychological facts useful for predicting your behavior. Now, I do not merely keep in 
mind the fact that your intentions issue from reasons, but rather, “I… allow your reasons to factor 
into my thinking and support my beliefs and decisions in something like the way my own 
 
88 Strawson 2008, 6–10 
89 Holton 1994, 5 
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[reasons] will.” Were I to do this, “it seems right to say that I adopt the participant stance towards 
you.”90 The trickster, presumably, does not think of his victim’s intentions in this way. 
The sketchiest yet perhaps most crucial part of Hieronymi’s “sketchy suggestion” about 
the participant stance concerns what she means by ‘reason’, and what, exactly, my relationship is 
to your “reasons” that makes them “something like” my own reasons. Two interpretations come to 
mind. The first is that your reasons are considerations that justify your intentions. In “something 
like” the way I am moved to find my own intentions justified by attending to my reasons, I am 
also moved to find your intentions justified by attending to your reasons. I set this interpretation 
aside because Hieronymi does not elaborate, nor is this interpretation what Cogley takes to be 
right when he disputes Hieronymi’s solution to the trickster problem. I am sympathetic to this 
direction, however, as it suggests an intuition articulated in Karen Jones’s generic concept of good 
will, Abraham Roth’s concept of practical intimacy, and my own concept of volitional empathy, all 
of which I discuss below in my section entitled “Trust’s Normativity.” 
The second interpretation of Hieronymi’s participant stance suggestion is what Cogley 
takes her to be saying, and which he criticizes as failing to rule out the trickster’s initial reliance as 
trust. On this interpretation, your “reasons” are the goals and the instrumental considerations 
salient to you that, together, explain your intentions. I take the participant stance towards you by 
keeping these explanatory factors in mind. These factors are “something like” my reasons, perhaps 
because, counterfactually, they would explain my having the intention that you actually have, 
were I to have your goals and were the same instrumental considerations salient to me. I might 
assume your point of view in this way to simulate your thinking, perhaps as if to predict your next 
 
90 Hieronymi 2008, 225–27 
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move in chess: were I to somehow play against someone exactly like myself, and were I to see 
exactly the same opportunities that you see, then the move I would make is the one I predict you 
will choose. 
We recall that the point of Hieronymi’s suggestion is to explain how the trickster does not 
take the participant stance towards his victim when he relies on her. If the suggestion succeeds, 
Hieronymi’s participant stance view of trust could rule out the trickster’s initial reliance, thereby 
solving the trickster problem. Against this solution, Cogley argues that the trickster can, in fact, 
take the participant stance towards his victim—the participant stance, at least, as understood 
according to the second interpretation of Hieronymi’s suggestion. Cogley’s first move is to argue 
that the participant stance view is too weak, counting too many cases of reliance as trust, 
including cases of mere reliance: 
[M]any cases of simply relying on another person will involve an 
implicit reference to that person’s reasons, given that we are dealing with 
another agent. For example, I rely on other motorists to allow me to proceed 
first when I arrive at a 4-way stop before they have. If I consider why I rely on 
them it is because I have certain beliefs about their reasons: I believe they want 
to avoid accidents and being cited by the police, and that these reasons are 
sufficient to get them to follow most traffic laws. But simply bringing the 
content of the reasons of others to mind does not amount to trusting them. Nor 
would it be reasonable for me to feel betrayed if one of the other drivers 
entered the intersection before me. While anger or exasperation might be 
reasonable for me to feel toward the driver, it would not be appropriate to feel 
betrayed.91 
 
91 Cogley 2012, 38 
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Cogley applies the foregoing reasoning to show that Hieronymi’s proposal would also 
count tricksters as trusting. Invoking the infamous Ponzi schemer Bernie Madoff, Cogley writes: 
When Madoff relies on his potential victim to go along with his plan, we 
can suppose that he has many true beliefs about the kinds of considerations 
that she tends to view as reasons. As a good-hearted person, she tends to 
support the plans of other people and she has even more of a soft spot for 
friends of her friends. Madoff knows that she tends to be frugal with her money, 
but also will take a chance from time to time on a more risky investment. 
Furthermore, he correctly surmises that she finds his current list of clients very 
impressive, which gives her confidence in his excellence as an investment 
advisor.92 
In this example, Madoff does seem to bear in mind not only his victim’s intentions, but 
also how these intentions are explained by the victim’s goals and by the instrumental 
considerations salient to her. If bearing these factors in mind is all that it takes to assume the 
participant stance, then Madoff certainly assumes it. 
Cogley’s rebuttal of the participant stance view may not do justice to Strawson’s original 
idea that both Hieronymi and H0lton invoke. The participant stance, we recall, is supposed to be 
a disposition to react to your treatment of me with emotionally-valenced attitudes like gratitude 
or resentment. The disposition to these reactive attitudes must therefore be part of the 
participant stance, even if Hieronymi also thinks that a necessary condition of the participant 
stance is keeping someone’s goals and instrumental considerations in mind. Indeed, the 
assumption behind the participant stance view may well be that the trickster is some kind of 
amoral sociopath, one emotionally detached from his victims in a way that normal people are 
 
92 Cogley 2012, 39 
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emotionally detached from inanimate objects. The emotional dispositions characteristic of 
Strawson’s original idea would then be of the essence of the participant stance view. Thus, if 
Cogley means to show that the trickster can take the participant stance, he must show that the 
trickster can have a disposition to reactive attitudes towards his victims. It is not enough to show 
that the trickster can bear his victims’ goals and instrumental considerations in mind. 
Can the trickster be disposed to reactive attitudes towards his victims? Can he assume the 
participant stance in Strawson’s original sense? In support of Cogley criticism, and against Holton 
and Hieronymi, I think that this is quite possible. Consider a trickster who is not an amoral 
sociopath. Jacques, we’ll call him, is a successful accountant, a family man, and a pillar of his 
community. Unknown to nearly everyone, however, he is also deeply in debt to the mob, which 
has just delivered an ultimatum: he has one week to repay his debt before they collect their pound 
of flesh from his family. Jacques doesn’t have the money or the assets, but he does have a number 
of wealthy friends. One by one, he appeals to them for help. He is vague about his situation, but 
his desperation is evident. His friends will be promptly repaid once he resolves his problem, he 
assures them, knowing full well that whatever money they lend him they will never see again. 
Privately, he is beside himself with guilt, but he would sooner bilk his own friends out of 
hundreds of thousands than abandon his family to a mafia hit squad.93 
On Jacques’s very last day to come up with the money, he approaches Grace, his best 
friend, whom he has known all his life. She listens to him with sympathy but finds herself very 
reluctant to help. Several years ago, you see, she lent an acquaintance a large sum of money that 
was never repaid, and since then she resolved to neither a borrower nor a lender be. Jacques 
 
93 Thanks to Jeff Helmreich for suggesting this example. 
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pleads with her, but at length she declines. In short, Jacques relied on Grace to rely on him, but 
her reliance was not forthcoming.  
Pace Holton and Hieronymi, I offer this case as an example of how a trickster might take 
the participant stance, in the proper Strawsonian sense, towards his own victim. Under the 
circumstances, it seems not only possible but even likely that Jacques resents Grace. After all, he 
took her for his best friend, and in this time of his greatest need, he felt entitled to her help, even 
if it must be unwitting. It would be astonishing if Jacques’s resentment and sense of entitlement 
were totally annulled by his consciousness of his own guilty intentions, or even by the real 
possibility that Grace would have given him the money he needed had he only been able to bring 
himself to tell her the truth.  
The case of Jacques seems to support Cogley’s rejection of the participant stance approach 
to solving the trickster problem, even if Cogley himself does not do justice to those solutions. As 
for Cogley’s own solution, his strategy is to add a condition to the will-based analysis of trust, a 
condition involving a putatively normative relationship between the trustor and the trustee. 
Cogley’s proposal is as follows: 
To trust someone is (i) to believe that because a person will be directly 
and favorably moved toward us we can count on her good will and competence 
governing our interactions in a particular domain and (ii) to believe that we are 
entitled to her good will because we are party to a normatively characterized 
relationship with that person.94 
 
94 Cogley 2012, 44 
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The trustor must not only believe in the trustee’s good will, but believe that she is entitled 
to it. This entitlement constitutes a “norm of trust” that characterizes the relationship between 
the trustor and the trustee. The trustee betrays the trustor, endangering their relationship, when 
he violates the norm by failing to have the good will to which the trustor believes herself entitled. 
This violation occasions feelings like anger, disgust, or sadness—feelings that give betrayal its 
emotional color, though they are not themselves sufficient to distinguish betrayal from mere 
disappointment: “Feelings of betrayal tend to be more intense,” reasons Cogley, “But the 
difference between feeling betrayed and feeling disappointed continues to assert itself even if we 
suppose that the intensity is equivalent across an episode of betrayal and disappointment. This is 
because feeling betrayed involves an implicit reference to the external situation—the breach of a 
relationship—that warrants the emotion.”95  
Cogley’s general strategy for solving the trickster problem is to show that the trickster is 
not vulnerable to betrayal. Since trust requires that the trustor be vulnerable to betrayal, Cogley 
would thereby show that the trickster does not trust. How, then, is the trickster not vulnerable to 
betrayal? Returning to the example of Bernie Madoff, Cogley writes, “Madoff is not entitled to take 
his victim’s good will toward him to get her to go along with his scheme. Consequently, Madoff’s 
victim does not owe him her good will.” And indeed, this plausibly explains why Madoff, as Cogley 
predicts, could not reasonably feel betrayed if a potential victim turned him down.96 
Madoff could, however, feel betrayed. The feeling would be unreasonable, as many 
feelings are, but he could still have it, on account of having the false belief that he is entitled to 
 
95 Cogley 2012, 40–41. Cogley appeals to Margaret Gilbert’s idea that relationships are constituted by 
norms—their “terms” (Cogley 2012, 46n16; see Gilbert 2006, 149-153) 
96 Cogley 2012, 36 
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his victims’ good will, just as Jacques believes himself entitled to Grace’s good will. Since Madoff 
would not in fact be entitled to his victim’s good will, he is not in fact party to a normatively 
characterized relationship, or at least not one characterized by the norm of trust that Cogley 
posits. Cogley explicitly acknowledges such cases when he explains that his “account does not 
require that someone actually be a party to a relationship of the requisite kind,” one whose 
constitutive normative character gives one an entitlement, “in order to count as trusting—it is 
sufficient for trust that someone believes himself to be a party to such a relationship.” Cogley then 
gives the example of an unfaithful lover who really does trust his partner to be faithful despite 
having “no compunction about cheating” himself, and who is consequently vulnerable to feeling 
betrayed should his partner follow his faithless example. As Cogley explains: 
Given his own transgressions, his trusting would be unreasonable 
because his unwillingness to be faithful means he is not entitled to fidelity from 
his partner. He is not entitled to his partner being directly moved by the fact 
that he is counting on the partner not to cheat. My account of trust can 
correctly characterize this case as unreasonable, but extant, trust, because it 
does not require that the relationship is as the trusting one believes it to be—
though reasonable trust does require this.97 
The possibility of falsely believing oneself entitled to another’s good will undercuts 
Cogley’s solution to the trickster problem, since it means that the trickster can satisfy Cogley’s 
conditions of trust. It is possible for Madoff (i) to believe that because his potential victim will be 
directly and favorably moved toward him, he can count on her good will and competence in the 
domain of writing cashing checks to well-regarded money managers sharing her cultural 
 
97 Cogley 2012, 44 
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background98; and, crucially, for Madoff (ii) to believe—however falsely—that he is entitled to her 
good will because he is party to a normatively characterized relationship with her.  
The solution to Cogley’s problem is straightforward: to avoid counting tricksters with false 
beliefs as trustors, we simply require trustors not only to believe but to truly believe themselves to 
be parties to normatively characterized relationships with their trustees. In other words, trustors 
must not only believe that they are entitled to their trustees’ good will, they must actually be 
entitled to their trustees’ good will. 
II. The Normative Features of Trust Relationships 
If we are going to say that in all cases of trust, a real entitlement exists—one that actually 
binds trustees—then we immediately face the following question: what is the nature of this 
normative relationship? Before giving an answer to this question, we should consider what an 
answer would look like—what features a normative theory of trust would explain. In this section, 
I collect these explananda. 
It would be convenient if trust’s normativity were simply moral normativity. After all, we 
can have false beliefs about our moral entitlements, and it is usually straightforwardly wrong, 
morally speaking, to betray someone’s trust. Unfortunately, this route is problematic. As Philip 
Nickel writes: 
What does morality have to do with trust? Nothing much, one might 
say: the relationship of trust can hold between two apparently amoral people. 
For, first, it is possible to trust somebody to do what is morally bad; thieves and 
gangsters can be trusted rationally. Second, bad people, just like anybody else, 
 
98 Sales 2018 
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can trust others. And third, people often use amoral criteria when they trust, in 
the sense that the grounds on which they draw the distinction between the 
trustworthy and the trustworthy are not moral grounds. Trust can be non-
moral in its object, its hold, and its ground—even in all three at once. We can 
label this the Possibility of Amoral Trust.99 
It appears that I must either show that trust is morally normative despite the Possibility of 
Amoral Trust, or I must describe a non-moral kind of practical normativity. I adopt the second 
strategy, which exchanges the paradox of amoral yet somehow morally normative trust for the 
question of what sort of practical normativity trust would have if not moral normativity. Let this, 
then, be the first normative feature of trust, namely, its non-moral character.  
Trust’s non-moral character is but one of several normative features that trust shares with 
Margaret Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment, which I briefly sketch below. These features also 
include the special standing of the trustor to demand that the trustee perform and to rebuke the 
trustee who fails to perform. A further normative feature of trust, and one not shared with joint 
commitment, is the power of the trustor to unilaterally rescind a trust obligation. 
Gilbert proposes joint commitment as the ground of the normative relations constituting 
shared agency, such as when you and I—when we—have lunch together, go for a walk together, 
jointly believe or decide something, form an agreement, and make and accept a promise, among 
many other cases. The ensuing normative state of affairs is one where we owe it to each other to 
get and to stay with the program—our program—so to speak. “Correlated with these obligations 
 
99 Nickel 2007, 309. Nickel cites Baier (1992, 110) and Hardin (2002, 75) for the first two points concerning 
the non-moral object and hold of trust. This possibility is reminiscent of Margaret Gilbert’s discussion of 
immoral promissory obligations (Gilbert . Unlike Gilbert, who commits to the existence of such obligations 
as a manifestation of non-moral normativity, Nickel understands them as incorrect ascriptions of moral 
obligations. I will presently adopt Gilbert’s strategy. 
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of the parties,” Gilbert elaborates, “Are rights in the parties against one another: rights to actions 
that conform to the joint commitment. Correlated, again, with these obligations and rights is an 
important kind of standing or authority: the standing to demand conforming action and rebuke 
for non-conformity.”100 We should note that persons not party to a given joint commitment do 
not have the obligations, correlative rights, and correlative standing to demand and rebuke. For 
instance, I would not have standing to rebuke one stranger for breaking a promise to another, 
other things being equal, though the aggrieved stranger would have this standing. We should also 
take note of the non-moral character of joint commitment’s normativity. The promise between 
the two strangers, for instance, might have been to do something immoral, and they would have 
been obligated accordingly. This is to say that the obligations of joint commitment are not moral 
obligations, nor is their existence subject to any moral constraints.101 
We have already considered why trust normativity is non-moral, a conclusion motivated 
by the problem of reconciling a moral conception of trust with the Possibility of Amoral Trust. 
With respect to the special standing of the trustor, consider that there is nothing inappropriate, 
other things being equal, about a trustor mentioning a trust relationship while speaking with the 
trustee, just as there is nothing inappropriate, other things being equal, about a third party 
mentioning the trust relationship while speaking with the trustee. This would be unsurprising but 
for an almost inevitable crucial difference between the force of the trustor’s mention and the force 
of the third party’s mention. Consider that when speaking with a trustee, it is difficult for a trustor 
to mention their particular trust relationship—that the trustor trusts the trustee to see to some 
 
100 Gilbert 2015e, 8.  
101 Gilbert 2015g, 321–22.  
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particular thing—without implicitly demanding or rebuking.102 Indeed, a very common trust 
demand takes the form of a simple report of the current existence of a trust relationship: “I’m 
trusting you.” Almost any mention of the trust relationship by the trustor, however gentle or 
circumspect, is bound to have the air of demand. Similarly, a very common rebuke of betrayal 
takes the form of a simple report of the past existence of a trust relationship—“I trusted you.” No 
mention of the betrayal itself is necessary. Almost any mention by the betrayed trustor to the 
erstwhile trustee of their breached trust relationship is accordingly bound to have the air of 
rebuke. I take this as reflecting the close conceptual connection between trust and the trustor’s 
standing to demand and to rebuke—a connection so intimate that when speaking with a trustee, 
the trustor’s mere mention of their trust relationship is enough for a demand or rebuke to be 
communicated. 
A normative feature of trust not shared with joint commitment relationships is the power 
of the trustor to unilaterally rescind the trustee’s obligation qua trustee.103 This power exists 
because trust requires that the trustor rely on the trustee.104 As a trustor can unilaterally cease to 
rely, she can unilaterally remove a necessary condition of the trust relationship grounding the 
trustee’s obligation. This power seems to bear out in practice. Suppose that I trust you to drive me 
 
102 Perhaps the trustor might declare, “I trust you very much,” or perhaps, “I trust you implicitly.” But these 
statements do not so much refer to a trust relationship as they assert that the trustor finds the trustee 
trustworthy. 
103 Gilbert 2015b, 32. A joint commitment cannot be unilaterally rescinded by any single party.  
104 Trust requires reliance on my account, and also according many theorists across many camps, including 
Baier, Hieronymi, Dasgupta, and Holton. The role of reliance in Jones, Hardin, and Cogley is murkier, but 
trust for them still depends on the trustor’s attitudes. While these may not be under the trustor’s direct 
voluntary control, they nonetheless make trust (and any obligations it grounds) unilateral insofar as it 
depends on the trustor alone. 
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home from the airport tonight, and that you are consequently obligated to pick me up.105 The day 
before I fly home, however, I decide to prolong my trip, and so I call you to say that you needn’t 
pick me up after all. Your consent to being released is immaterial: even if, for some reason, you 
declare over the phone that you refuse to be released from your trust obligation, it is intuitively 
no longer in your power to betray me by failing to pick me up. It likewise seems clear that should 
I fly back on the original date after all—perhaps it proved too expensive to change my return 
flight—it would no longer be apt for me to rebuke you for betraying my trust by not picking me 
up. It seems, then, that whatever other obligations you may have concerning picking me up, your 
trust obligation was unilaterally terminated without your consent and, indeed, over your 
protests.106 
III. Trust’s Normativity 
This section will discuss how trust can be normative without be morally normative. As 
mentioned earlier, the distinguishing feature of will-based theories of trust is that, other than 
competence, the trustor counts on something distinct from the trustee’s interest.107 This 
 
105 I use a pre-theoretical normative notion of trust here. It at least involves reliance, some kind of shared 
understanding between the trustee and the trustor, some kind of ensuing obligation binding the trustee to 
perform in accordance with the trustor’s reliance, and the standing of the trustor to rebuke the trustee for 
betrayal when appropriate. I do not mean to suggest that the mere fact of my reliance obligates you to 
perform, whatever you may have to say about it. 
106 Perhaps you were looking forward to sharing a late dinner after picking me up. In fact, you’ve always 
picked me up from the airport, we’ve always had a meal together afterwards, and I’ve always scheduled my 
return flight for when you are available. You are now disappointed to hear me announce over the phone 
that I intend to return on a day when you are not free. Gilbert would probably analyze our little tradition as 
having constitutive joint commitment obligations that neither party can unilaterally rescind, and what is 
more, as involving an obligation on my part to arrive at the airport when you are available so that we can 
have dinner afterwards. Granting these obligations, the intuition that I can still unilaterally cancel your 
ability to betray my trust suggests that trust obligations are at least somewhat independent of the 
obligations of joint commitment. 
107 E.g., Baier 1986; Jones 1996; Hieronymi 2008; Cogley 2012. Hieronymi takes some inspiration from Holton 
1994, who is not a good will theorist, denying as he does that good will is either necessary or sufficient for 
trust (2). 
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something is what will-based theorists call ‘good will’, and it is from a conception of good will that 
I plan to derive the normativity of trust.  
What, exactly, do trust theorists themselves mean by ‘good will’? Jones has criticized the 
literature’s use of the term as “a meaningless catchall that merely reports the presence of some 
positive motive.” That said, among these motives she discovers a “kind of unity”: “If I have robust 
goodwill toward someone, of the kind found in friendship or good collegial relations, I will take 
the fact that they are counting on me to be a reason to act as I am being counted on in my 
motivationally efficacious deliberation.”108 Normativity is already implicit in this conception of 
good will since the agent takes the fact that others are counting on her as a reason to act. 
For Jones, this generic good will does not appear to depend on one’s social role, though 
one’s social role may depend in part on the existence of good will. For instance, it is not because 
someone is a friend that one takes her reliance as a reason to act accordingly, though it is because 
(perhaps among other things) one takes her reliance as a reason to act accordingly that she is a 
friend.109 This kind of role-independent responsiveness is similar to Abraham Roth’s concept of 
practical intimacy, whereby one person can act directly on another person’s intention, as Roth 
posits in his account of shared agency. The deliberative process Roth describes when one acts in 
this way is of particular interest: 
I need not have deliberated over, weighed, or recognized reasons for 
doing this or that. If anyone had to have done so, it was this other individual, 
the intender. I didn’t decide or settle the issue of what to do regarding this 
matter; the other individual did that. Her decision does not merely provide a 
 
108 Jones 2012, 67 
109 2012, 68. Compare Jones’s concept of conscientiousness, which is role-dependent. 
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strong reason for me to act as she intends for me to do, a reason that is 
supposed to enter into my deliberation about what to do. Rather, what we’re 
envisioning is that I do not deliberate at all, or at least not enough to 
undermine this other individual’s ability and authority to settle what it is that 
I’m to do.110 
It is not entirely clear whether Roth sees practical intimacy as circumventing the agent’s 
normal practical reasoning process (where “I do not deliberate at all”), or as submitting to that 
process a reason the agent takes as sufficient (perhaps I deliberate but “not enough” by 
considering all potential objections as answered without examining them myself).  
In my own account of trust, ‘good will’ is cashed out in a way similar in some respects to 
Jones’s generic concept of good will and to Roth’s concept of practical intimacy. I call volitional 
empathy what it is, exactly, that I have in mind. The concept of volitional empathy shares with 
Jones’s generic good will and Roth’s practical intimacy the idea that one’s actions can be 
connected to the practical reasoning of another agent in a way more direct than a mere 
coincidence of interests. Volitional empathy is more general than Jones’s good will, however, in 
that one may volitionally empathize with a person who is not already relying on one (as when one 
is moved to offer unsolicited help). And unlike Roth’s practical intimacy, volitional empathy 
involves volitions rather than intentions. While volitions and intentions are intimately related, 
they are importantly different, as I will discuss in my final section on the significance of betrayal.111 
In addition, volitional empathy does not short-circuit the agent’s own practical reasoning, but 
rather submits to it a reason the agent takes as sufficient, or more precisely, as controlling. An 
 
110 Roth 2004, 384–85 
111 This distinction is especially important when relating trust to regret, which I conceive of involving past-
0riented volitions. Past-oriented intentions may not be possible, as they are known to the agent to be futile. 
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agent’s controlling reason is an internal reason psychologically analogous to a sufficient reason, in 
the sense that it would determine, on account of its importance to her, the outcome of her 
practical deliberation in conditions of adequate information. I distinguish controlling reasons 
from sufficient reasons to avoid the impression that controlling reasons must be sufficient in an 
externally normative sense. 
Cutting to the chase,112 an agent G volitionally empathizes with an agent H, with respect to 
an event v, if and only if: 
(i) H wills that G sees to it that v, 
(ii) (i) is an internal reason for G to will that G himself see to it that v, and 
(iii) The weight of (i) in G’s economy of internal reasons is proportional to the urgency to 
H of G seeing to it that v. 
By volitional empathy I mean all cases of volitional empathizing, and by volitional empathy 
disposition I mean an agent’s disposition to volitionally empathize. A concordant will is a volition 
of the form acquired by volitional empathy—G’s volition that he himself see to it that v in (3).113 
G’s volitional reasonH is H’s willing that G see to it that v qua consideration for G to will 
concordantly. A volitional reason may be controlling or non-controlling for G in the sense just 
described. Volitional reasons may also be efficacious or inefficacious for G, depending on whether 
 
112 See the introduction for a less abstract overview. 
113 Concordant wills are simply volitions with the same content belonging to different agents. They may 
issue from some process other than volitional empathy, like a prospective advantage to A or even sheer 
coincidence. When a distinction in time can be made, the concordant will is the volition occurring second. 
Thus, it is A’s will that is concordant (or concordant with B’s will), and not B’s will that is concordant (or 
concordant with A’s). 
 
 
93 
 
 
they successfully move G to will that he see to it that v—that is, depending on whether G is 
akratic. 
I intend (i) and (ii) to capture a certain psychological and normative experience whereby 
another agent’s goal-directed behavior seems to directly prompt one’s help or one’s 
noninterference. Declining this prompt is possible, but declining without justification warrants 
blame, and is in that sense and to that extent wrong. In more psychological terms, volitional 
empathy is the normatively laden attraction to helping and aversion to ruining what one 
perceives as a goal directed effort, together with the action motivated and warranted by this 
normatively involved attraction and aversion. 
I wish to stress three points. First, the reasons of volitional empathy are internal reasons in 
Bernard Williams’s sense, which I take to be considerations playing a reason-giving role in an 
agent’s practical reasoning given that agent’s set of motivations, as well as considerations that 
would play this role were the agent aware of them.114 I set aside, as much as possible, the question 
of how volitional reasons are related to motivation-independent “external” reasons; as well as how 
volitional reasons are related to other internal reasons, except that I take for granted that it is 
psychologically difficult and uncomfortable to hold incompatible internal reasons where one is 
aware of this incompatibility, and that we are disposed by this and perhaps by other factors to 
resolve incoherencies of this kind.  
Second, the volitional empathy disposition does not require indiscriminate volitional 
empathizing. Suppose, for instance, that one spots M mugging P. Any volitional reasonsM may be 
 
114 Williams 1982a 
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swamped by more salient volitional reasonsP, perhaps to the point where considerations in favor 
of the mugger don’t even come to mind. Alternatively, volitional reasonsM might be swamped or 
defeated solely by nonvolitional considerations such as a general moral conviction against 
assaulting and robbing people, or by such considerations in combination with volitional reasonsP. 
That said, I don’t rule out the possibility that volitional reasonsM might be controlling for an agent 
wearing the right sort of blinders, or at least salient enough to be noticed—if only to be 
overruled—by someone not thus equipped, as one might come to root for a Michael Corleone or a 
Tony Soprano.115 
Third, the reason-taking of volitional empathy does not involve the explicit or implicit 
mediation of a general normative principle covering the case under consideration.116 For example, 
volitional empathy might involve the sight of a stranger trying to get up from a fall, where that 
sight by itself prompts one to help her. To feel prompted in this way, one does not need to consult 
a general principle requiring one to help others in cases like this. Rather, the stranger’s very effort 
to get up seems to require that one assist, or at least that one not interfere. Whether one is 
prompted to assist or merely not to interfere may depend on the circumstances of the case. For 
instance, if the person sprawled on the pavement looks at you plaintively as she struggles to rise 
to her feet, then it will likely seem that you are required to assist, and not merely to refrain from 
kicking her back to the ground. 
 
115 Blinders might include racial prejudice or some other syndrome of beliefs or dispositions that arbitrarily 
denies or diminishes someone as a possible subject of volitions. For instance, Hitler’s description of Jews as 
a “racial tuberculosis” (“Adolf Hitler’s First Anti-Semitic Writing” n.d.). 
116 Although volitional empathy might supply intuitions one might take as evidence for a general moral 
principle. But volitional empathy would precede rather than be preceded by such a principle in the order of 
discovery. 
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IV. Normative Trust 
In this section I develop my normative account of trust, where the normativity I have in 
mind is the non-moral variety described in the previous section. This account aims to solve the 
trickster problem, to explain the power of the trustor to unilaterally rescind the trustee’s 
obligation qua trustee, and to explain the special standing of the trustor to demand and rebuke. 
With one elaboration, I take for granted the concepts of competence and reliance when I 
say that an agent R may rely on another agent E to see to it that v, and where E, in turn, can be 
competent to see to that v. The elaboration is that R’s reliance on E to see to it that v is 
constituted, at least in part, by R’s volition that E see to it that v. I also make use of the concept of 
good will, which I understand in terms of volitional empathy as described earlier.  
With these concepts in place, we may say what makes someone trustworthy. Namely, E, a 
potential trustee, is trustworthy with respect to R, a potential trustor, to see to it that v, an event, 
if and only if: 
E is competent to see to it that v, and 
E bears R good will with respect to v: if R relies on E to see to it that v, then E will have a 
controlling volitional reasonR to see to it that v. 
I mention trustworthiness first because will-based trust involves reliance on the trust-
warranting (rather than mere reliance warranting) considerations bearing on a trustee’s 
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reliability.117 These considerations deserve to be understood as the conditions of trustworthiness 
on a will-based trust theory, since they alone can make someone worthy of another’s trust.118 
Trustworthiness is not itself trust as it cannot be betrayed: however surprised or 
disappointed we might be, we would not say that we are betrayed if someone on whom we are not 
currently relying, but whom we considered trustworthy, turns out to be a fraud and a pathological 
liar. The possibility of betrayal seems to require actual reliance—in particular, the reliance 
specifically characteristic of trust, which takes into account only the trustworthiness of the trustee 
as it appears to the trustor (and thus allows the possibility of trusting the untrustworthy).  
Trust reliance (T): R relies on E to see to it that v only because R believes that E is 
trustworthy with respect to R and v. 
If offered on its own as a will-based theory of trust, trust reliance would be hard to pick 
out from a lineup of other will-based theories, and in fact, closely approaches the first condition 
of Cogley’s account of trust—a condition that is, in essence, Jones’s account of trust with a 
friendly revision replacing Jones’s attitude of optimism with Cogley’s belief attitude.119  
 
117 Hieronymi 2008, 218–24 
118 All will-based theories aside from Baier’s require the trustor to bear an attitude towards the trustee’s 
competence and good will that disposes the trustor to rely on him. The theories of Hieronymi and Cogley 
require the attitude of belief, while Jones requires a weaker “attitude of optimism” (1996, 4) that Cogley 
critiques as inadequate to distinguish trust from hope and as failing to make the attitude warrant trust 
reliance (2012, 35). Baier does not specify an attitude, and specifically rules out belief, which she considers 
incompatible with unconscious trust, though she does not seem to consider the possibility of dispositional 
belief. It is, in any event, unclear how Baier would analyze the ill-advised trust—but trust nonetheless—of 
someone whose good will or competence is lacking. Interposing an attitude, such as belief, resolve this 
difficulty. 
119 Cogley 2012, 35–36 
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A trickster, however, can satisfy the trust reliance condition. Trust reliance is therefore at 
best one of several conditions of trust. We might strengthen it with another condition, 
reminiscent of Cogley, and informed by the normative insight: 
Control belief (BRC): R believes that if T, then E has a controlling 
volitional reasonR to see to it that v. 
BRC is similar to the normative condition proposed by Cogley, though instead of the 
trustor directly imputing to himself an entitlement, BRC has the trustor impute to the trustee a 
controlling internal reason as a consequence of the trustor’s trust reliance. And like Cogley’s 
normative condition, BRC goes some way towards explaining the trustor’s feeling of betrayal as a 
response to being denied something to which the trustor believes she is entitled.  
Unfortunately, BRC does not exclude all tricksters. As with Cogley’s condition, BRC can be 
satisfied by tricksters who genuinely but falsely believe that the trustee is obligated to perform, as 
Jacques feels about Grace. As we discussed earlier at length, we must take the normativity of trust 
outside the trustor’s belief context. Doing so yields the following condition: 
Control (C): if R trustingly relies on E to see to it that v, then E has a 
controlling volitional reasonR to see to it that v. 
The trustee is now normatively bound by trust, since it is not merely in R’s mind that E 
ought to follow through. If anything, the urgency of following through is in E’s own mind, since it 
is on pain of rational incoherence relative to E’s own motivations that E ought to see to it that v. 
As earlier discussed, this is because volitional reasons are internal reasons arising from volitional 
empathy with R, as prompted by R’s reliance on E to see to it that v. It is important that these 
reasons arise from the volitional empathy involved in E’s good will towards R: it would not do for 
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E’s reason to be independent of R’s trusting reliance. In that case, it would be difficult to 
understand betrayal as a violation of trust’s normativity, rather than as a violation of normativity 
independent of trust (e.g., as a moral wrong). 
Using C, we finally exclude from cases of trust the trickster who falsely believes that his 
victim is normatively bound to perform. The trickster can still trustingly rely on his victim, but 
this reliance could no longer plausibly give his victim a controlling volitional reason to perform: 
the fact of the trickster’s trust reliance would be outweighed by the danger to the victim arising 
from the trickster’s intention to defraud. The victim may well be unaware of this danger, but its 
status as an internal reason for her is unaffected by her ignorance, following Williams’s 
conception of internal reasons. According to Williams, this is because internal reasons must, as 
reasons, not only explain but also rationalize an agent’s actions relative to her motivations. The 
trickster’s intention to defraud would thus prevent his initial trust reliance from rationalizing the 
victim’s decision to participate in his scheme. This is even if the victim’s participation is explained 
by the trickster’s trust reliance and by the victim’s ignorance of his intention to defraud her.120 
C cannot complete my account of trust, however. Intuitively, trust requires some kind of 
mutual understanding between the trustor and trustee, an understanding that the trustor’s trust 
reliance and the trustee’s responsiveness to such reliance do not quite capture, and which is 
required to explain the trustor’s special standing to demand and rebuke the trustee. 
To explain how trust on my analysis produces standing, it will be very helpful to conceive 
of standing using the same conceptual resources employed in explaining trust, namely, the 
 
120 Williams 1982a, 102–3.  
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apparatus of volitional reasons. From this perspective, standing is a kind of psychological leverage 
that a trustor has over a trustee, which the trustor has to the extent that the trustee is averse to 
the rational incoherence of rebelling against one of his own internal reasons—a certain internal 
reason, to be specific, with which the trustor is uniquely able to confront him. As discussed 
earlier, the trustee’s reason, qua trustee, is the trustor’s volition. This volition, for the trustee, is an 
internal reason for him to will concordantly. Now recall that when the trustor says, “I’m trusting 
you,” her utterance has a different force than when a third party says, “R is trusting you.” I 
propose that this is because where the third party refers to the trustor’s volition, the trustor 
presents it by directly manifesting her volition as a conspicuous trying. That is to say, the trustor is 
not merely referring to her volition, but enacting it by trying, by means of her utterance, to carry 
it out—to get E to see to it that v. Nor is there anything discreet about this trying: not only does R 
try to get E to comply by means of mentioning the reason for his compliance, but R intends for E 
to notice that she is trying. It is no accident that R turns the screws on E’s conscience. In this way, 
R confronts E with his own internal reason, which also happens to be R’s volition. 
The trustor’s standing is special, not being shared with third parties, which we can see by 
considering a revealing exception, where she endorses a third party as her representative, speaking 
on her behalf. In this case, the representative’s utterance mentioning the trust relation to the 
trustee is itself the trustor’s visible trying—it is the representative’s effort on the trustor’s behalf 
that manifests her volition. This exception is illuminating because a third party who does not 
speak on the trustor’s behalf may still speak as if on the trustor’s behalf. But in that case, we 
expect that the trustee may reply, and aptly, “It’s none of your business.”121 On my analysis, this 
 
121 See Gilbert 2015f, 288. 
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rebuffs the third party for the false pretense of enacting the trustor’s will when in fact he speaks 
for the sake of his own distinct interest. Compare this with the case where the trustee accepts that 
the third party speaks for the trustor, but refuses to speak with anyone but the trustor herself 
about their trust relationship. “It’s none of your business” seems no longer so apt, as we would 
expect on my analysis, seeing that the trustee here does not believe that the representative’s agent 
is pursuing his own interest distinct from the trustor’s claim. Indeed, we would expect the trustee 
to say something more like, “You can tell R that she can talk to me herself,” perhaps adding, “R 
shouldn’t have involved you,” which declines the conversation but accepts that the third party 
speaks for the trustor. 
I propose two further conditions of trust, KT and KC, that include and expand on the 
foregoing conditions T and C. These more comprehensive conditions complete my account of 
trust by explain how trust relationships give rise to the trustor’s special standing to demand and 
to rebuke. KT and KC, which entail T and C, suffice for a full statement of my theory. 
Known Trust Reliance (KT): 
1) E knows that T, namely, that R relies on E to see to it that v only because R believes that E 
is trustworthy with respect to R and v, and 
2) R knows (1). 
Known Control (KC): 
1) E knows that C, namely, that if R trustingly relies on E to see to it that v, then E has a 
controlling volitional reasonR to see to it that v, and 
2) R knows (3). 
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KT1 and KC1 function together to compel E, on pain of conscious rational incoherence, to 
see to it that v. Without KT1, E does not feel the pressure of rational incoherence because the 
antecedent of the conditional in KC1 does not obviously obtain. Even if it does it fact obtain—even 
if, for instance, both T and C obtain, E would not feel compelled since E does not know that T and 
C obtain. That said, E might learn that T and C obtain and consequently feel compelled, 
distinguishing that case from where T or C does not, in fact, obtain. 
Knowledge of KT1 and KC1 would together allow anyone to soundly argue to anyone that E 
knows he should see to it that v: E knows that P, E knows that if P then Q, therefore, E knows that 
Q, on the assumption that E’s knowledge is closed under known and straightforward deduction. 
In contrast, R’s knowledge of KT1 and KC1, required by KT2 and KC2, allow something in addition, 
and they allow it to R alone: R may not only to soundly argue to anyone but also to demand of E in 
particular that E see to it that v. This is because R alone can manifest her volition by asserting or 
implying that E well knows that T and C, making salient and occurrent to E the rational pressure 
to see to it that v.122 
V. The Significance of Betrayal 
I conclude by exploring the significance of betrayal, which connects trust to the 
phenomena of regret and punishment by way of the betrayed trustor’s standing to rebuke. As 
earlier discussed, when R trusts E, R is able compel E to will that v on pain of rational incoherence. 
 
122 Gilbert has argued that the standing to demand an action in enforcement of a right requires a joint 
commitment among the parties involved. I touch on joint commitment on p. 13 and on pp. 85-88). Many of 
the rights Gilbert has in mind—moral and legal rights, in particular—are rights in a much more robust 
sense than the normative relations discussed in this chapter (Gilbert 2018). While I do believe that these 
relations qualify as rights in a structural sense, much needs to be done to relate them to the more robust, 
externally normative relations that Gilbert’s account underwrites (see note to p. 111). 
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That is to say, while E might conceivably decline to will that v, to do so would be for E to rebel 
against his own controlling volitional reasonR, which is an internal reason of his that he acquires 
by means of his volitional empathy disposition. R’s ability to compel E in this way is R’s standing 
to demand under a psychological description. R’s ability to compel E’s will need not end if E 
betrays her—if E fails to will concordantly in some irrevocable way, such as by disclosing a secret 
that R told him in the strictest confidence. Her ability to compel E’s will under these new 
circumstances—her standing now to rebuke instead of demand—may persist so long as R still 
wills that E see to it that v, and so long as E still takes R’s volition as a reason to will 
concordantly.123 
R’s volition that E not have done what he has done already has an air of paradox about it. 
How can R will that E not have done what he has done already? How can she will that he not have 
revealed the secret he disclosed? I consider this question at greater length in my first chapter, 
where I proposed to explain regret as just such a past-oriented volition that can no longer be 
carried out. I might currently regret disclosing a friend’s secret, which on my analysis is a volition 
I now have that I not then have disclosed his secret. This is not to say that I now intend to have 
then done otherwise—I do not intend what I believe impossible, namely, changing the past, 
though I do will it.  
While a full examination of the relationship between intention and volition is well beyond 
the scope of this paper, I will observe that they are not equivalent, lest we be tempted to equate 
intending what we believe impossible with willing what we believe impossible. Volition is no 
doubt a necessary condition of intention, but it is not controlling. For instance, despite fully 
 
123 This is consistent with Gilbert’s description of rebukes as “after-the-fact” demands (Gilbert 2015d, 417). 
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believing that it is impossible for me to beat Tiger Woods in a fair round of golf, I might 
nonetheless have the volition to do so. What does this mean? I might spend every waking hour 
and every cent in my bank account training to become the best golfer I can be, I might move 
heaven and earth to arrange to somehow play a round with him, and on the appointed day, I 
might make my utmost effort on the golf course. Under such circumstances, it seems strange to 
say that it is not my volition—my will—that I beat Tiger Woods. Yet if someone asks, “Do you 
really intend to beat Tiger Woods at golf,” it would also be strange for me to say that indeed I do. 
At most, I might say that I intend to try. It is precisely this conative posture towards φ, this trying 
to φ, disposing one to intend to φ, were one to believe that φ-ing were possible, that I consider 
central to volition (perhaps among other conditions). This posture explains the content and 
unpleasant affective character of regret: one regrets not achieving what one would intend were 
achieving it only possible, and one feels frustrated and undermined as if struggling against the 
inevitable. This is precisely the attitude that R can compel E to experience should E betray her. So 
while R can no longer compel E to will and consequently to intend v, she can still compel E to will v 
and thereby to regret not v-ing. 
In my second chapter, I proposed inducing regret as a moral goal of punishment. After all, 
punishment is intuitively imperfect whenever punishment subjects do not afterwards regret what 
they have been punished for. As I argued in that chapter, this intuition is consistent with, if not 
altogether explained by, the prevailing retributive, expressive, and educationist theories of 
punishment where the effect of the punishment on the punishment subject is a principal concern. 
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R rebuking E is in this way analogous to punishment. Punishment might even be a form of 
rebuke, perhaps given an appropriate background of social conditions.124 In addition, the 
authority to punish, widely held to be a conceptual component of punishment, finds a ready 
analogy in the trustor’s standing to rebuke a trustee for betrayal.125 This analogy suggests that the 
authority to punish is found in a punishment agent’s psychological leverage over a punishment 
subject’s internal reasons. While punishment agents are probably, for the most part, third parties 
to the offenses punished, their standing can be supported using the concept of third-party agency 
discussed in the previous section. A final analogy is between the power of a punishment agent to 
forgive an offense and the power of a trustor to unilaterally rescind a trustee’s obligation: when 
betrayal has occurred, the trustor’s rescission removes the ground of the trustee’s regret; likewise, 
when an offense is committed, the punishment agent’s pardon removes the warrant for the 
offender’s punishment. 
 
124 Gilbert considers rebukes to be a “mild form” of punishment (Gilbert 2015c). Feinberg’s position that 
punishment has a “reprobative” function also suggests this idea (Feinberg 1965, 403-408). 
125 See, for instance, Flew 1954, 294; Feinberg 1965, 397; Hampton 1984, 225; Morris 1981, 264. 
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Chapter 4: Why Should We Rebuke? 
Rebukes are intimately related to many normative phenomena, including trust, 
punishment, regret, blame, and shared agency. Despite these links, they have not yet attracted 
substantial attention, attention which they warrant on account of their central role in normative 
life, and on account of being puzzling. Consider the following conditional. If it is appropriate for 
one agent to insist to another that he conform to a given interpersonal norm when she doubts 
him, then it is appropriate for her to insist to him that he should have obeyed the norm when she 
knows he hasn’t. For instance, if it is appropriate for you to insist that I adhere to our contract, to 
pay for items taken from your store, or to return your car undamaged—you have your doubts—
then, when I fail to adhere to the contract, pay for the items, or return your car undamaged, it is 
appropriate for you insist that I should have. The point of the prospective cases of insisting—of 
demands—seems clear: to the addressee to do as he should. The point of the retrospective cases—
of rebukes—is not so clear. Here I borrow ‘demand’ and ‘rebuke’ back into their pre-theoretical 
sense from Margaret Gilbert, for whom these words are technical terms from her theory of shared 
agency.  I also borrow the insight, which illuminates the conditional above, that rebukes are 
“after-the-fact” demands126 in some sense. 
Even though it is not clear what rebukes accomplish, or even whether it is reasonable to 
issue them, is it clear that they are somehow appropriate. Perhaps rebukes are essentially an 
expressive variety of punishment communicating disapproval and resentment.127 Perhaps rebukes 
 
126 Gilbert 2018, 63. 
127 Feinberg 1965, 403 
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just make people feel better. Perhaps they are uselessly, counterproductively vindictive. Perhaps 
different kinds of rebukes serve different purposes, some more reasonable than others.  
I suspect that each of these answers is sometimes correct. Perhaps each is correct for a 
different species of rebuke. While it is my hope that this discussion illuminates every species to 
some extent, I confine my attention to one species of central importance: the rebuke of the 
betrayal of trust. Where the distinction matters, I call these fiduciary rebukes, though for brevity, I 
will usually just call them rebukes with the understanding that fiduciary rebukes are what I have 
in mind. When we attend to fiduciary rebukes in particular—that a trustee should have kept one’s 
trust—their puzzling character is not lost. The horse has left the barn. How does it make sense to 
close the door as if his escape could still be barred?  
By applying and elaborating on the account of trust developed in the previous chapter, I 
aim in this chapter to construct answers to a pair of closely related questions: what fiduciary 
rebukes do and whether they are reasonable. In answering these questions, I will take as seriously 
as possible the insight that rebukes are after-the-fact demands. The answer I develop, very 
roughly, is that the function of a fiduciary rebuke is to compel the trustee, on pain of rational 
incoherence, to repair the harm caused by the betrayal of trust—the peculiarly fiduciary 
violation—both to the trustor’s ends, and to the trustor’s relationship with the trustee.  
I begin by briefly recapitulating my account of trust and identifying the relevant concept 
of betrayal. I then explain the prospective responses to betrayal available to the trustor, which 
include unilaterally rescinding her reliance volition, which terminates the trust relationship and 
contributes to estranging her from the trustee; and alternatively, demanding performance, which 
preserves the relationship instead. Finally, I consider the retrospective responses to betrayals that 
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have already occurred. To explain how rebukes are, indeed, after-the-fact demands in every sense, 
I consider past-oriented volitions, along with what I take to be two principles of rational 
coherence. 
I. Trust and Betrayal 
‘Trust’ 
In this section, I summarize the features of the trust account developed in the last chapter 
that shed light on the function and reasonableness of fiduciary rebukes. Let’s begin by settling the 
relevant sense of ‘trust’, since we sometimes use the word broadly to refer to reliance 
relationships of every kind. In some of these relationships, which I call relationships of mere 
reliance, the reliant agent counts primarily on her prediction about the behavior of the agent 
relied on. For example, an extortionist might “trust” his victim not to contact the authorities, 
predicting that he would be too humiliated or afraid to do so. Likewise, Kant’s neighbors might 
“trust” him to appear outside their windows at the same time every day, predicting that nothing 
could interfere with such a fastidious man’s long-established habit.  
The distinguishing feature of mere reliance relationships is that the agent relied on cannot 
betray the reliant agent by not behaving as predicted. Intuitively, if the extortionist’s victim does 
contact the authorities, then he does not thereby betray the extortionist; likewise, Kant does not 
betray his neighbors should he decide one day to take his walk at a different time. This intuition 
appears to be unaffected by how much the reliant agent has at stake. For instance, we would not 
say that the victim betrays an extortionist who risks a long prison sentence, but not one who risks 
being chided by her schoolteacher. 
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Closely connected to the impossibility of betraying mere reliance is the inaptness of 
rebuke. It would be absurd for the extortionist to “rebuke” his victim, or for the neighbors to 
“rebuke” Kant. This is because betrayal is the ground for rebuke in the context of a trust 
relationship, but the “trust” of mere reliance is not the right kind of trust. 
I simply call trust relationships the reliance relationships in which betrayal is possible. 
These have been discussed at length by “will-based” trust theorists,128 as Karen Jones has called 
them, since these philosophers seek to distinguish trust as a reliance relationship where the 
trustor’s reliance is grounded in her belief in the trustor’s good will towards her, along with her 
belief in his competence to do as trusted. 129  In the case of mere reliance relationships, reliance is 
grounded indifferently on anything relevant to predicting behavior of the agent relied on, 
whether or not those factors include the trustee’s good will. For example, if you count on me to 
know German because you know that I have a German last name, then you merely rely on me 
(regrettably, to your disadvantage). 
II. Trustworthiness, Good Will, and Trust 
My account of trust is a will-based theory, requiring that the trustor’s reliance be 
grounded in her belief in the trustee’s good will and competence. Since the trustee’s good will and 
his competence qualify him as a candidate for her trust, I refer to these conditions together as his 
trustworthiness. That is to say: 
An agent E is trustworthy to an agent R with respect to an event v if and only if: 
(a) E is competent to see to it that v. 
 
128 See, e.g., Baier 1986; Jones 1996; Hieronymi 2008; Cogley 2012 
129 Jones 1999, 68. 
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(b) E bears R good will with respect to v. 
Will-based accounts of trust typically hold that a trustor trusts a trustee when she relies 
on him specifically because she believes that he satisfies these conditions. My account builds on 
this foundation by elaborating considerably on good will, a phenomenon that will-based trust 
theorists are generally content to take for granted.130 My account also adds knowledge conditions 
to the effect that the trustor and the trustee see eye to eye about the trustor’s reliance and the 
trustee’s good will. All of these elements contribute to explaining how a trust relationship 
implicates interpersonal norms.131 
In the course of explaining how trust is normative, my concept of good will also explains 
how a trustor can make fiduciary demands and rebukes. Very generally, the trustee’s good will 
allows his own internal reasons to be used by the trustor to bind him to keep her trust. It is in this 
way that good will generates an interpersonal trust norm. The trustor can use the same process to 
increase the weight of the reasons by which the trustee is bound already, and it is in this way that 
good will empowers the trustor to demand and to rebuke. 
 
130 Jones 2012, 67 
131 In addition, they also allow my account to rule out Richard Holton’s confidence trickster counterexample, 
which has been a troublesome problem for other will-based accounts of trust (Holton 1994, 64–65). The 
confidence trickster relies on a mark to rely on her so that she can ultimately defraud him. Intuitively, the 
trickster’s reliance is not a case of trust, even though her reliance may very well be grounded in her belief 
that the mark bears her good will and is competent to write a big check. Consequently, reliance grounded 
in the belief that someone is competent and trustworthy is not sufficient to constitute trust. My account 
rules out the trickster case by showing that the confidence trickster’s initial reliance does not, in fact, give 
the mark a sufficient internal reason to do as trusted, even if she thinks otherwise because she is ignorant of 
his fraudulent intentions. The case is similar to Williams’s example of the agent who wants a gin and tonic, 
believes a substance is gin, but does not, in fact, have an internal reason to drink it mixed with tonic as the 
substance is really gasoline (Williams 102-103). 
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This mechanism for good will involves volitional empathy, namely, the disposition to take 
the volition of another agent as one’s own internal reason. In the case of trust, the trustor’s 
volition is that trustee see to the event that she, the trustor, is counting on, which the trustee 
takes as an internal reason that he, the trustee, see to that event. For instance, if I am trusting you 
to keep a secret, then you volitionally empathize with me with respect to keeping the secret 
provided that you take my volition that you keep it as your own internal reason to do so. The 
weight of that reason and the urgency of the volition are proportional: introducing the secret by 
saying, “Just between you and me,” gives you reason to keep it, but less reason than were I to take 
you aside, look you in the eye, and say with a lowered voice and a hand on both your shoulders, 
“It is very, very important to me that you keep this close to the vest. I cannot stress to you how 
essential it is that no one ever find out.” In general, E volitionally empathizes with R with respect 
to an action v if and only if: 
(iv) R wills that E sees to it that v 
(v) (a) is an internal reason for E to see to it that v 
(vi) The weight of (a) in E’s economy of internal reasons is proportional to the urgency to 
R of E seeing to it that v 
The trustee’s internal reason to have this will—that reason just being the trustor’s volition 
taken by the trustee as an internal reason—just is the trustee’s volitional reason. I call an internal 
reason controlling for E if it predicts the volition that, given enough relevant information (a state 
which may be the rule rather than the exception), would leave him feeling less at odds with his 
own ends—less as though he foreseeably undermined what he most values—than if he did not 
will accordingly. The controlling reason predicts this volition even if the option of not willing 
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accordingly is supported by contrary, non-controlling internal reasons that E happens to have at 
the same time. This is simply to say that contrary internal reasons can both be inputs into one’s 
practical reasoning, a process that nonetheless may decide in favor of what one reason supports 
over what a conflicting one does.132 Where a trustee has a controlling volitional reason, and where 
this reason issues in a volition that he see to it that v, this volition is his concordant will—
concordant, specifically, with the trustor’s will, with which it shares its content.133 
I can now restate the good will condition of trustworthiness in terms of a controlling 
volitional reason. Trustee E bears trustor R good will with respect to an event v if and only if the 
following conditional obtains:  
If R wills that E see to it that v, then E has a controlling volitional 
reasonR to see to it that v. 
With this concept of good will in mind, here are the conditions of trust.134 R trusts E to see 
to it that v provided that: 
(1) R believes that E is trustworthy with respect to R and v, namely, that: 
(a)  E is competent to see to it that v 
 
132 This is not to say that there is no possible contrary internal reason, or combination of them, that could 
become controlling later, where the original controlling reason recedes in importance and becomes non-
controlling. People have changes of heart, after all. 
133 For instance, if it is my volition that you help me get up from a fall I’ve just taken, and if you volitionally 
empathize with me in this respect, then you take my volition as an internal reason to yourself have the 
concordant will that you help me up from the fall. If it is my volition to pick myself up unassisted, and if 
you volitionally empathize with me in this respect, then you will take my volition as an internal reason to 
will that you not involve yourself with my effort. 
134 These conditions are equivalent to the more compact conditions I gave in the previous chapter, assuming 
some very trivial closure of knowledge under known implication. 
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(b)  If R wills that E to see to it that v, then E has a controlling volitional 
reason to see to it that v. 
(2) R relies on E to see to it that v, and accordingly, wills that E see to it that v, 
only because (1), namely, R’s belief that E is trustworthy with respect to v 
(3) E knows that (2) 
(4) R knows that (3) 
(5) If (1) - (3), then E has a controlling volitional reason to see to it that v 
(6) E knows that (5) 
(7) R knows that (6) 
These conditions make relationships normative in the following way. The trustee is 
rationally required to see to it that v, which follows from (1), (2), (3), and (5). The trustor knows 
that he is subject to this requirement, which follows from (4) and (5). Her ability to demand and 
rebuke the trustee is supported by (6) and (7), as I will explain when I discuss demand. The 
requirement on the trustee has the form of a duty directed towards the trustor, which, following 
Hohfeld, can be equivalently characterized as a claim of the trustor against the trustee. The 
trustee’s ability to cancel this requirement would then be a power, once again following 
Hohfeld.135   
 
135 Hohfeld 1923, 36–38. I mean ‘duty’, ‘claim’, and ‘power’ in the Hohfeldian sense, as they have the structure 
of the “jural relations” that Hohfeld describes under those names. (Strictly speaking, the trustee also has a 
liability correlated with the trustor’s power). It makes sense to speak of the trustee’s duty as directed toward 
the trustor, and thus of trustor’s correlative right, for at least two reasons. First, the trustor has normative 
control over the duty on all three counts mentioned by H. L. A Hart: the trustor can cancel the duty before 
it has been discharged by rescinding her volition; upon betrayal, she can “seek compensation”, in a sense 
that will become clear, as a consequence of the regret that rebukes prompt; and finally, she can also cancel 
this obligation to compensate her (Hart 184, 1982). The second reason for thinking the trustee’s duty is 
directed towards the trustor is that the trustor is in a unique position to demand that trustee do as required 
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III. Betrayal and Jeopardized Trust 
Betrayal occurs when the trustee irrevocably fails to do as trusted and when (5) no longer 
obtains—when in spite of the trustor’s continued reliance and belief in his trustworthiness, the 
trustee ceases to bear the trustor good will. Irrevocable failure—failure to do what was previously 
possible and is now impossible—is intuitively necessary for betrayal. That good will ceases to 
obtain is also required because irrevocable failure does not by itself distinguish betrayal from 
innocent and merely incompetent failure. Consider that we do not normally consider someone to 
have betrayed our trust whose good faith effort was thwarted by a natural disaster or other force 
majeure. Such a failure is not only not a betrayal, it does not even usually impugn the trustee’s 
trustworthiness, and is in that sense innocent. Additionally, irrevocable failure can be a 
consequence of incompetence, which does impugn the trustee’s trustworthiness, yet still does not 
constitute betrayal. Consider that there is a very material difference between a prisoner who 
implicates his accomplice in order to receive a lighter sentence, and one who does so because his 
simple-mindedness allows the interrogators to trick him into thinking that the accomplice has 
already implicated both of them. Both failures make the prisoner an untrustworthy partner in 
crime, but only the former failure seems to qualify as a betrayal. 
What if (5) ceases to obtain before the trustee irrevocably fails? This is likely be the case 
for many betrayals—those that happen not on a lark but with some degree of premeditation. If 
conditions (1) – (7) are necessary for a trust relationship, however, then most betrayals would not 
count as such: before they could occur, the trust relationships they presuppose would cease to 
 
(see, e.g., Feinberg 252, 1970). On my account, she is in the position to demand for the same reason she is in 
a position to control, namely, her leverage over the trustee’s internal reasons. 
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exist. But trust clearly does not work this way, since you do not cease to be able to betray me the 
moment my rival offers you twenty thousand dollars in exchange for my secret, giving you more 
internal reason to dish up the dirt than to keep my confidence. Now this is not to say that one 
cannot prevent a trust relationship and the attendant obligation from arising in the first place: 
“Before you tell me anything,” you might have said as I took you aside, “You should know that I’m 
not great at keeping secrets. In fact, I hear that someone is offering money for yours—money that 
I could really use as I’m behind on my mortgage and I don’t know what to tell the bank the next 
time it calls.” In this respect, a trust relationship is like a promise: the trustee, like the promisor, 
can prevent the attendant obligation from arising, but once arisen, he cannot simply cancel it. 
In cases of premeditated betrayal, then, (1) – (7) are initially satisfied. When the trustee’s 
internal reasons to betray come to outweigh his volitional reason to keep trust, but before the 
trustor discovers the trustee’s change of heart, the trust relationship between the trustor and the 
trustee becomes a jeopardized trust relationship. In a jeopardized trust relationship, (1) – (4) still 
obtain, but (5) ceases to obtain, and consequently, (6) and (7) cease to obtain. (5) – (7) are 
replaced by the following weaker conditions:  
(5′) E has a volitional reasonR to see to it that v 
(6′) E knows that (5′) 
(7′) R knows that (6′) 
(5′) reflects the subjective character of betrayal as something that can be worth it—as 
something undesirable in itself but potentially desirable on balance—where the volitional reason 
to keep trust is outweighed by a conflicting internal reason. Now, it is logically possible that the 
trustee finds his volitional reason entirely extinguished, in which case it would follow that his 
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duty to the trustee is annulled. But I cannot think of a psychologically plausible way for this to 
occur without the trustee’s agency being compromised, in which case the annulment of his duty 
might be a plausible consequence.136 That said, there are cases where trustees retrospectively 
discover that they did not, in fact, have controlling volitional reasons to do as trusted when the 
trust relationship was formed. One example would be the mark discovering a confidence 
trickster’s intention to defraud. But in those cases, the trustee did not have a duty to the trustor in 
the first place, as the trustee had a contrary internal reason at the time he acquired his volitional 
reason, even if it was only later that he discovered it. 
IV. Prospective Responses to Betrayal 
To best understand why rebuke is a reasonable retrospective response to betrayal, it will 
help to explore the prospective responses available to the trustor, as betrayal is deeply linked to 
one of them. To that end, in this section, I consider the prospective responses to betrayal available 
to the trustor, including what I take to be the simplest response, namely prejudicial rescission, 
which has the disadvantage of compromising the relationship between the trustor and the 
trustee. In contrast, demanding is an alternative response that can avoid this disadvantage, as I 
will show. I shall then be able to consider how rebuke is illuminated by being an after-the-fact 
demand. 
 
136 For instance, the trustee might suffer a head injury and cease to take the trustor’s reliance as a reason, 
becoming a “fiduciary psychopath.” I am inclined to hold that fiduciary psychopaths cannot have fiduciary 
duties, mirroring Gary Watson’s position on psychopaths and moral responsibility (Watson 2011). 
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Prejudicial Rescission 
Suppose that the trustor ceases to believe that the trustee is, in fact, trustworthy, raising 
the prospect of his betrayal. Perhaps she learns that the trustee has a substantial incentive to 
betray her, and she is not confident whether her volition outweighs the incentive, or vice versa, in 
his economy of internal reasons. It follows that the first four conditions of both trust and 
jeopardized trust no longer obtain. This is because the (2), (3), and (4) depend on (1), her belief 
that the trustee is trustworthy. Consider (2) in particular. Since the trustor no longer believes that 
the trustee is trustworthy—since (1) no longer obtains—then while she might still rely on the 
trustee to see to it that v, she can no longer do so on account of believing the trustee to be 
trustworthy. Since, by (2), this belief is necessary for her reliance and the volition that her reliance 
involves, then assuming that the belief cannot be restored, she is rationally required to rescind 
her volition, ending her reliance. 
Rescission under these circumstances preempts the trustee’s betrayal and any harm to the 
trustor that would follow from it. However, it does so at a cost: by rescinding her volition, she 
ends her trust relationship with the trustee, annulling the trustee’s duty and her own correlative 
claim. What is more, rescission under these circumstances is prejudicial against the trustee: since 
the trustor doubts that the trustee is trustworthy to see to it that v, it behooves her to doubt the 
trustee’s trustworthiness in all relevantly similar circumstances. If I tell you in confidence that I 
think that a mutual acquaintance of ours is obnoxious, and if I come to doubt that you will keep 
my confidence, then, other things being equal, it would be irrational for me then to tell you in 
confidence what I really think about another mutual acquaintance. Now, relevant similarity is not 
an all-or-nothing affair: I might trust you with less sensitive information—perhaps only with my 
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neutral or favorable opinions of people—or trust you only when you also have more substantial, 
non-volitional reasons to keep my trust, such as when I know your secrets, too. Nonetheless, the 
ultimate consequence of prejudicial rescission must be estrangement, whether by degrees or in 
one fell stroke, since trust is undeniably a precondition for intimacy.  
In this way, prejudicial rescission has much in common with Scanlon’s conception of 
blame. Keeping in mind that for Scanlon, someone is blameworthy who reveals “intentions or 
attitudes that are faulty by the standards of a relationship,” he writes:  
To blame a person is to judge that person to be blameworthy and, as a 
consequence, to modify one’s understanding of one’s relationship with that 
person (that is, to alter or withhold intentions and expectations that that 
relationship would normally involve) in the particular ways that the judgment 
of blameworthiness makes appropriate, given one’s relation with the person 
and the significance for one of what that person has done.137 
The drawbacks of prejudicial rescission as a response to betrayal, in turn, reflect some of 
the limits of Scanlonian blame, as well. For example, Susan Wolf has argued that Scanlon’s 
concept of blame does not cover what she calls angry blame, which, unlike Scanlonian blame, 
does not necessarily reflect an impaired relationship, and which is characterized by negative 
reactive attitudes like “resentment, indignation, guilt, and righteous anger… arising from the 
belief or impression that the person has behaved badly toward oneself or to a member (or 
members of a community,” attitudes that “tend to give rise to or perhaps even include a desire to 
scold or punish the person for his bad behavior.”138 Angry blame is, in one respect, the opposite of 
 
137 Scanlon 2013, 89 
138 Wolf 2011, 337 
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Scanlonian blame: according to Wolf, “getting angry and expressing it, and demanding a 
response,” in the course of angry blame, “may bring people together and make them closer, rather 
than pushing them away.”139 
Without speaking to the relative merits of Scanlonian or angry blame, I observe that just 
as prejudicial rescission is a prospective response reminiscent of Scanlonian blame, there is 
another prospective response reminiscent of angry blame—reminiscent, at least, in its expressive 
character and in its tendency to repair relationships. The response I have in mind is fiduciary 
demand. 
Demand 
I understand fiduciary demand as a trustor’s attempt to shore up her trustee’s doubtful 
good will. More specifically, she attempts to increase the weight of his volitional reason, whose 
sufficiency she doubts, by acting on his volitional empathy—the same disposition by which he 
acquired his volitional reason in the first place. To do this, she manifests her volition: she does not 
so much express that she has it, but rather, expresses it in a way that promotes it. For instance, if I 
say to you, “Remember, I’m trusting you to keep this secret,” I am not merely expressing that I 
have the volition that you keep my secret, and reasoning that you therefore have a volitional 
reason to do so. Rather, my saying what I said is itself an attempt to promote what I am willing. I 
am not just telling you of my trust, I am trying to get you to keep it in telling you. Manifesting a 
volition is, in this way, a trying, and it is precisely by trying in front of the trustee that she 
prompts the trustee’s volitional empathy in order to shore up his volitional reason. 
 
139 Wolf 2011, 339 
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Why, in demanding, must the trustee not only manifest her volition, but know that the 
trustee knows that her volition is his reason? The trustee, for his part, must know that the 
trustor’s volition is his reason, or he will not receive the trustor’s attempt to demand as a demand, 
but rather, as an inexplicably peremptory first offer of trust.140 For example, we might imagine 
that, having forgotten about the paperclips, he calls her from the store to inform her that he is 
buying the staples and the markers. The trustor then attempts to make a demand, saying, with 
audible irritation, “Look, I need you to buy paperclips, too. Get the paperclips.” If this does not jog 
the trustee’s memory, we would expect him to be taken aback, replying, doubtless to his 
disadvantage, “What? You want paperclips now?” This reply seems to reject the implication that 
he already had reason to buy the paperclips—that buying the paperclips was already normative, 
since he would be at odds with himself if he didn’t do so.141The trustor, in turn, must know that 
the trustee knows, because her demand involves making or implying the assertion that the trustee 
knows that he has a reason.  
What, then, does the trustee do by making a fiduciary demand? The immediate effect is to 
shore up the trustee’s volitional reason to do as he was trusted to do. And in shoring up his 
volitional reason, she does three things. First, she enforces her claim against him by compelling 
him to keep her trust on pain of rational incoherence, since by reinforcing the trustee’s volitional 
reason, the trustor has reinforced rational incoherence as an inevitable consequence of betrayal. 
Second, she avoids being rationally required to prejudicially rescind her volition and being 
 
140 Or as a demand in a non-normative sense, as one might demand to speak to the manager.  
141 It is in this way that, on my account, the trustor would lack the standing to demand, since she lacks the 
ability to compel the trustee to experience rational incoherence if he does not keep her trust, and in this 
sense, lacks the ability to compel the trustee to experience keeping her trust as normative. This conceives of 
standing as a three-place relation involving a claimant, a respondent, and a judge. 
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thereby estranged from the trustee. This is because she has, at the same time, shored up her 
wavering belief in the trustee’s trustworthiness. Third, she promotes whatever further goal her 
reliance on the trustee serves, a goal she would otherwise need to give up or promote differently. 
In this way, we see how it can be reasonable to make a fiduciary demand: other things being 
equal, it is reasonable for a trustor to seek to enforce her claim, to preserve her relationship with 
the trustee, and to promote the goal served by relying on him in the first place. 
V. Rebuke as a Retrospective Response to Betrayal 
We can often express fiduciary rebukes in the same language as fiduciary demands, 
accounting for the trustee’s irrevocable failure with nothing more than a change of tense. Just as 
“I am trusting you” can express a demand prior to betrayal, “I trusted you” unambiguously 
expresses a rebuke after betrayal has occurred. On my account, fiduciary rebukes are after-the-
fact fiduciary demands in the fullest sense: they are fiduciary demands expressed after the fact of 
betrayal. 
But what of the fact that, for rebukes, betrayal has already occurred? The trustee’s 
volitional reason is the trustor’s volition to see to it that v, such as my volition that you keep my 
secret. But it is hard to understand how, for instance, I can still have the volition that you keep a 
secret you’ve already disclosed. If I cannot, then there is no volition of mine for you to take as a 
reason, nor can I shore that volitional reason up by manifesting a volition I do not have. Nor, 
then, can I enforce my claim, preserve our relationship from estrangement, or further the goal of 
my reliance—not, at least, in any way resembling how demands accomplish these ends. No hope 
would remain for explaining the reasonableness of rebuking in the same way as I explained the 
reasonableness of demanding. 
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Past-Oriented Volitions 
The first step towards understanding rebukes as demands, then, is to make sense of the 
trustor’s volition after the trustee’s betrayal, since her volition must survive his betrayal for him to 
continue to take it as a volitional reason. And he must continue to take it as such for the trustor 
to shore it up with an after-the-fact demand—with a rebuke. We can understand the trustor’s 
volition by attending to a feature I call propositional tense, which is the temporal truth condition 
of an intentional attitude’s propositional content. For instance, the tense of the propositional 
content of the assertion “Tomorrow I will buy groceries” is the fact that the asserted proposition is 
true only if the speaker buys groceries the day following the utterance, and without regard to 
grocery purchases at any other time. Grammatical tense reflects the relation between the time of 
utterance and the propositional tense of what is asserted, denied, feared, desired, willed, and so 
forth. Accordingly, grammatical tense can change as a speaker’s temporal relation changes with 
respect to a changeless proposition, just as “Tomorrow I will buy groceries” expresses the same 
proposition today, with the same temporal truth condition, as “Yesterday I bought groceries” 
expresses the day after tomorrow.  
When I confide in you, my volition is that you not disclose my secret. The following day, 
the same enduring volition should have the same propositional content, and accordingly, the 
same propositional tense. Due to my changing temporal relation to the unchanging propositional 
tense, the two utterances involve different grammatical tenses. Accordingly, the volition, 
expressed the following day, would be that you have not disclosed my secret and that you not 
disclose it. Note that the object of the volition now extends into the past. Suppose that you let 
news of the party slip, spoiling the surprise. If it is possible for my volition to survive your 
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betrayal, then grammar poses no obstacle to expressing its content, namely, that you had not 
disclosed my secret. The object of my volition is now not only in the past, but in the 
counterfactual past. 
Can volitions have past objects? This must be possible, and even be common, on the 
plausible assumption that volitions can endure over time—that something that was my will can 
still be my will. Can volitions have objects that their agents believe to be impossible? It might 
seem that they can’t, insofar as one cannot intend what one believes to be impossible. However, 
volitions differ from intentions in this respect. This is because volition, as I understand it, is a 
conative attitude—an attitude of trying to do something—and the ability to try does not seem to 
require the belief in the probability—or even the possibility—of success. Indeed, several months 
ago at a local fencing competition, I faced an opponent whom I—as a ticket-bearing spectator—
had recently seen representing the United States in an international tournament against the best 
competitors from around the world, including several Olympic medalists. I was under no illusion 
whatsoever that it was in my power to beat this opponent. And in that sense, I did not intend to 
win. But I tried to beat him anyway—it seems strange to characterize my efforts differently—
seeing that I fenced him as intelligently and with as much determination as I fenced everyone 
else, including everyone I would beat, nor did I exert myself any less with each point he scored. 
Accordingly, if volitions can have both past objects and objects that their subjects believe to be 
impossible, then the way seems clear for there to be volitions with objects both past and believed 
impossible—impossible, in particular, on account of being past. 
What could a past-oriented volition of this kind be? It would certainly be distressing, 
considering the conative character of volition and the impossibility of attaining past objects. It 
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would be an experience familiar to Tantalus, unable to reach the fruit above his head or the water 
at his knees, both of which would always recede just beyond his grasp. Regret, I have proposed, is 
one case of this unpleasant attitude.142 For regret, the subject of the volition and the subject of the 
volition’s content are the same: Williams’s lorry driver would will that he himself not have run 
over the child. In this respect, regret is distinct from the volition of the betrayed trustor: she wills 
that the trustee had seen to it that v. We might call the trustor’s will volitional blame.143 While it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to explore the relationship between volitional and existing 
concepts of blame, I pause to note that volitional blame could explain the relationship between 
Scanlonian blame and Wolf’s angry blame. As we shall see, volitional blame can ground rebuke, in 
the manner of Wolf’s angry blame; as well as retrospective prejudicial rescission, in the manner of 
Scanlonian blame. An account of volitional blame might in this way explain how angry blame and 
Scanlonian blame can be, at bottom, blame of the same kind. Importantly, rebuke is not the same 
as volitional, Scanlonian, or even angry blame, since rebuke is essentially something expressed, 
something which neither Scanlon nor Wolf seem to require. 
Rebuke as an Alternative to Prejudicial Rescission 
Suppose that the trustor discovers that the trustee has betrayed her. This, naturally, 
disconfirms her belief in the trustee’s trustworthiness. What becomes of the trustor’s volition? It 
is now past-oriented, and she knows it to be impossible to carry out. As I have just discussed, a 
volition can have these properties, so she must still decide whether to rescind it. Once again, 
 
142 See chapter 1 
143 The main components of volitional blame would be (i) an agent’s past-oriented volition that someone 
else had done otherwise; (ii) the agent’s belief that the blamed party now has and then had reason to have 
done otherwise; (iii), the agent’s belief that the blamed party knew then that he had reason to have done 
otherwise, and knows now that he has reason to have done otherwise. 
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assuming that her belief in his trustworthiness cannot be restored, she is rationally required to 
rescind her volition. Rescission after betrayal is prejudicial for all the same reasons it is prejudicial 
in the prospective case: the trustor’s doubts about the trustee’s trustworthiness to see to it that v 
generalize to relevantly similar circumstances. If anything, retrospective rescission is likely to be 
more prejudicial, insofar as the trustor’s  belief about the trustee’s trustworthiness is more 
thoroughly disconfirmed by an accomplished betrayal than by evidence of a disposition or settled 
intention to betray in the future. In this way, rescission still has the effect of estranging the 
trustee from the trustor. 
If a rebuke really is an after-the-fact demand, then it consists in manifesting her volition—
now past-oriented—while knowing that the trustee knows that he takes it as an internal reason. 
But what does this accomplish? Recall that a demand enforces the trustor’s claim by compelling 
him to keep her trust on pain of rational incoherence, it obviates the requirement of prejudicial 
rescission, and it promotes whatever further goal served by the trustor’s reliance. Does a rebuke 
still promote these ends? 
To answer this question, let us consider the effect of shoring up the trustee’s volitional 
reason subsequent to his betrayal. Inconveniently, the trustor’s volition is past-oriented, and as a 
consequence, so is the trustee’s concordant will. The trustee is now in the unfortunate position of 
willing that he had seen to it that v while knowing it is impossible now to have done something 
he didn’t. In my first chapter, I interpreted volitions of this form as regret. Intuitively, regret is a 
good start as far as regaining trust is concerned. Yet we do not typically make demands simply to 
avoid disconfirming our belief that someone is trustworthy, but rather, to accomplish some 
further end. I might pay a roommate my share of the electric bill, trusting him to send the entire 
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amount to the utility company. This I do not for its own sake, but so that the lights work, so that I 
can charge battery-powered electronics, so that my alarm clock wakes me up, and so on. 
Accordingly, betrayal usually harms more than one’s belief in another’s trustworthiness—harm 
that demands can avert. Can rebukes address the harm of betrayal in addition to the trustee’s 
deficient good will? I submit that they can. This is essentially because the trustee is moved by 
regret, conceived as past-oriented volition, to mitigate the damage, exactly as we intuitively 
expect of someone sincerely regretful. We can see how rebukes promote this outcome via regret if 
we apply two principles concerning volitions that are necessary for an agent’s rational coherence. 
Two Principles of Rational Coherence 
By ‘rational coherence’, I simply mean the sort of coherence compromised by conflicting 
beliefs or mutually incompatible intentions—the sort of coherence John Broome considers a 
normative requirement.144 In Broome’s terminology, a normative requirement is a strict non-
detaching relation of the form O(P → Q).145 O(P → Q) is strict in that it reflects the ‘ought’-like all 
things considered, rather than pro tanto, force of its object. It is non-detaching in the sense that 
O(Q) does not follow from P. For example, it is normatively required of me that if I believe that it 
is Tuesday, then I believe that it is a weekday. Now, suppose I believe that it is Tuesday. It does 
not follow that I ought to believe that it is a weekday. Rather, the wide scope of O means that I 
ought either to believe that it is a weekday, or to cease to believe that it is Tuesday, since both 
 
144 Broome 1999, 411–13. 
145 For Broome, P and Q are propositions. I have preferred to think in terms of intentional states and events. 
It should make no difference if one takes Broome’s discussion of normative requirements to be more 
metaphysically neutral, or if one paraphrases everything I say about the normative relationships of volitions 
and events in terms of propositions. 
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alternatives would make me consistent with myself. 146 The wide scope of the two principles below 
will be crucial in the coming discussion. 
The first wide-scope rational coherence principle concerns the relationship between 
volitions and actions. We might call this the encratic principle:  
Encratic principle: for any agents A and B and for an event v, it ought to be the 
case for A that if A knows that she has a controlling internal reason that B see to 
it that v, then A has the volition to see to it that B see to it that v.  
For instance, if A knows that she has a controlling reason that she herself arrive on time, 
then she may see to it that she herself sees to it that she herself arrive on time. (The two 
occurrences of “seeing to it” and of “she herself” are awkward and unnecessary when A and B are 
the same agent, but convenient when A and B are not, as in the case of trust and other reliance 
relationships.) The encratic principle has wide scope because A would be rationally coherent 
either by willing what she has a controlling internal reason to do, or by not having a controlling 
internal reason known to her to do it. It might seem questionable that people are free to simply 
cease to have a known controlling internal reason, but this seems to be precisely what people are 
doing when they try to constrain their future selves. For instance, my internal reason to snooze 
my alarm clock to get a few more minutes of rest might not be controlling if the snooze button 
triggers a donation from my bank account to causes I strongly oppose.147 
I call the second wide-scope principle the volitional coherence principle: 
 
146 Schroeder 2004, 337 
147 As of this writing, such alarm clocks are, in fact, for sale. 
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Volitional coherence principle: for an agent A, it ought to be the case for A that: 
if A wills that φ and A knows that ψ is the means to φ, then A wills that ψ. 
Here I gloss over complications involving multiple means to φ known to A. We might 
assume, for instance, that all things considered, ψ is the best means to φ as far as A knows. The 
point of this principle is not to capture the nuances of instrumental reasoning, but rather, the 
intuition that there is something evidently problematic about someone who wills that φ, knows 
that ψ is the means to φ, yet does not will that ψ. For example, if it is really the will of a certain 
relation of mine not to experience lower back pain, then every morning, he would do the quick 
and easy stretching exercises that his physical therapist has prescribed, and that he himself grants 
are effective. There is something deliberatively problematic about not resolving to do the 
exercises if he was really concerned to alleviate his back pain—problematic, at least, unless he 
preferred to be in pain so that he can kvetch about it to everyone who will listen.148 
The normativity of principles like these has been vigorously challenged.149 For my 
purposes here, these principles need only be normative in an internal, quasi-psychological sense: 
one conforms to them on pain of feeling150 that one has foreseeably undermined one’s own ends 
under conditions of sufficient relevant information. This feeling conforms to considerations of 
rational coherence. This is because the fact of having foreseeably undermined oneself is a 
straightforward consequence of faulty instrumental reasoning. The feeling, in turn, must track 
this fact given enough relevant information, since the possibility that it does not is precluded as a 
needlessly uncharitable interpretation of the agent. For instance, suppose that I lose a number of 
 
148 Fortunately, he resolved this incoherence in favor of resuming his stretching routine. 
149 See Raz 2005, Schroeder 2009, and p. 30n for my view on their criticisms. 
150 By ‘feeling’, I mean an attitude closely related to regret conceived as a past-oriented volition. This feeling 
is regret when the agent realizes that she has irrevocably undermined a controlling internal reason. 
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journals, sketchbooks, athletic trophies, and other mementos of childhood in a housefire that my 
neglect foreseeably permits to happen. Perhaps I repeatedly put off repairing the faulty wiring. 
After completely accounting for everything lost, I discover that instead of the distress I expected, I 
feel profound relief—released, perhaps, from the burdens of childhood dreams and parental 
expectations. Perhaps I do not find that I undermined myself because my feeling does not track 
fact, even given enough relevant information. The alternative interpretation, which seems far 
more apt, is that my unexpected feeling is entirely veridical: it turns out that I did not value what 
I lost nearly as much as I had thought—that preserving it was not, in fact, a controlling reason for 
me.151 
Regret Prompts Repair and Repair Prompts Rescission 
The trustee’s volitional reason compels him to experience regret in that he must, on pain 
of rational incoherence, will that he had seen to it that v. This is an unfortunate situation, seeing 
that changing the past is clearly impossible. Yet his situation is not hopeless, as on the encratic 
principle, the requirement he must satisfy has wide scope: he ought either to have seen to it that 
v, or to no longer have a controlling volitional reason to have seen to it that v. Since he cannot 
now have seen to it that v, his remaining option is to remove his controlling volitional reason. 
Can the trustee somehow reduce the weight of his volitional reason so that it is no longer 
controlling? This is sometimes possible for garden-variety internal reasons arising from desires: 
by reducing the strength of the desire for a gin and tonic, one might reduce the weight of the 
resulting internal reason to mix and drink one. One might, for instance, try to conjure disgust by 
 
151 Perhaps some agents are so incoherent that no such charitable interpretation is available. But the same 
extreme incoherence would make it hard to impute ends to such agents in the first place. 
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recalling the occasions where imbibing made one feel terribly ill. Can one likewise reduce the 
weight of internal reasons arising from volitional empathy? Conceivably, certain people might 
remind themselves of their highly problematic beliefs about who is a fully-fledged agent, and who 
is more like a child or even a non-human animal. In this way, they might come to perceive 
someone’s volitions as somehow defective, inferior, or illusory compared with the volitions of a 
normal agent. I am reminded of Ralph Fiennes’s character of SS Commandant Amon Göth from 
Schindler’s List, who tells a terrified Jewish girl with whom he is inconveniently infatuated, “I 
realize that you are not a person in the strictest sense of the word….” 
Setting aside that disturbing possibility, the trustee’s only escape from regret is to induce 
the trustor to rescind her volition. Insofar as he values his relationship with her, he would find 
prejudicial rescission undesirable, as it would be estranging. But even if prejudicial rescission were 
acceptable to him, it is the trustor’s alone to grant. By rebuking him, she chooses not to grant it, 
so any attempt to induce her to grant it anyway is likely to fail.152 
The option left open to the trustee, then, is to obtain the trustor’s non-prejudicial 
rescission. Recall that prejudicial rescission is prejudicial because it results from the trustor 
ceasing to believe that the trustee is trustworthy. But rescission can be motivated—and, indeed, is 
 
152 This is not to say that the trustor’s prejudicial rescission is impossible for the trustee to obtain on his own 
initiative. Conceivably, the trustee might convincingly represent himself as incorrigible, though this would 
likely be false, seeing that if he were really incorrigible, he would be insensible to the trustor’s volition, not 
taking it as an internal reason at all, and not feeling any rational pressure in the first place to have the 
volition rescinded. Alternatively, the trustee might do the trustor a valuable favor that, though important, 
does not restore the trustor’s opinion of his trustworthiness. In a fictional example from Pulp Fiction. Bruce 
Willis’s character Butch, a boxer, is paid by Ving Rhames’s character, the gang boss Marsellus, to lose in the 
fifth round of an upcoming match. Instead, Butch wins the fight, having used Marsellus’s money to bet on 
himself. Marsellus is outraged and resolves to have Butch killed. Eventually, Butch rescues Marsellus from, 
shall we say, an extremely hazardous situation that they find themselves in together, and in return, 
Marsellus allows Butch to leave Los Angeles without being pursued. 
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usually motivated—by non-prejudicial considerations. This is clearly the case with entirely 
intrapersonal volitions where considerations of trustworthiness do not even arise: on my way to 
the refrigerator, I might realize that I’m not as hungry as thought I was, and consequently rescind 
my volition to retrieve a snack. Similar cases occur in trust relationships. For instance, the trustor 
might rescind her volition that the trustee buy paperclips if she finds a dozen boxes of them 
hidden at the back of the office supply cabinet. Observe that her rescission under these 
circumstances has nothing to do with her belief in the trustee’s trustworthiness. It is therefore not 
prejudicial and not tending towards estrangement, as she is not rationally required to modify her 
other trust relationships with him, or to be more reluctant to enter new ones with him in the 
future. 
Thus, we see that in both the intrapersonal case and in the case of trust, rescission occurs 
in accordance with the volitional coherence principle, and by taking advantage of the principle’s 
wide scope. Because of its wide scope, an agent ought either to will the means to her end, or to 
cease to will the end. In my case, since I no longer have the volition to eat a snack, I no longer 
ought to have the volition to retrieve one from the refrigerator. In the case of the trustor seeking 
paperclips, since she no longer wills that she remedy the paperclip shortage, she no longer ought 
to will that the trustee purchase paperclips from the office supply store.153 
We see, then, that the rational coherence principle allows the trustor to rescind a volition 
that is a means to an end that she also wills, provided that she rescinds that further volition as 
well. This is relevant to seeing how a trustee might get a trustor to rescind her volition if her 
 
153 The placement of ought is significant: while I no longer ought, and the trustor no longer ought, it does 
not follow that I ought not, or that the trustor ought not. In short, the volitional coherence principle no 
longer requires the trustor and me to retain our volitions, though it permits us to retain them. 
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volition is a means to a further end that she wills. Is it? I contend that it is, and even that it must 
be. This is because trust involves reliance, and even without performing a conceptual analysis, it 
seems fair to say that all reliance, including the reliance of trust, is always reliance to some further 
end: I rely on you to keep my secret, the office manager relies on the intern to purchase 
paperclips, and so forth. Even reliance on objects is reliance to a further end: boxers rely on gloves 
to protect their hands,154 New Yorkers rely on the subway to get to work, and I rely this computer 
to save this chapter instead of letting it disappear unsaved into the ether. We do sometimes say 
that we rely on people or on things without further specifying, but it seems clear that in those 
cases, it is either obvious from context what we rely on them for, or we mean that we rely on them 
for various and sundry things. 
We can now begin to see how regret prompts the trustee to repair the harm to the trustor 
caused by his betrayal. As we have seen already, given the encratic principle’s wide scope, the 
trustee can still obey the requirement imposed by his volitional reason by inducing the trustor to 
rescind her reliance volition. Being a reliance volition, it is a means to some further end that she 
also wills. By the volitional coherence principle, she is constrained to will the means to that end 
unless she ceases to will the end. Thus, we see that the trustee can facilitate the trustor to rescind 
her reliance volition by getting her to rescind her own further volition. This may appear to create 
a regress, but it needn’t, provided that the trustor rescinds her further volition because it is 
discharged—because she gets what she wills—and not because she rescinds some still further 
volition. 
 
154 Not, apparently, to cushion their blows. 
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I will not linger on this point, but I take it that a volition is necessarily rescinded when it is 
satisfied. If it is my will to sit down and I sit down, I may then have the volition to remain seated, 
and I may esteem the volition that brought about my seatedness as effective at resting my weary 
legs. But that volition is one I no longer have. This seems to be because volition, as mentioned 
earlier, is a conative attitude—an attitude of trying. Trying, in turn, seems to presuppose that the 
object tried for has not yet been attained. 
VI. Repair Prompts Rescission 
Consider the following case of betrayal. The trustee borrows the trustor’s expensive 
camera for a photography project. While walking down the street, he runs into an acquaintance 
who marvels at the extravagant purchase he appears to have made. Relishing the mistake, the 
trustee decides to swing the camera around nonchalantly by its wrist strap, as if he were so 
wealthy that the cost of replacement was of no consequence to him. “What, this old thing?” he 
says, as he hurls the heavy gadget around by a flimsy piece of leather clearly not up to the task, 
even as it occurs to him that the trustor would have never lent him the camera had she known 
that he would do this. The strap breaks, flinging the camera into the street, shattering the 
expensive removeable lens and splintering the camera into pieces, which are promptly pulverized 
under the wheels of a train of school busses returning from a field trip. 
Perhaps the trustor regrets his betrayal, or perhaps not at first, not until the trustor 
rebukes him. This rebuke, manifesting her reliance volition—now her volitional blame—gives 
him a controlling volitional reason to have a past-oriented volition with an impossible object—to 
have regret. He cannot obey the requirement in the usual way, by satisfying the volition, namely, 
to have taken care of the camera. What he can do is replace the camera. What replacing it 
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accomplishes is to satisfy the trustor’s further volition, to which her reliance volition was a means. 
This further volition is to have the use of the camera once the trustee was done with it.155 By 
replacing the camera, the trustee satisfies this further volition in an alternative way, by means 
other than having taken care of the camera. In this way, he induces the trustor to rescind her 
reliance volition—to let go of her volitional blame—releasing him from the requirement of 
experiencing regret, and extinguishing his duty to have taken care of the camera. 
We can more completely appreciate the way the trustor is induced to rescind her volition 
by considering both her reason for rescinding and the obstacles to rescission. Regarding her 
reason for rescinding, recall that regret is unpleasant because it is a volition that cannot be 
satisfied—a conative attitude towards what cannot be attained. The trustor’s enduring reliance 
volition, now her volitional blame after discovering the trustee’s betrayal, is unpleasant for the 
same reason: as it is now impossible for the trustor to have seen to what he didn’t, it is likewise 
now impossible for the trustor to have seen to it that the trustee have seen to what he didn’t. To 
the extent that volitional blame is blame, this is precisely what we would expect. Blame is 
unpleasant. It takes a toll. And not on the blamed alone, but on the agent blaming. Such is reason 
enough not to blame, other things being equal. 
Unfortunately for the trustor, other things are not equal. While she can rescind her 
volitional blame, she is constrained in how she can do so, and once again, on pain of rational 
incoherence. By the volitional coherence principle, volitional blame is required by the further end 
of her reliance. After all, having seen to it that the trustee saw to it that her camera was taken care 
 
155 Multiple further volitions are possible. For instance, you might also have the volition to continue to have 
an asset in exchange for the camera’s considerable cost of purchase. 
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of, is still timelessly a means, albeit now inaccessible, to her further end of having the use of the 
camera once the trustee was done with it.  
With respect to the constraints of rational coherence, the trustor benefits from the same 
wide scope as the trustee: she can satisfy the requirement of the volitional coherence principle 
either by having volitional blame, or by rescinding the further volition to which her volitional 
blame is a means. Now, rescinding the further volition may be very difficult, since she would have 
to make her peace with not getting the object of this further volition. She would have to make her 
peace with not having the use of her expensive camera. Reconciling herself to this may, in turn, 
require that she rescind still further volitions, such as embarking on her own photography project 
after the camera was to be returned. Alternatively, she might reconfigure her volitions in other 
ways, such as by rescinding her volition to take a long-anticipated vacation so that she can afford 
to replace the camera. Such are the harms that, in rescinding her volition without the trustee’s 
repair, the trustor must reconcile herself to suffering. Such are the harms that the trustee repairs 
when he perfectly navigates the requirements of rational coherence imposed by regret. And such 
are the harms the trustor compels the trustee to repair by inducing regret with a rebuke.  
In the case of the camera, the harm of betrayal can be completely repaired. But sometimes 
this is not possible. A broken camera can be replaced, though even something like a camera can 
have irreplaceable properties like sentimental value. What of something less concrete, like the 
secret of a surprise party? What it if wasn’t a camera destroyed or a secret disclosed, but the 
trustor’s child killed in a car accident, the trustee having been provoked into a street race by the 
sneering driver of a flame-decaled Volkswagen Beetle? In the case of the camera with sentimental 
value, the harm can still be substantially mitigated, insofar the trustor’s reliance is a means to 
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further ends that don’t involve the camera’s sentimental value. If the trustee replaces the camera 
with an identical one, the trustor can still, for instance, embark on the photography project she 
was planning. In this way, even though the trustee can only mitigate the harm of betrayal, he does 
make it easier for the trustee to reconfigure her volitions to allow her to rescind her volition of 
reliance. As for the trustee who discloses the secret of the surprise party, he might make the 
necessary arrangements to reschedule it so that it’s still a surprise. Alternatively, he might lavish 
his time and resources on the now-expected party so that, surprise or not, it will still be an event 
to remember for the person to be celebrated, thereby accomplishing a still further end of the 
trustor’s—an end to which preserving the surprise was but a means. 
The wide scope of the volitional coherence principle is almost certainly of no use in 
determining how to repair harms like having killed the trustor’s child. The principle can, however, 
contribute to explaining why this harm is likely irreparable. The trustor willed that the trustee 
keep her child safe because she valued her child primarily for himself, and not as a means to 
further ends. Consequently, the trustor has no further end the trustee might satisfy to make it 
easier for her to rescind her reliance volition. 
VII. Conclusion 
Using the resources of my accounts of trust and regret, I have sought to show what a 
fiduciary rebuke does and why it is reasonable. What it does is enforce a trustor’s claim against 
the trustee who betrays her by compelling him, on pain of rational incoherence, to repair both the 
harm he caused her ends, and the harm he caused their relationship. Both effects are promoted by 
prompting the trustee’s good will, just as a demand does. Prior to betrayal, good will results in the 
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volition to keep trust. After betrayal, it results in the same volition, namely, to have kept trust—a 
volition I identified as a case of regret.  
The trustee’s regret reflects a rational requirement upon the trustee that he repair the 
harm his betrayal caused to the trustor’s further ends. This requirement is nothing more and 
nothing less than the trustee’s original duty to keep the trustor’s trust. Owing to the wide scope of 
this requirement, the duty can be discharged either by keeping the trustor’s trust or by inducing 
the trustor to rescind her volition. Once betrayal has occurred, only the latter option is available. 
We might find in this situation the beginnings of a duty of repair, seeing that the trustee can 
induce the trustor to rescind her volition only by repairing the harm to her further ends caused by 
his betrayal. Often, however, this duty is one the trustee cannot completely discharge. Since the 
trustor’s volition is the ground of the trustee’s duty, it remains in trustor’s power to rescind the 
ground and cancel the duty even though the harm she suffered has not been fully repaired. 
Considerations of rational coherence can make this difficult for her, however, since she would 
need to reconcile herself to reconfiguring her volitions to account for what is no longer possible, 
whether that entails exerting herself to repair the harm that the trustee could not, or abandoning 
the ends placed beyond her reach by the trustee’s betrayal. 
But even a trustee incapable of repairing the harm to the trustor’s ends can repair the 
harm to her belief that he is trustworthy. For regret itself, however effective or impotent, shores 
up this belief, since regret is a consequence, and therefore evidence, of the trustee’s good will. By 
shoring up this belief, the trustee removes a cause for the trustor to rescind her reliance with 
prejudice: that is, to rescind it both in this case and in all other cases where she relies on the 
trustee for anything relevantly similar. And by removing this cause, the trustee removes a cause 
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for the estrangement that would follow. This cannot guarantee that the relationship between the 
trustor and the trustee will be undamaged, or even that it will endure it all. For harm itself is a 
cause for estrangement, over and above the trustor’s doubts about whether the trustee bears her 
enough good will to be trustworthy.  
These, then, are the ways that fiduciary rebukes can allow a trustor to avoid writing off 
both the trustee himself and the harm he caused. I submit that the latter, on its face, is a 
reasonable goal. The former, in turn, is reasonable to the extent that the trustor still values her 
relationship with the trustee in light of the harm he cannot repair. Where she no longer values 
this relationship, and where he is incapable of further repair, rebukes serve to condemn a him by 
his own lights—with his own reasons—to a duty he cannot discharge, to a regret he cannot 
escape. I would not presume to call this reasonable. 
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